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ABSTRACT 
 
Benjamin Mangrum:  Land of Tomorrow: The Postwar Novel and the Rise of the New 
Conservative Movement 
(Under the direction of John McGowan) 
 
This dissertation charts a cultural history of the decline of the New Deal regulatory state 
and the rise of American income inequality through novels published between 1945 and 1968. 
While scholars such as Thomas Piketty, Paul Pierson, and Jacob Hacker have shown that 
political mechanisms during the 1970s eroded regulations on the capitalist economy, I argue that 
these shifts in policy developed from intellectual crises facing the American welfare state during 
the immediate postwar decades. I chart this political history through novels by Norman Mailer, 
Vladimir Nabokov, Ralph Ellison, Patricia Highsmith, and Walker Percy, who helped to define 
public animus toward the New Deal and gave intellectual legitimacy to an emerging political 
culture opposed to a progressive political agenda. These four authors are particularly relevant 
because they engage intellectual movements and historical phenomena that, I argue, contributed 
to the unraveling of New Deal reform:  namely, the circulation of existentialist notions of 
authenticity and individual choice, which opposed expansive federal power; the association of 
progressive politics with totalitarianism; a growing demand among intellectuals for arenas of 
civil society autonomous from a managerial state; and the rise of personal psychology, rather 
than sociology, as an explanatory template for everyday life. By augmenting the public purchase 
of these trends, each author helped to shape a postwar culture that hastened the political death of 
the New Deal. 
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INTRODUCTION:  THE RISE AND TRANSFORMATION OF NEW DEAL REFORM 
In Norman Mailer’s recollection of the 1967 march on the Pentagon, he describes the 
United States as a land pregnant with an uncertain future. “America,” he muses in his novel The 
Armies of the Night (1968), “once a beauty of magnificence unparalleled, now a beauty with a 
leprous skin. She is heavy with child—no one knows if legitimate—and languishes in a dungeon 
whose walls are never seen.” The United States is on the cusp of giving birth, but “to what?” 
Mailer asks, “the most fearsome totalitarianism the world has ever known? or can she, poor 
giant, tormented lovely girl, deliver a babe of a new world brave and tender, artful and wild?”1 
For Mailer, his moment in American politics is latent with ominous possibilities. The Janus-
faced presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, as Mailer presents it, has been delegitimized because its 
so-called Great Society of domestic policies has as its underbelly the continued escalation of the 
war in Vietnam. The president’s support for American intervention faced increasing opposition 
among certain segments of his Democratic base, and a rigorous revolt was organized by the New 
Left, which Mailer had helped to shape as an early editor of Dissent magazine in the mid-1950s. 
A variety of anti-war movements—student groups at Berkeley, intellectuals in New York and the 
East Coast, as well as civil rights activists in the South—had begun to organize their objections. 
The march on the Pentagon was one of the first expressions of this consolidated movement, 
mobilizing “somewhere between 75,000 and 90,000 people” at the Lincoln Memorial before the 
demonstrators proceeded to the headquarters of the Department of Defense (245). Mailer later 
                                                
1 Norman Mailer, The Armies of the Night: History as a Novel, the Novel as History 
(New York: Plume, [1968] 1998), 288. Hereafter cited parenthetically. 
  2 
felt ambivalent about the effects of this organized act of protest, but in Armies of the Night he 
nonetheless registers his hope that the America of tomorrow might be more just through its 
rejection of Johnson’s militaristic interventionism. 
In March of 1968, five months after the march on the Pentagon, U.S. Army soldiers 
killed as many as five hundred unarmed civilians in South Vietnam, an event the American 
media dubbed the My Lai Massacre after a small hamlet in the nearby Son My village. Reports 
of the massacre soured American public opinion of the war and deepened LBJ’s already 
fracturing Democratic base of support.2 On March 31 after a poor showing in a Democratic 
primary, Johnson addressed the nation announcing his decision not to seek reelection, thus 
creating an electoral lacuna that competing factions of his Party tried to fill during the 1968 
Democratic National Convention.3 Held in Chicago during August of that year, the Convention 
was plagued by further violence as the same group who organized the Pentagon demonstrations 
mobilized protests throughout the city. The protests incited what Max Frankel says could “only 
be called a police riot.”4 Broadcast on national television were scenes of “indiscriminate police 
assaults, with billyclubs and gas and Mace, against crowds of protestors and even onlookers, 
                                                
2 See Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York: Harper-Perennial, 
1991), 244. 
 
3 The deep ambivalence of the public regarding the Vietnam War was made more 
complicated when Russian forces invaded Czechoslovakia just before the Democratic 
Convention. The effects of this invasion, as John Schultz explains, was to give a momentary 
boost to public support for the war of “containment” in Vietnam, thus ensuring “the nomination 
of Humphrey [rather than the progressive Eugene McCarthy] and thereby have either Humphrey 
or Nixon as President of the United States.” Schultz speculates that the timing of the Russian 
invasion was intentional, for “there is possibly nothing the Russian leaders fear more than a 
progressive United States.” See John Schultz, No One Was Killed: The Democratic National 
Convention, August 1968 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1969] 2009), 69. 
 
4 Max Frankel, “U.S. Study Scores Chicago Violence as ‘A Police Riot,’” New York 
Times (2 December 1968), page 1, column 1. 
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against apparently stray and innocent citizens in the streets and even against seriously injured 
victims of the melees.”5 The violence surrounding the protests at the Convention further 
unraveled the coalition of Democratic support and, as John Schultz recounts, “because of what 
was now happening in Chicago” Richard Nixon “would be elected President in November.”6 The 
rising tide of anti-war protest merged with the violence at the Convention, and the Democrats 
consequently lost their legitimacy as the Party of civil rights and progressive equality.7 
Mailer’s Armies of the Night coalesced around this unraveling consensus for the 
Democratic Party. Mailer looked to the march on the Pentagon as an opportunity for national 
choice—a moment when the country will either emerge as force of global oppression or become 
a “brave and tender” leader. Mailer hoped that Armies of the Night, as well as his own account of 
the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, Miami and the Siege of Chicago (1968), 
would influence American liberals much like his essays “Superman Comes to the Supermarket” 
and “In the Red Light” had influenced the 1960 and 1964 elections. These essays had provided a 
cultural rationale in support of the presidential campaigns of John F. Kennedy and helped to 
motivate an uneasy left-liberal coalition to back the Democratic Party.8 As Michael Szalay 
                                                
5 Ibid., page 39, column 1. 
 
6 Schultz, No One Was Killed, 257. 
 
7 See Robert D. Schulzinger, “Richard Nixon, Congress, and the War in Vietnam, 1969-
1974,” in Vietnam and the American Political Tradition: The Politics of Dissent (ed. Randall B. 
Woods; New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2003), 282-300. For a comprehensive study of 
the escalation of the war in Vietnam and its effects upon the politics of the 1960s and beyond, 
see Melvin Small, At the Water’s Edge: American Politics and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan 
R. Dee, 2005). 
 
8 For a record of this influence, see Michael Lennon, Norman Mailer: A Double Life 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), 408. By “left-liberal,” I mean a prominent segment of 
Kennedy’s voting bloc who were suspicious of state capitalism but nonetheless would come to 
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argues, Mailer’s work during the 1960s sought to “produce new kinds of political meaning and 
embodied experience,” directing those innovations toward a new “branding” of the Democratic 
Party in progressive terms.9 In “Superman Comes to the Supermarket,” for example, Mailer 
presents Kennedy as a suave hipster-cum-bullfighter able to keep at bay the danger facing an 
America “drifting into a profound decline.” Kennedy, according to Mailer’s presentation, 
transcends the muck of mainstream political life: “his good, sound, conventional, liberal record 
has a patina of that other life, the second American life, the long electric night with the fires of 
neon leading down the highway to the murmur of jazz.”10 Enveloping Kennedy in a hip cultural 
cloth, Mailer presents the Democratic candidate as an embodiment of the hopes of American 
progressives, particularly insofar as he offers a style of politics alternative to the vanilla 
Eisenhower. As Szalay suggests, this depiction is part of wider white fantasies about blackness 
during the era.11 With the aura of jazz surrounding him, Kennedy would be seen as uniquely 
positioned to understand the plight of African Americans, while at the same time Mailer also 
presented the Democratic nominee as part of a political counterculture, somehow foreign to the 
“bosses” of the Party.12 In short, Kennedy’s campaign in 1960 benefited from a cultural 
branding, a legitimation of his presidency through the work of critics, artists, and writers. 
                                                                                                                                                       
support the Democratic Party. Kennedy’s ambivalence toward civil rights was cloaked in an 
aesthetic, which itself had a racially complicated history.  
 
9 Michael Szalay, Hip Figures: A Literary History of the Democratic Party (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2012), 31. 
 
10 Norman Mailer, “Superman Comes to the Supermarket,” Esquire (November 1960). 
Rpt. in The Presidential Papers (New York: Berkeley Medallion Books, 1963), 44. 
 
11 Szalay, Hip Figures, 107-08. 
 
12 Mailer, “Superman Comes to the Supermarket,” 43. 
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Mailer again sought to frame the political debates in 1967-1968 by calling the 
Democratic Party to return to its progressive roots. Rather than providing a cultural rationale, 
however, Armies of the Night only highlighted the fissures among the Democrats, seemingly 
exacerbating the split between supporters of Hubert Humphrey, George McGovern, and Eugene 
McCarthy. Rather than providing a shared vision for the uneasy liberals of the moment—one 
centering on civil rights, an opposition to militaristic “containment” foreign policy, and domestic 
support for labor unions—Mailer’s novels from the late 1960s signal the death knell of the 
Democratic political coalition underwriting the postwar New Deal. The Party had sustained the 
longest running electoral consensus in American history, enjoying control of both houses of 
Congress from 1932 to 1980 (except small Republican majorities in 1946 and 1952). The crown 
of that coalition was seven out of nine presidential victories. Yet, as Mailer presents it, the 
rebirth of the Democratic Party proved abortive in the late 1960s:  as he worried, a “fearsome 
babe” comes to life instead of an “artful and wild” America (Armies 288). The coalition shatters, 
and “Tricky Dick” takes the White House instead of a progressive Democrat.13 
Mailer thus contributes to what would later become the standard narrative about postwar 
liberalism:  Johnson’s stance on Vietnam during 1967-1968 fractured a Democratic Party already 
reeling from the loss of its Southern base after the Party’s controversial stance on civil rights 
during 1964-1965. This convergence of challenges to the Party’s political consensus, so the story 
goes, meant that Humphrey not only lost the presidency to the “resolutely phony” Richard Nixon 
but also fumbled the progressive possibilities of the thirty-six-year-old New Deal.14 The year 
1968 consequently marks the beginning of what Michael Schaller and George Rising call “the 
                                                
13 Norman Mailer, Miami and the Siege of Chicago: An Informal History of the 
Republican and Democratic Conventions of 1968 (New York:  New York Review Books, 2008).  
 
14 Qtd. in Lennon, Norman Mailer: A Double Life, 405. 
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Republican ascendancy,” a return to the prewar dominance of conservative Republican politics, 
which would culminate in the electoral triumphs of Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.15 Prior to this 
ascendancy, New Deal Democrats had formed a heterogeneous coalition of interests, including 
labor unions, racial and religious minorities, white Southerners, urban political bosses, 
intellectuals, and a collection of farm groups. Yet this coalition—and the New Deal welfare state 
that it had constructed—supposedly began to fragment in the mid-1960s as the contradictions 
and tensions of that disparate Democratic bloc could no longer sustain the illusion of political 
consensus.  
This dissertation challenges that mapping of American political history by charting the 
unraveling legitimacy of New Deal reform politics during the immediate postwar years. Long 
before the tensions regarding the civil rights movement and U.S. campaigns in Southeast Asia 
fractured the Democratic coalition, I argue that a set of cultural and intellectual crises beset the 
American welfare state of the 1940s and 1950s. These challenges to the intellectual authority of 
the New Deal had mitigated, revised, and even undermined key features of Roosevelt’s early 
reform agenda, which was initially devised to usher the nation out of the Great Depression. The 
Second World War and a wave of intellectual movements, cultural voices, and public anxieties 
contributed to the eroding grounds for New Deal progressive politics during the postwar decades. 
I chart this political history through novels by Vladimir Nabokov, Ralph Ellison, Patricia 
Highsmith, and Walker Percy, who helped to define public animus toward the New Deal 
managerial state while at the same time circulating sensibilities about the self and the state that 
would help to reshape American political culture. These four authors are particularly relevant 
because they engage the intellectual movements and historical phenomena that, I argue, 
                                                
15 Michael Schaller and George Rising, The Republican Ascendancy: American Politics, 
1968-2001 (Wheeling, Ill.:  Harlan Davidson, 2002). 
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contributed to the unraveling of New Deal reform—namely, the translation of European 
existentialist notions of authenticity and individual choice into an American idiom, an 
association of progressive politics with totalitarianism, a growing demand for arenas of civil 
society autonomous from a managerial state, and the rise of personal psychology as an 
explanatory template for everyday life. The circulation of these ideas during the 1940s and 
1950s, I argue, helped to shape an American political culture no longer amenable to an 
interventionist state or a reform agenda.  
While only one feature of American culture, the novels of the postwar years occupied an 
important niche in the intellectual life of the nation. For one, a burgeoning publishing industry 
disseminated fiction on an unprecedented scale, outpacing the growth of the American 
population every year since the beginning of the postwar era.16 While selling books became 
increasingly lucrative for publishers, literacy and public reading also grew exponentially during 
the 1950s.17 Furthermore, as James F. English notes, the marked growth in the publishing 
industry during the 1950s corresponds to the expanding economic weight of reading and the 
proliferation of markers of prestige.18 In short, what may broadly be called “book culture” 
                                                
16 James F. English, The Economy of Prestige: Prizes, Awards, and the Circulation of 
Cultural Value (Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press, 2005), 19.  For example, a 1957 
report in Publishers Week claims, “The increase in trade book sales during 1956 will top the 7 
per cent increase which 1955 registered over 1954.” In contrast to the relatively small size of the 
book trade before WWII, the 1950s enjoyed successive years of significant growth in the 
economic value of the publishing industry. See “Highlights of 1956 News and Trends in the U.S. 
Book Industry,” Publishers Weekly (21 January 1957), 47.  
  
17 See Carl F. Kaestle, Helen Damon-Moore, Lawrence C. Stedman, Katherine Tinsley, 
and William Vance Trollinger, Jr. Literacy in the United States: Readers and Reading Since 
1880 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 150-54. This study also notes the increase in 
library borrowing during the 1950s, which suggests that book reading more generally—not just 
the publishing industry—grew throughout the 1950s (165). 
 
18 English, The Economy of Prestige, 19-20. 
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became an increasingly prominent feature of American life in the postwar era, and as reading 
seemed to garner a new scale of importance the markers of cultural legitimacy likewise began to 
multiply. In fact, as Evan Brier has shown, the expanding significance of novels during the 
postwar era were in large part a result of a series of successful marketing strategies by the book 
trade, which often presented novels as embattled holdouts against ostensibly vulgar mass 
culture.19 While novelists looked to new media to reimagine the form of their fiction, shrewd 
editors and a burgeoning mass publishing industry found the novel-as-cultural-bastion to be a 
widely marketable branding of the genre.20 The novel, in other words, accumulated 
unprecedented leverage in determining which structures of thought and feeling—which 
sensibilities about the self and its status in collective space—would attain wider public 
legitimacy. 
Vladimir Nabokov, Ralph Ellison, Patricia Highsmith, and Walker Percy helped to 
imagine what the critic Kenneth Burke describes as cultural “equipment” for navigating specific 
currents of American culture in ways that, as I show, helped to give articulate form to public 
animus regarding the American welfare state.21 Yet their contributions to the intellectual and 
cultural debates that preoccupied postwar life were often only indirectly political. That is to say, 
unlike Norman Mailer, Allen Ginsberg, or even Robert Penn Warren, who were often wont to 
provide direct commentary on the institutions and programs of the New Deal, the four authors 
                                                
19 Evan Brier, A Novel Marketplace: Mass Culture, the Book Trade, and Postwar 
American Fiction (Philadelphia, P.A.:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009). 
 
20 On the relation between the form of the novel and the new media of the postwar era, 
see Florence Dore, “The New Criticism and the Nashville Sound: William Faulkner’s The Town 
and Rock and Roll,” Contemporary Literature 55.1 (Spring 2014): 32-57. 
 
21 See Kenneth Burke, “Literature as Equipment for Living,” in The Philosophy of 
Literary Form (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 293-304. 
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considered in this study most often engaged the substantive intellectual underpinnings of 
American political culture: What is the relationship between the self and society’s institutions? 
How does one determine the authenticity of action, or the attempts of the self to navigate public 
space? And what is the source of the malaise that is seemingly so pervasive throughout postwar 
society? Their answers to these social concerns cut to the foundations of the progressive 
sensibilities and ad hoc assemblage of ideas that comprised the New Deal reform agenda.  
 
A Short History of New Deal Reform 
To be sure, the shifts that I trace in American intellectual life were only part of a 
sequence of crises facing the New Deal welfare state. As Alan Brinkley explains, the postwar 
New Deal had already begun to depart in significant ways from the reform agenda established in 
the early years of Roosevelt’s presidency (1933-1938). This period, often described as the 
“active phase” of the New Deal, was a moment in American intellectual and political life “awash 
in ideas,” some of which “were rooted in the progressive philosophies of the first decades of the 
twentieth century, others in the experience of World War I, still others in some of the generally 
unsuccessful reform initiatives of the 1920s.”22 Yet an economic recession during 1937-1938, the 
growing influence of Keynesian redistributive policy upon Roosevelt’s advisors, and the 
                                                
22 Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New 
York: Knopf, 1995), 4-5. Many scholars often make distinctions within this “active phase,” 
describing Roosevelt’s administration during the Seventy-third Congress (1933-1935) the “first” 
New Deal. It was comprised of fifteen acts passed by Congress and signed by the President, 
many of which were soon hotly contested. I am principally concerned with the entire active or 
reform phase of the New Deal era, however, because the contested legacy of legislation passed 
during 1936-1938 would also prove to be a significant marker of the changing sensibilities of the 
postwar era. 
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exigencies of WWII interrupted the activist reform agenda of the New Deal.23 The legacy of that 
active phase—and the 1920s and 1930s Progressive Era more broadly—became increasingly 
suspect during the postwar years, particularly as intellectuals reflected upon the totalitarian 
regimes of WWII and identified their rise to power with the socialist welfare states of Europe. 
This convergence of historical features surface in Nabokov’s and Percy’s anxieties about the 
state, Highsmith’s repudiation of a narrative world governed by structural, socio-economic, and 
environmental conditions, and Ellison’s construal of the self as the only authentic locus for 
choice and political action in the postwar moment. The concerns and ideas of these novelists 
have precursors, of course, but the social demands and felt crises of their moment color the 
cultural equipment they offer for dealing with postwar American life.   
The domestic anxieties that harried progressive Democrats during the postwar moment 
arose principally as reactions to the legacy of the reform agenda fashioned during the active 
phase of the New Deal. The fluidity of policies, programs, and ideas during this period attests to 
the fact that there was no single political philosophy or delineated theory of liberalism governing 
Roosevelt’s first two terms. Rather, the New Deal was an assemblage of ideas that developed in 
response to a unique crisis in American history—the Great Depression. The majority of 
Roosevelt’s advisors explained this crisis as a consequence of concentrated economic power and 
a speculative financial sector. The New Deal reform agenda thus sought to control overweening 
monopolies, strengthen organized labor, and regulate the economic vicissitudes produced by 
                                                
23 See Theodore Rosenof, Patterns of Political Economy in America: The Failure to 
Develop a Democratic Left Synthesis, 1933-1950 (New York: Garland, 1983); Dean L. May, 
From New Deal to New Economics: The American Liberal Response to the Recession of 1937 
(New York: Garland, 1981); and Richard P. Adelstein, “ ‘The Nation as an Economic Unit’: 
Keynes, Roosevelt, and the Managerial Idea,” Journal of American History 78 (1991), 160-87. 
  11 
American banks and industries.24 While few in the administration were categorically opposed to 
capitalism, there was nonetheless a diversity of competing ideas about how to structure the 
national economy.25 Some in the administration looked to centralized economic planning, while 
others pushed for policies and legislation that simply opposed monopolies. As Louis Menand 
puts it, “there was no master plan, no guiding philosophy, for the reforms that Roosevelt 
oversaw. Some were his idea; some were Congress’s; some were left over from the Hoover 
Administration. Roosevelt was improvising.”26 The reform phase of the New Deal thus featured 
a “chaos of experimentation,” as Richard Hofstadter put it in 1955, in order to mitigate the 
economic uncertainties and wage inequalities produced by industrial capitalism.27  
From regulatory legislation such as the Banking Act of 1933 to compensatory welfare 
programs such as the creation of Social Security in 1935, the early New Deal tried to reform the 
socio-economic structures of American life through the mechanisms of a regulatory state and the 
expansion of activist federal power. The federal programs designed to usher the nation out of the 
Depression mostly involved either regional planning or agricultural reform, such as the 
Tennessee Valley Authority and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (A.A.A.). One of 
the centerpieces of the early New Deal, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (N.I.R.A.), 
authorized the President to regulate industry, mandated a minimum wage, and established the 
                                                
24 Brinkley, The End of Reform, 5. 
 
25 For an anti-capitalist voice in the administration, see Carl Dreher, “The American 
Way: A Voice from the Left,” in The American Way (ed. David Cushman Coyle; New York:  
Harper, 1938), 75-88. 
 
26 Louis Menand, “How the Deal Went Down: Saving Democracy in the Depression,” 
The New Yorker (4 March 2013). 
 
27 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR (New York: Knopf, 
1955), 307. 
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Public Works Administration (PWA), which was led by Harold L. Ickes, a progressive 
Republican who had been a past president of the Chicago NAACP. Significant provisions of 
both the A.A.A. and N.I.R.A were later struck down or hamstrung by the Supreme Court, but 
their initial effects were momentous. These acts were part of the unprecedented (and as yet 
unmatched) first one hundred days of Roosevelt’s administration. The Seventy-third Congress 
and the Executive branch limited deductions for capital depreciation, reorganized tax rates to 
remove the onus from the middle class, and ended the tax-exempt status of corporate dividends. 
During its short life, the PWA—replaced by the Works Progress Administration (WPA) in 
1935—also provided well-paying jobs through public construction projects, such as dams, 
bridges, and hospitals.  
Perhaps most remarkably, Roosevelt’s administration and a New Deal-friendly Congress 
courted labor unions, which formed a central faction of their political coalition. For example, the 
1935 National Labor Relations Act (also known as the Wagner Act) strengthened the collective 
bargaining power of American unions by requiring businesses to bargain with any union 
supported by a majority of its employees. Sensing the favorable winds that this legislation 
signaled, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)—which was open both to communist 
union leaders and African American members—became more aggressive in organizing 
previously non-union workers. During the 1930s and early 1940s, the CIO became one of 
Roosevelt’s largest supporters.28 The reform phase of the New Deal era also featured the Glass-
                                                
28 See Gilbert J. Gall, Pursuing Justice: Lee Pressman, the New Deal, and the CIO 
(Albany, N.Y.:  State University of New York Press, 1999).  I return to the labor movements of 
the 1930s and 1940s in the second chapter, where I discuss Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man and the 
decline of organized progressive politics in postwar America. It is also worth noting that the less 
radical American Federation of Labor (AFL) played a significant part in the labor movement in 
the 1940s, particularly after the CIO broke with the organization in the mid-1930s. See Andrew 
  13 
Steagall Act of 1933, which was a response to what many in the administration felt was the 
direct cause of the Great Depression:  the conflation of commercial and investment banking. A 
central provision of the Glass-Steagall Act established a rigid separation between these two 
forms of banking in an effort to protect citizens from speculative investments. At the same time, 
however, the Seventy-third Congress also authorized the President to promote free trade through 
tariff reductions. The hodgepodge of this active phase of the New Deal, in other words, crossed 
ideological lines for the sake of pragmatic political reform:  aggressive regulation of 
concentrated economic power and a commitment to the rights of laborers to organize was 
matched by a commitment to anti-monopoly free trade.  
The protean and seemingly ad hoc quality of Roosevelt’s politics were later cause for 
suspicion among many postwar Democrats, who themselves fell under the long shadow of the 
ideological conflicts of the early Cold War. As Walter Benn Michaels puts it, “the Cold War may 
be (and often was) described as universalizing, as involving every part of the world and 
potentially every part of the universe.” The conflict between the United States and the Soviet 
Union was dominated by “difference” understood in terms of mutually exclusive ideological 
disagreement.29 According to Michaels’ account, that construal of difference as disagreement 
came to dominate American intellectual life until the late 1980s. Perhaps for this reason, as 
Landon R.Y. Storrs explains, the federal government effectively cannibalized itself for the sake 
of the rigidities of ideological conflict, particularly through the Federal Employee Loyalty 
Program, which screened over five million of its employees from 1947-1956. The effect of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
E. Kersten, Labor’s Home Front: The American Federation of Labor during World War II (New 
York: New York University Press, 2006). 
 
29 Walter Benn Michaels, The Shape of the Signifier: 1967 to the End of History 
(Princeton, N.J.:  Princeton University Press, 2004), 30. 
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program, according to Storrs, was to drive the postwar heirs of New Deal progressivism under 
ground or off the government payrolls. In essence, the ideological conflicts of the 1950s 
suppressed the spectrum of policies and political philosophies that characterized the reform 
phase of the New Deal.30  
Despite Roosevelt’s landside electoral victories in the 1930s, the New Deal reform 
agenda had been under significant pressures before the contentious postwar moment. One of the 
principal sources of these challenges to the New Deal came from the Southern bloc of 
Roosevelt’s coalition. The tensions within Congress regarding the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938 (FLSA) is a telling example of the fact that the reformist impulses of Roosevelt’s 
administration had begun to cut in too many directions. The Act established a forty-four-hour 
workweek, a minimum wage, and prohibited most forms of child labor. It also was particularly 
contentious for Southern Democrats, who began to worry that the federal dollars and 
employment initiatives of FDR’s work programs came at the cost of greater equality for black 
laborers. On the one hand, the Southern Democrats were frequently given concessions during the 
early reform legislation of the New Deal era. Federal laws regulating the wages and working 
conditions of laborers, for example, were often passed with exceptions for farms, whose 
employees in the South were most often black. As a part of these employment efforts to support 
rural farming, Southerners also supported the Coalition’s legislation regarding union activity. 
However, as the National Labor Relations Board enforced the Wagner Act and, later, the FLSA, 
an environment conducive to labor organization slowly began to achieve in the South what 
progressives in Congress failed to do:  a wave of often effective strikes among industrial 
                                                
30 Landon R. Y. Storrs, The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking of the New Deal Left 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2013). I return to Storrs’s argument in the second 
chapter, where I trace the diminishing fortunes of American progressivism during the 1950s.   
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employees, many of whom were African American, began to eke out better working conditions 
for all laborers.31 Thus, after the FLSA was passed, a segment of the New Deal Coalition began 
to work actively to undermine the legal framework of the Wagner Act and inaugurated an era of 
tensions within the Democratic Party that would come to a head in 1948 and again in 1964. After 
1938, though, the Dixiecrats refused to pass any significant reform legislation based upon these 
fears. The result was that, as Ira Katznelson puts it, the Fair Labor Standards Act became “the 
last lawmaking victory of the New Deal’s radical moment.”32  
While the reform agenda of the New Deal was often contradictory and increasingly 
challenged by the members of its own Democratic coalition, the legacy of its active phase faced 
unique pressures following Roosevelt’s death and the end of the Second World War. As I show 
in subsequent chapters, the Democratic coalition associated with the New Deal had by the 1960s 
distanced itself from the earlier regulatory impulses toward concentrated economic power. The 
New Deal of the early 1960s focused instead on civil rights and compensatory welfare programs. 
It was a politics of redistribution, not regulation, such that the structural and pro-union reform 
positions of the early New Deal had either been mitigated or entirely abandoned. Johnson’s “War 
on Poverty” is a telling bellwether of these shifts. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (EOA) 
attempted to eliminate poverty by providing job training as well as loans and grants to small 
businesses through local Community Action Agencies (CAAs). Despite a concern for the 
economically dispossessed, Mical Raz argues that a theory of poverty unique to the postwar 
moment underwrote the EOA:  Johnson’s “War” replaced the reformist New Deal explanation 
for poverty—i.e., as an effect of the structural inequities of concentrated economic power—with 
                                                
31 See J. David Greenstone, Labor in American Politics (New York: Knopf, 1969), 408. 
 
32 Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time (New York: 
Liveright Publishing, 2013), 272. 
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the notion that poverty is the “deprivation” of opportunity.33 This new view is peculiarly 
tautological: the cause of poverty is a lack of opportunity, while the causes of the lack of 
opportunity are the markers of poverty. This circularity is apparent during Johnson’s State of the 
Union address in 1964:  
To help that one-fifth of all American families with income too small to even 
meet their basic needs, our chief weapons in a more pinpointed attack will be 
better schools and better health and better homes and better training and better job 
opportunities to help more Americans, especially young Americans, escape from 
squalor and misery and unemployment rolls, where other citizens help to carry 
them. 
Very often a lack of jobs and money is not the cause of poverty, but the 
symptom. 
The cause may lie deeper in our failure to give our fellow citizens a fair 
chance to develop their own capacities, in a lack of education and training, in a 
lack of medical care and housing, in a lack of decent communities in which to live 
and bring up their children.34 
 
This vision contrasts sharply with Roosevelt’s insistence that the crises of the 1930s derive from 
the power of “organized wealth.” For Roosevelt, at least during his first two terms, concentrated 
economic wealth was to blame not only for the Depression of 1929 but also the recession and 
spike in unemployment during 1937-38.35 The cycle of poverty was a function of structural 
avarice and unchecked industry. Johnson’s commitment to alleviate the nation’s “poverty crisis,” 
in contrast, had already abandoned the regulatory language of the early New Deal in favor of 
“supply” rhetoric. The cycle of poverty is, according to the Johnson administration, a self-
enclosed and self-replicating crisis. Its causes are its effects. 
                                                
33 Mical Raz, What’s Wrong with the Poor?: Psychiatry, Race, and the War on Poverty 
(Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2013), especially pp. 76-111. 
 
34 Qtd. in “Unconditional War on Poverty,” Social Service Review 38.1 (March 1964), 73. 
 
35 Qtd. in Brinkley, The End of Reform, 48. 
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The absence of a regulatory impulse and a nearly exclusive emphasis upon compensatory 
and “opportunity” programs in Johnson’s “War on Poverty” is emblematic of the turn that 
American liberalism takes in the postwar years. Following the planned wartime economy of 
1940-1945—in effect, an interregnum in the conflict between progressives and other “liberal” 
Democrats, where the federal government’s control over the economy reached its historical 
apex—the New Deal coalition drifted toward a form of political economic organization called 
“embedded liberalism,” which refers to a state-sponsored economic and industrial strategy with a 
modest regulatory environment. The form of embedded liberalism dominant in the late 1940s 
and 1950s nurtured—often even planned at a federal level—a web of industrial production and 
global trade. Yet even those forms of central planning were, in effect, a compromise between the 
expansion of a global marketplace and a domestic welfare state.36 As I show in the following 
chapters, the social and political pressures of the postwar era cultivated visions of American 
political (as well a-political and anti-regulatory) life that would slowly erode the economic 
restraints upon capital established during the reform phase of the New Deal era. The embedded 
liberalism of the postwar New Deal provided something like an historical border phase for this 
transformation. Indeed, it is commonplace among scholars to characterize the postwar decades as 
the “apex of American liberalism.”37 After Johnson’s defeat of Barry Goldwater in the 1964 
general election, the distinguished presidential scholar James MacGregor Burns even declared, 
“By every test we have, this is as surely a liberal epoch as the late 19th Century was a 
                                                
36 See Robert Wolfe and Matthew Mendelsohn, “Values and Interests in Attitudes toward 
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conservative one.”38 Despite such sweeping declarations, the New Deal coalition during the 
1960s had in fact drifted away from the progressive experimentation and regulatory 
commitments of the 1930s.  
The struggle to define American liberalism during the postwar era took place on multiple 
fronts. Corporate interests, anti-civil rights Democrats, and anxieties about Soviet communism—
juxtaposed with progressives like Henry Wallace, who had been one of Roosevelt’s most 
prominent advisors and his second Vice President (1941-45)—contributed to the changing shape 
of the postwar Democratic Party. The contribution of this dissertation is to point to certain as-yet 
unrecognized features of this transformation:  a wave of intellectual movements and felt crises 
that, I show, garnered increasing cultural attention during the postwar years. Novelists writing in 
this moment of intellectual flux contributed to a new cultural rhetoric within the contested terrain 
of American public life. In particular, they helped to circulate emerging political sensibilities that 
privileged self-possession, the burden of individual choice, and a form of social thinking that was 
post-welfare, post-institutional, and thus opposed to an activist-managerial state. These political 
sensibilities surfaced in a variety of ways, including among the “new” professional-managerial 
class that, as Stephen Schryer argues, gave up on “building institutions” during the postwar era 
in favor of other forms of professionalism. The non- or post-institutional “fantasies” of this new 
class are not merely economic; rather, they are imbricated with larger intellectual trends and 
growing political opposition toward the expanding bureaucracy of the New Deal.39 In contrast to 
the political discourse of the 1930s—which was formed in the wake of the Great Depression and 
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widespread public animus toward concentrated wealth—a political culture developed during the 
postwar era that would prove decisive against a New Deal reform agenda already forced into 
stasis by an international war, racial politics, and domestic economic pressures. 
 
From the New Deal to a New Conservatism 
When John Steinbeck published The Grapes of Wrath (1939), the American economy 
had finally begun to emerge from the 1937-1938 Recession that stalled Roosevelt’s recovery 
agenda. The Great Depression had by then been elevated to the status of a national myth. 
Steinbeck did not need to remind Americans of the national crisis, which still loomed like an 
ominous penumbra over the late 1930s and its slowly improving economic fortunes. That is to 
say, rather than preaching to the dispossessed choir, The Grapes of Wrath draws on the shared 
experience of the Depression to respond to the economic crisis and political demands of a 
Recession-hardened America. On the one hand, Steinbeck’s novel is critical of the limits of New 
Deal reform—the state’s failures to attain the social and political aspirations that had elevated the 
Democratic Party in 1932-1933. Roosevelt famously expressed such progressive aspirations in 
his address at the 1932 Democratic National Convention, when he warns,  
These unhappy times call for the building of plans that rest upon the forgotten, the 
unorganized but the indispensable units of economic power, for plans […] that 
build from the bottom up and not from the top down, that put their faith once 
more in the forgotten man at the bottom of the economic pyramid.  
 
Roosevelt’s vision of capitalism for the proletariat had coaxed GDP to climb back to its pre-
Depression level by 1939, yet the simultaneous, mercurial rise of unemployment during his 
administration—hovering around 25% in the mid-1930s and still as much as 15% by 1940—
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seemed to be at odds with the New Deal agenda of national restoration dedicated to providing 
economic security for the “Forgotten Man.”40  
This national dearth of jobs and dignity during the 1930s provides the impetus for 
Steinbeck’s novel, which embeds that experience within the seemingly impassible fury of an 
Oklahoma landscape. This coincidence of forces drives the Joad family to California in search of 
security and employment. After several deaths and desertions by family members, the 
beleaguered Joads arrive out West to find an oversupply of labor. Law enforcement officers 
harass the unemployed while large corporate farms collude to choke out smaller farmers and thus 
to ensure a system of cheap labor. The Joads soon discover Weedpatch, a “gov’ment camp” built 
in 1936 for the purpose of providing housing to migrant workers. Built by the Farm Security 
Administration, Weedpatch, as one destitute woman puts it, offers “water right handy” and “no 
cops let to come look in your tent any time they want.”41 However, as the Joads discover, this 
federal haven is an awning with too little cover. While the Joads eventually are given space in 
the government camp, they are consistently beleaguered with economic and political problems. 
Local police officers often try to break into or dissolve the camp, but more importantly the 
federal relief itself seems to be insufficient. As Ma Joad says, the family only eats “fried dough” 
and “Tom had five days’ work” in the one “month we been here” (478). After discovering that 
federal relief is spread thin, the Joads soon search for work elsewhere and become strikebreakers 
at a peach farm. Much like the winds of the Dust Bowl that had swept them toward the promises 
of California, the members of the family are again caught up in the wider forces of a conflict 
between labor unions and corporate farms. A family friend, Jim Casy, becomes a casualty of this 
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conflict, and Tom Joad murders the man responsible for his friend’s death. In turn, Tom becomes 
a fugitive in the land of opportunity; he is yet another “vagrant” dispossessed from within the life 
of the nation (456).  
Despite Steinbeck’s reservations regarding the deficiencies of New Deal reform, he 
nonetheless calls attention to precisely the confluence of social and political concerns 
underpinning Roosevelt’s agenda:  the lack of protections for workers’ rights and organized 
labor, an anxiety about concentrated economic power, and the need for expanded relief programs 
for the unemployed. Indeed, as Alan Wald explains, The Grapes of Wrath “popularized 
numerous conventions of the American labor narrative.”42 Steinbeck provides an account of 
politics that, rather than spurning the New Deal, demands the augmentation of progressive 
intervention and activist-managerial power called for by many of Roosevelt’s advisors. 
Government camps such as Weedpatch are the only refuge in the novel from local police and the 
exploitative system of labor created by large corporate farms. What’s more, despite the 
inadequacies of federal power in The Grapes of Wrath, Steinbeck provides a cultural rhetoric for 
an activist political community by mythologizing the plight of the poor and dispossessed. “The 
migrant people,” the narrator chronicles, are “scuttling for work, scrabbling to live, looked 
always for pleasure, dug for pleasure, manufactured pleasure, and they were hungry for 
amusement.” The imaginative response for dealing with the tension between the migrants’ 
aspirations and their dire circumstances is a secular, mythic community: “the story teller grew 
into being, so that the people gathered in the low firelight to hear the gifted ones. And they 
listened while the tales were told, and their participation made the stories great.” The demands 
and needs of the masses inspire “great” tales, which in turn unite these migratory masses “in the 
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camps along the roads, on the ditch banks beside the streams, under the sycamores” (444). 
Dispossessed migrants become an imaginary community, a nation all its own with a shared 
narrative life.  
Steinbeck brings this narrative invention of a community to bear upon the political 
debates of the 1930s, specifically regarding the continued suffering of the rural poor. Steinbeck 
frames the crisis of widespread poverty through the travails of the Joads, whose family name 
alludes to the biblical Job, a “righteous” man who nonetheless experiences consummate 
catastrophe and whose experience calls into question the goodness of God. Whereas this biblical 
figure is a mechanism for scrutinizing the principal authority of the ancient world, the suffering 
of the Joads teases out the injustice of national life without socio-economic security and 
protections for the poor. Steinbeck puts this national mythologizing to political use most tellingly 
through Rose of Sharon, whose name is taken from the endearment given to one of the lovers in 
the biblical book Song of Songs. “I am the rose of Sharon,” the young woman of the poem 
proclaims, “the lily of the valleys” (2:1). The beloved’s assertion provides grounds for erotic 
linguistic play—her lover “feedeth among the lilies,” for example—yet, by way of contrast, the 
lover of Steinbeck’s young woman abandons her during the search for more secure social space. 
Steinbeck’s deserted beloved is a figure for possibility gone awry, a world without fulfillment or 
dignity.  
Yet the Judeo-Christian tradition has also read the beloved in Song of Songs as an 
allegory of the Deity’s relationship to his chosen people—either Israel or the Church, as the case 
may be. In that religious tradition, in other words, “Rose of Sharon” more often than not signifies 
the beloved community, rather than a virginal beloved. Thus, even as Steinbeck’s turn on the 
biblical Job calls into question the goodness of national life without public securities, his Rose of 
  23 
Sharon takes on secular allegorical status. In particular, during the novel’s famed ending, Rose of 
Sharon and the remaining Joads encounter a nameless boy and his starving father. The Joad 
daughter, who has only recently given birth to a stillborn child, nurses the starved man: “Her 
hand moved behind his head and supported it. Her fingers moved gently in his hair. She looked 
up and across the barn, and her lips came together and smiled mysteriously” (619). Steinbeck’s 
Rose of Sharon—who here also seems to be a Madonna figure—becomes the image of a mythic 
community, a surrogate family for the nameless masses who are otherwise destitute in the world. 
She provides for the wellbeing of the poor; she stands in for the aspiration of a secular family to 
welcome the dispossessed. 
Steinbeck’s image of a political community responsible for the welfare of the anonymous 
masses is replaced with a different set of cultural metaphors during the postwar moment. In 
Mailer’s work from the 1950s and 1960s, for example, Steinbeck’s mythic aspiration for political 
existence is replaced with a new figure, which Mailer describes as “the American existentialist—
the hipster.” Writing in Dissent during the summer of 1957, Mailer argues that the Second World 
War of “super states” and the advent of “instant death by atomic war” has subjected the “psyche” 
of postwar Americans to a unique intellectual crisis. “One could hardly maintain the courage to 
be individual, to speak with one’s own voice,” Mailer says of this postwar milieu, “for the years 
in which one could complacently accept oneself as part of an elite by being radical were forever 
gone.”43 The collectivist politics of Steinbeck no longer seems plausible to Mailer, for a “stench 
of fear has come out of every pore of American life, and we suffer from a collective failure of 
nerve.” How can there be a political community—a secular order of welfare—when the 
collective is itself systemically sick? The only hope to be found under such dire circumstances, 
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Mailer insists, “has been the isolated courage of isolated people.” Mailer’s despair at the 
conditions of postwar life causes him to look toward the hipster of the 1950s because, he says, 
such a figure responds to the threat of “a slow death by conformity with every creative and 
rebellious instinct stifled” through “the only life-giving answer” available to him: “to live with 
death as immediate danger, to divorce oneself from society, to exist without roots, to set out on 
that uncharted journey into the rebellious imperatives of the self” (277). In short, the collective 
condition of postwar society is either to be swallowed up by the state and mass society, or to be 
fractured from that collective. The self—the courage to be individual—becomes Mailer’s haven 
from the bleak conditions of the 1950s. 
In “The White Negro,” Mailer insists that a fundamental, existential dilemma faces 
Americans, who now must either retreat into mass conformity or turn toward counter-cultural 
scripts. For those who follow the latter route, the “Negro” has become a model for life amidst the 
absurdities of postwar society. Mailer explains that black Americans must either “live a life of 
constant humility or ever-threatening danger” (279). By simply expressing the self—rather than 
suppressing it, becoming a subservient shadow of a self—black Americans face the lynch mobs 
of reactionary Southerners and the bellicosity of urban policemen in the North. Mailer argues 
that a particular subculture of the postwar generation “was attracted to what the Negro had to 
offer,” for the “existentialist synapses of the Negro” seemed to offer a universal pattern of 
existence that white postwar Americans could appropriate (278, 279). From this nexus of racial 
fantasies and cultural idioms, Mailer imagines that the “language of Hip” is born, giving 
“expression to abstract states of feeling which all could share, at least all who were Hip” (279). 
The hipster, in other words, becomes the principal figure for dissenting from the existential 
threats and oppressive social structures of the 1950s.  
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What’s more, because this figure draws on the “existential” plight of black Americans, 
Mailer explains that the hipster “for practical purposes could be considered a white Negro” 
(279). Mailer’s refraction of existentialism through the aspiration of crossing the color line is, as 
Szalay argues, “a complex variant of the peculiarly American tradition of blackface minstrelsy.” 
Szalay explains that notions of hip such as Mailer’s derive from the anxieties of “white men 
[who] sought and found in black subculture a means of negotiating the conflicted ideological and 
organizational imperatives of postwar liberalism.”44 In other words, because the New Deal 
Coalition was fraught with internal disagreement and beset with external pressures, American 
existentialists like Mailer looked to black Americans to sort out their sense of political 
displacement. Mailer’s existentialist turn, in particular, centers on a crisis between “the Hip and 
the Square,” that is to say, a “primal battle” over whether “to open the limits of the possible for 
oneself, for oneself alone.” The collective, generally speaking, becomes “Square” while 
affirming the self and its desires is the essence of “Hip.” Thus, whereas Steinbeck’s leftism 
offers a script for collectivist political action, organized labor, a critique of concentrated 
economic power, and an urgent demand for socio-economic security, Mailer’s progressivism 
looks to “Hip” to “return us to ourselves, at no matter what price in individual violence” (290). 
While marshaling crowds to protest the war in Vietnam was later Mailer’s self-avowed métier, 
his turn toward existentialism during the 1950s and early 1960s displaced the locus of political 
action from the collective to the singular. The “heart of Hip,” he says, is an “emphasis upon 
courage at the moment of crisis,” the willingness to assert the self irrespective of social 
consequences (291). Mailer’s notorious example in “The White Negro” is the acte gratuit of 
“two strong eighteen-year old hoodlums” who “beat in the brains of a candy-store keeper” (284). 
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Such arbitrary acts of violence—“no matter how brutal”—offer something like a radical form of 
dissent from the social death of the self. Mailer thus insists that the singular—the daring of the 
unknown, an abandonment of premeditated behavior, the refusal to conform at any cost—
achieves elevated status amidst the dire conditions of postwar life. As a result, the authentic life 
of the self becomes the touchstone for political action. 
Before Mailer’s dalliance with existentialism, he wrote what would become a New York 
Times-bestseller, The Naked and the Dead (1948). Mailer’s first novel follows a platoon of 
soldiers during the fictional siege of the Japanese-held island of Anopopei during the Second 
World War. Throughout the novel Mailer explores the ethnic and nationalist impulses of the 
American soldiers and, more broadly, the American war effort itself. Mailer also calls attention 
to the divisions that stratified the military along racial and class lines. The Naked and the Dead 
was therefore hewn from the same cloth as his literary masters at the time—most notably, 
Tolstoy’s social realism in Anna Karenina (1878) and American naturalists like Steinbeck, 
James T. Farrell, and the early radicalism of John Dos Passos. In the vein of these literary 
predecessors, Mailer distributes the focus of the narrative across the lives and consciousness of 
over a dozen infantrymen and officers. Through free indirect discourse, the realist prose blends 
with both a Southern soldier’s untutored dialect and a well-born East Coast officer’s brooding 
meditations on mortality and the army. Mailer thus democratizes his war story, implying that a 
concert of voices from across the ranks of the platoon is necessary for understanding American 
intervention. Furthermore, through short accounts of the “life” and “education” of the soldiers, 
Mailer situates the siege of Anopopei within a wider account of social reality, one attentive to the 
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national myths and economic narratives that inform the behavior of the soldiers and provide the 
collective antecedents to the war effort itself.45  
The dispersion of social reality across classes and characters embeds an awareness of 
class consciousness within literary form, if not also an outright political commitment to 
analyzing the markers of socio-economic structures. In the case of writers such as Steinbeck and 
the Mailer of The Naked and the Dead, this brand of realism is, in effect, a function of 
progressive social thinking. While Mailer would return to these literary and political 
commitments in later novels such as The Executioner’s Song (1979), his long affaire du cœur 
with existentialism had profound effects upon his work during the 1950s and 1960s. Even The 
Armies of the Night, with its progressive acerbity directed against liberal Democrats and their 
support for the Vietnam War, signals this intellectual shift by identifying the novel’s narrative 
center with an absurd and self-reflexive comic hero—Mailer himself. The author-cum-
protagonist is caught up in his own novelistic account, and the life of the self consequently 
becomes the governing window for political history. That is to say, in order to make sense of 
history, Mailer explains that the author himself becomes a central feature of an ambiguous social 
landscape: “Either the century was entrenching itself more deeply into the absurd, or the absurd 
was delivering evidence that it was possessed of some of the nutritive mysteries of a marrow 
which would yet feed the armies of the absurd” (54). Mailer’s existentialist construal of an 
“absurd” century makes certain demands upon literary form, he claims, and so the authorial 
attempt to represent social reality itself mirrors that absurdity: 
So if the event took place in one of the crazy mansions, or indeed the crazy house 
of history, it is fitting that any ambiguous comic hero of such history should be an 
egoist of the most startling misproportions, outrageously and often unhappily self-
assertive, yet in command of a detachment classic in severity […]. Such egotism 
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being two-headed, thrusting itself forward the better to study itself, finds itself 
therefore at home in a house of mirrors, since it has habits, even the talent, to 
regard itself. Once History inhabits a crazy house, egotism may be the last tool 
left to History. (54) 
 
Mailer’s image of the author—a disproportionately large head, who is preoccupied with 
regarding itself and whose “home” is amidst reflections of itself—departs sharply from the 
literary strategies of The Naked and the Dead. For Mailer the existentialist, the global threats and 
social malaise of postwar America requires the author to inflect political fiction through a 
“talent” for self-reflexivity. The life of the self, in other words, becomes the locus for political 
understanding.  
The turn in Mailer’s literary form signals wider intellectual currents, which I trace 
through work by several authors throughout the remaining chapters of this dissertation. The 
implications of these postwar developments for political culture are, as is the case with “The 
White Negro” and The Armies of the Night, often a question of shifting accents in literary 
representation, while at other times these shifts surface directly in the intellectual dialogue posed 
by the works themselves with specific political and historical determinants. The experience of 
totalitarianism in Europe is one of the principal historical phenomena informing this public 
dialogue during the postwar era. Intellectuals accounting for the rise of totalitarianism feared that 
similar political oppression might take hold in the United States, and they tried to shape policy 
and public sentiment about the New Deal welfare state based upon that fear. As a feature of that 
conversation, I argue in the first chapter that Vladimir Nabokov invokes a form of 
aestheticism—the idea that our existence ought to be governed by private judgments and 
pleasures—as a cultural strategy for dealing both with the specter of totalitarianism and the 
increasingly politicized society of his newly adopted American home. Beginning with Bend 
Sinister (1947), I argue that Nabokov’s American novels reject politicized social space on 
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aesthetic grounds, and I show how this aestheticism offers a cultural permutation of the growing 
demand for arenas of civil society autonomous from an activist managerial state.  
As is the case with Mailer and a collection of other postwar novelists—Saul Bellow and 
the Beats are among those whom I do not consider—the ascent and diverse rhetoric of American 
existentialism provided a cultural map for writers to navigate not only the reverberations of 
totalitarianism but also the competing ideas and social demands of postwar domestic life. George 
Cotkin rightly notes that ideas later associated with European existentialism had been expressed 
by American intellectuals long before the imported influence of Sartre, Camus, and de Beauvoir. 
Citing Melville’s “theology of absence” and William James’s pragmatism—surely Emerson’s 
philosophy is applicable, too—Cotkin notes that an “existential attitude” had a longstanding 
history in American culture.46 Later, the progressive wing of the civil rights and student 
movements would draw heavily on Camus’s intellectual rhetoric to frame their activism and ill-
treatment.47 Yet, as I trace through novels by Ellison, Highsmith, and Percy, the invocation of 
“existentialist” ideas in the 1950s and early 1960s had a diverse range of effects upon postwar 
intellectual life. Indeed, I argue that the reemergence of ideas and cultural strategies rooted both 
in the work of nineteenth-century thinkers—specifically Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and 
Nietzsche—as well as the French existentialists of the twentieth-century had specific historical 
determinants. The proto-existentialists of the nineteenth century—with their preoccupation with 
the irrational, the estranged, and intellectual displacement more generally—provided a tableau of 
sensibilities for postwar intellectuals and artists to grapple with a seemingly absurd world, one 
characterized by the contradictory impulses of the “apex of liberalism” and institutional 
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segregation, the anxieties of the nuclear age and increased professional attention to the 
psychological. European existentialism enjoyed a culturally symbiotic relationship with the likes 
of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche—in fact, the Anglophone translators and American critics who 
sung the virtues of the former also helped introduce the latter to a wider audience. (I trace 
relevant moments of this reception history in chapters two and three.) In effect, this web of 
sensibilities garnered legitimacy as a set of intellectual strategies for responding to the social 
crises of the immediate postwar years: How, for example, can one find meaning in the life of the 
self when everywhere private existence seems to be embattled? Many American writers retooled 
Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, and Sartre in their attempts both to define this crisis for a reading 
public and to resolve the inquiry in ways consistent with their framing of the problem. 
Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man (1952) provides one of the earliest and most telling uses of 
existentialist sensibilities when reflecting upon the political culture of postwar America. In this 
second chapter, I trace the rising cultural currency of existentialism during the late 1940s and 
1950s, while at the same time the fortunes of a spectrum of progressive thought was in decline. 
This flux of social concerns and intellectual movements informed Ellison’s literary work, 
particularly as the invisible man navigates a variety of political demands—from communism and 
black nationalism to segregated assimilation into welfare liberalism. Reacting against the 
legalized marginalization of black Americans perpetuated by the New Deal Coalition, Ellison’s 
protagonist finds himself alienated from institutional space. In response to this systemic 
estrangement, the invisible man repudiates the dehumanizing intellectual commitments of 
progressivism in favor of existentialist sensibilities about the self as the locus for freedom and 
political action. Invisible Man is thus among the first novels to give articulate form to pubic 
animus regarding New Deal liberalism within the context of anxieties regarding radical politics. 
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But, equally as important, Ellison’s novel circulates a form of American existentialism that, I 
argue, undercuts the intellectual legitimacy of the New Deal reform agenda. In particular, the 
invisible man’s alienation from national institutions and collective affiliations prompts his flight 
into the self as the only tenable avenue for subsequent political action. The retreat into the 
possibilities of the self in Ellison’s National Book Award-winning novel thus marks the 
emerging cultural legitimacy of sensibilities about the self and the state that, I argue, would 
transform American political culture during the postwar decades. 
Whereas Ellison’s retreat into the self has direct consequences for institutional politics, 
Patricia Highsmith’s fiction from the 1950s draws from the well of what Nathan Hale describes 
as psychoanalysis’ “golden age of popularization” in the United States.48 Psychoanalysis and its 
eccentric cousin, the existential psychology movement, provide for Highsmith an intellectual 
bannister for framing the anxieties of the early Cold War era.  I argue, in particular, that the 
wider normalization of therapeutic psychology contributed to the eroding grounds for an 
interventionist welfare state by widely disseminating psychological—rather than environmental 
or socio-economic—explanatory templates for social phenomena. In contrast to the literature of 
the long Progressive era and certain strains of literary naturalism, which had acquired canonical 
status in the United States during the 1930s, the ego and its vicissitudes become the dominant 
template in the 1950s for understanding society and the self. While Highsmith’s novels from the 
decade mark the development of these intellectual shifts, she also recasts cultural representations 
of phenomena such as violence, murder, alienation, class envy, and social mobility in ways that 
helped redesign a changing literary arena. Highsmith helps to circulate these templates by 
drawing on the tropes of psychoanalysis, but, more importantly, she repudiates a narrative world 
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governed by structural, socio-economic, and environmental conditions. In effect, the existential 
turmoil of the mind becomes the chief structuring principle for her construal of social space. In 
contrast to naturalists like Theodore Dreiser, then, Highsmith presents the darker corners of 
human experience as phenomena of the largely autonomous, internal arena of an existential 
psyche. These shifts in literary tastes, I argue, augment the waning intellectual legitimacy of the 
New Deal regulatory impulse during the 1950s. 
The role of American existentialist thought in transforming the political culture of the 
United States takes a distinctive turn in the work of Walker Percy. His National Book Award-
winning novel The Moviegoer (1961) retools existentialist sensibilities about individual 
consciousness as the linchpin of authenticity alongside anxieties about the state as an alienating 
institution. Percy’s nexus of concerns gives definition to the social angst that a bureaucratic New 
Deal state trivializes the self for the sake of social welfare. Percy’s fiction after The Moviegoer—
particularly Love in the Ruins (1971) and Lancelot (1978)—explores a form of existentialism 
that is shorn of the radical political commitments of Sartre, de Beauvoir, and Camus. Among the 
consequences of this translation of existentialism is that Percy validates public animus toward an 
activist managerial state on the grounds that such an institution impinges upon the authentic life 
of the self. By following the development of these anxieties, I show that Percy’s novels chart the 
cultural maturation of what he describes as a “sovereign” form of selfhood and its emergence at 
the center of gravity for American social thinking—a phenomenon that I suggest leaves partisan 
and institutional affiliations as casualties of an emerging political culture. 
Even as these novelists bring definition to various aspects of the public animus toward 
New Deal reform, they also circulate alternative sensibilities about the self and the state that 
would contribute to the transformation of American intellectual life. The standard political 
  33 
history after the collapse of the New Deal Coalition in 1968 is that American liberalism decamps 
from politics into “identity politics” and the cultural wars more generally. Tod Gitlin, for 
example, explains that after 1968 “activists cooled, beaten and disappointed in the measure they 
were once hopeful and desperate.” While the “Right counterorganized,” American progressivism 
“squandered its own values.” Those who had been mobilized against Johnson and the war in 
Vietnam were “pulled away: attracted to the once fortified, now alluring satisfactions of private 
life.”49 While Gitlin laments the unraveling of the organized progressive movement, Walter Benn 
Michaels describes the post-1968 trajectory of progressivism within a wider drift “from the 
universalist logic of conflict as difference of opinion to the posthistoricist logic of conflict as 
difference in subject position.”50 Michaels argues that this shift in American thought is rooted in 
the “postmodernism” (or “posthistoricism,” for the two are synonymous for Michaels) that was 
formulated in Europe in 1967-1968 and quickly imported into the United States. The “triumph” 
of this development is that culture, rather than ideology, becomes the site of disagreement.51 
Similarly, for Gitlin, the New Left gets “dismissed” within an “antipolitical culture,” as if its 
brand of progressivism were “a set of discarded clothes or a groovy nostalgia trip.”52 Thus, the 
conflict between progressives and American political institutions fades into the background of 
the so-called “culture wars” of the 1970s and 1980s.53 
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Despite the perspicuity of these accounts of post-1968 American political culture, they 
nonetheless belie the intellectual settlements and cultural shifts that took place in American life 
from 1945 to the early 1960s. Indeed, rather than marking the creation of a political vacuum in 
1968—a moment when conservative politics supposedly seized the day and thus enjoyed a 
period of ascendancy culminating in the presidency of Ronald Reagan—this dissertation traces a 
more fluid political history, one in which mutual but unevenly constitutive cultural voices and 
intellectual movements converge with wider historical phenomena to reshape American political 
sensibilities. The novels that I consider are at once markers of wider intellectual developments as 
well as determinative forces in their own right. They are, in other words, both causes and effects 
of the changing intellectual fabric of the postwar era—a cultural dialogue imbricated within a 
social debate. Nabokov, Ellison, Highsmith, and Percy contributed to the shape of American 
intellectual life by framing public animus toward the prevailing political order while at the same 
circulating solutions tailored to the social crises they helped to define. Moreover, they gave a 
cultural imprimatur to emerging sensibilities while criticizing other forms of social thinking. 
That is to say, the causes-and-effects of these novels not only contributed to the unraveling 
legitimacy of the New Deal reform agenda; they also converged with other historical phenomena 
to change American political culture. The image here is a kind of historical atonality, a 
composition without a single governing key. Rather than a history of the conflicts and policies 
that ripple outward from the center of organized power, then, the crisis of the New Deal welfare 
state from 1945 until the early 1960s is, in fact, a labyrinth of forces and feelings, institutions and 
enthusiasms. The spread of American existentialism, a growing demand for arenas of civil 
society, the contracting spectrum of progressivism, and the development of private therapeutic 
psychology each provide threads for navigating this labyrinth.  
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One of the difficulties of tracing political history is the temptation to institute rigid 
breaks, moments of interruption where a new age or altogether different political order begins. 
The notion of the so-called “Reagan Revolution” is representative of such a tendency. According 
to this version of political history, Reagan, employing executive power, instituted major shifts in 
the landscape of American economics and politics that were patterned on the work of the 
economist Milton Friedman. In effect, Reagan did what the Republicans and Democrats of the 
1970s had failed to do:  he formed a broad, new coalition that consolidated partisan power and 
offered a distinctive vision for American political life. Thomas B. Edsall, sketching the backstory 
of this standard narrative, suggests that the electoral successes for Democrats in the mid-1970s 
were merely short-term gains that represent, if anything, the lack of cohesion enjoyed by either 
party. “Watergate, and America’s defeat under Republican leadership in Vietnam,” Edsall 
claims, “produced major congressional victories for the Democrats in 1974 and gave them the 
presidency in 1976.” That is to say, the Republicans fumbled the opportunity created by the 
Democratic crisis of 1968, but Edsall insists that conservatives soon recovered the ball: “All 
those [Democratic] gains and more were swept away in 1980 with Ronald Reagan’s victory and 
the Republican takeover of the Senate.”54 The “Reagan Revolution” of 1980, according to this 
view, is the consolidation of electoral power that took place after the weak party coalitions of the 
1970s and, in particular, the “stagflation” that plagued Democrats during Carter’s presidency.55 
Reagan stepped into a lacuna in political power, writing an original script for the United States. 
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Among the problems with this version of political history is that it relies on an 
institutional view of politics and social power, one concentrated primarily in the Executive 
Office and presidential election cycles. When measured in terms of public economic policy, 
however, the transformation in American politics actually has a long legislative history 
preceding Reagan’s election. One of the most conspicuous indicators of these shifts is the 
growing disparity of household incomes in the United States beginning in the mid-1970s. For 
example, as the political scientists Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson argue, one of the central 
contributing factors to growing income inequality is the shift in tax policy in the United States. 
Changing structure of federal taxation has, in effect, allowed those at the very top of the tax code 
to retain an increasingly larger share of after-tax income. As Hacker and Pierson summarize, 
“Although the early years of the Reagan administration figure prominently, the change began in 
the 1970s. The initial drop [in progressive taxation] came through large cuts in the capital gains 
tax and other taxes on the well-to-do passed, after very intense business lobbying, by a Congress 
composed of large Democratic majorities in both chambers and signed into law by a Democratic 
president.”56 Whereas other accounts of growing American inequality explain the shift as a result 
of global integration, changing technology, partisan occupations of the White House, or 
heightened domestic competition, Hacker and Pierson demonstrate that the sharp rise in income 
inequality since the late 1970s is “causally related” to dispersed and sustained shifts throughout 
the preceding decade in public political behavior and organized influences, which shaped “large-
scale public policies that mediate distributional outcomes.”57 These policy shifts, in other words, 
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were not caused by political-partisan fiat in 1979-1980; rather, organizational interests 
inordinately influenced the economic landscape of the late 1960s and 1970s, while policy makers 
either failed to update key public policies to reflect the growing strength of employers, or they 
even appeared to stack the political deck in favor of the wealthiest. Political history charted 
through momentous breaks such as the “Reagan Revolution” belie such cumulative changes 
across decades of public life, thought, and institutions. 
For this reason, the often-invoked idea of “neoliberalism” is deeply suspect. Marxists 
such as David Harvey and conservatives such as Edwin J. Feulner more or less agree on defining 
neoliberalism as a political philosophy that promotes free markets, limited government, and 
personal liberty under the rule of law.58 Dieter Plehwe, however, argues that this understanding 
is a “premature identification of one school of neoliberal thought with the whole.” Plehwe 
instead points to a “neoliberal thought collective” that differs drastically in both “political 
philosophy and political practice” throughout the world.59 For Plehwe, the plurality of 
“hegemonic neoliberalism” demands comparative study: “Although individual freedom served as 
a key value of neoliberalism in the effort to rally the opposition against the socialist regimes of 
Eastern Europe,” he argues instead that “it continues to be difficult to reconcile the neoliberal 
message of individualism and freedom with the history of authoritarian neoliberal regimes in 
Latin America, for example.”60 That is to say, “neoliberalism” is at its most coherent as a 
signifier when defining global phenomena that are themselves often disarticulated by conflicts 
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and contradictions. These global differences and even the notion of a “hegemonic” order depend 
upon too general of a register to provide any significant intellectual traction when describing the 
specific changes in a national political culture. To situate the transformation and dismantling of 
the American welfare state from 1945 until 1989 within the rise of “neoliberalism” is, in other 
words, about as helpful as describing a starfish as an organism. The global term would, when 
figured into a historically specific and geographically limited study, obscure the particular and 
the granular.  
For this reason, I describe the political culture that develops alongside the transformation 
of the New Deal welfare state as the “New Conservatism,” although this term, too, perhaps 
implies a false rupture—a misleading “newness.”61 In point of fact, the history of New Deal 
reform seems to be an interregnum in the at best modestly regulated development of American 
industrial capitalism and the volatile, speculative financial sector of the late nineteenth century. 
The labor historians Jefferson Cowie and Nick Salvatore show that the Depression created 
extraordinary circumstances leading to what they describe as a “Long Exception,” the temporary 
emergence of a New Deal regulatory state that serves as more of an aberration in American 
history tied to the exigencies of 1929-1939 and not the inauguration of a permanent break from 
the political economy of the 1920s. Thus, following the economist Paul Krugman, Cowie and 
Salvatore suggest that the 1970s, rather than being the institutionalization of a new form of 
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political economy, were in fact the last days of the “interregnum between Gilded Ages.”62 Using 
income inequality as the guiding marker for this interregnum, Claudia Goldin and Robert A. 
Margo similarly show that an increased demand for unskilled labor incited largely by public 
works programs, the wartime economy of 1940-1945, and the efforts of the National War Labor 
Board “compressed” the wage gap during the 1940s. The regulatory and managerial reforms of 
the 1930s had not only ushered the nation out of the Depression but also into an unprecedented 
era of wage “compression,” which Goldin and Margo show lasted until the mid-1960s.63 Thomas 
Piketty and Emmanuel Saez likewise identify a “U-shaped pattern” in concentrated wealth across 
the twentieth century, while “top incomes” also began to expand in the late 1960s.64 In both sets 
of accounts, by 1985 the wage gap had risen back to its pre-war disparities and the wage 
structure itself returned to the level of inequality sustained throughout the 1920s until the crash 
of the stock market. 
If the opposition to concentrated economic power through a regulatory state was beset by 
intellectual opposition and public animus during the 1950s and 1960s through the advent of a 
“New Conservative” political culture, part of this story is undoubtedly non-literary. Thomas 
Piketty, in his theory of the general trend toward income inequality throughout the twentieth 
century, maintains that without firm regulations capital always increases at a greater rate than 
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labor, thus suggesting that income inequality is the inevitable result of a weak regulatory 
structure. Piketty traces a score of institutional shifts, tax-based disparities, and legislative 
mechanisms through which concentrated wealth (i.e. non-income) has acquired ascendancy over 
wage-earning labor. When describing these shifts in American monetary policy as they 
developed during the 1960s, Piketty notes a change in the economic theory surrounding the 
causes of the Great Depression and the subsequent deflationary spiral throughout the 1930s. 
Pointing to Milton Friedman’s influential study Monetary History of the United States (1963), 
Piketty explains: 
For Friedman, no doubt is possible: it was the unduly restrictive policy of the 
Federal Reserve that transformed the stock market crash into a credit crisis and 
plunged the economy into a deflationary spiral and a depression of unprecedented 
magnitude. The crisis was primarily monetary, and therefore its solution was also 
monetary. From this analysis, Friedman drew a clear political conclusion: in order 
to ensure regular, undisrupted growth in a capitalist economy, it is necessary and 
sufficient to make sure that monetary policy is designed to ensure steady growth 
of the money supply. Accordingly, monetarist doctrine held that the New Deal, 
which created a large number of government jobs and social transfer programs, 
was a costly and useless sham. […] The work of Friedman and other Chicago 
School economists fostered suspicion of the ever-expanding state and created the 
intellectual climate in which the conservative revolution of 1979-1980 became 
possible.65 
 
The severity of the Great Depression became, according to Friedman’s account, a consequence 
of New Deal interventionism. When Friedman won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1976, his 
argument had already become the last intellectual nail in the coffin of the New Deal managerial 
state. 
Yet the changes in economic policy and theory that began in the late 1960s do not 
account fully for the growing din of public anxieties directed against the welfare state in the 
preceding decades. Indeed, the economic data on public policy, income inequality, and global 
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trends toward “neoliberalization” often overlook the fluid cultural debates that followed the 
Second World War. The intellectual framing of these debates and their various public settlements 
would shape how Americans understood their political institutions and individual liberties. The 
novelists and wider intellectual movements that I consider contributed to that intellectual framing 
in ways that would prove decisive for the collapsing legitimacy of the New Deal reform agenda 
and the decline of an American regulatory state. The “rise” of the New Conservatism, then, is a 
feature of the crises besetting the New Deal in the 1950s and 1960s—an intercalation in the 
shifting structures of thought and feeling in postwar liberalism.  
It is worth noting finally that, not without irony, my definition of “conservative” agrees in 
its basic form with the libertarian thinker Friedrich Hayek, who claims, “A conservative 
movement, by its very nature, is bound to be a defender of established privilege and to lean on 
the power of government for the protection of privilege.”66 Unlike Hayek, however, this 
dissertation maintains that a regulatory state and the broader reform agenda of the early New 
Deal impeded entrenched economic privilege, rather than fostered it. The transformation of the 
reformist legacy during the postwar years (1945-1968) into a contractual-compensatory set of 
programs divested of a regulatory edifice bore little resemblance to the ad hoc agenda 
constructed in 1933-1938. This transformation of the New Deal, in fact, allowed for the 
economic volatility of the 1970s (e.g., the so-called “stagflation” during the Carter 
administration), particularly by weakening securities for organized labor and allowing for a 
broader return to the income inequality of the 1920s. To put this point another way, the 
intellectual crises and cultural anxieties assailing New Deal reform structures during the 1950s 
and 1960s comprise the early history of the rapid income inequality that began in the late 1960s 
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and escalated in the 1970s. The political culture that first begins to circulate and garner 
legitimacy during the late 1940s and 1950s sowed the seeds for this increasingly unequal 
national landscape. Therefore, the resurgence of concentrated economic power is, I hope to 
show, to an important degree a consequence of postwar realignments in American political 
culture.  
In the following chapters, I trace certain key features of these realignments as they 
emerge in the wake of postwar intellectual trends. An important part of this emerging New 
Conservatism is the rise of the idea of civil society in the political and theoretical discourse of 
the period. As I show in the first chapter, intellectuals and artists alike call for arenas of public 
life autonomous from a managerial state. The idea of civil society, for all its progressive 
possibilities, contributed to the public sensibility that federal interventionism constitutes the 
antithesis of democracy, the impoverishment of a vibrant private life. One current of this form of 
political thinking defined “liberty” in relation to—i.e. as a state of independence from—
regulatory authority, rather than as a function of socio-economic mobility. John Locke had 
offered one form of such a definition in his Second Treatise on Civil Government (1689): “The 
natural liberty of man,” Locke argues, “is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to 
be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule.” 
Despite this aversion to abstract governmental power, Locke’s contractual argument nonetheless 
distinguishes between arbitrary and consensual forms of legislative power, where the former is 
defined as any law that subjects the individual “to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary 
will of another man.”67 During the postwar moment, the legitimate “consensual” forms of 
legislative authority are not only increasingly contested—Is progressive taxation arbitrary? Do 
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protections for collective bargaining subject the individuals in the business community to undue 
authority? Is a planned economy incompatible with democracy?—but also a rising tide of voices 
helping to shape postwar American political culture construed the economic as a function of the 
private. That is to say, the economic as an arena of private life, rather than public conditions, gets 
new traction in the postwar decades. This aestheticization of the economic—its reemergence 
from a structural and public category to being a bellwether of the individual’s life and 
judgments—is one of the principal fronts in the shifting political terrain of postwar America. 
Another feature of this emerging political culture is a resuscitated and reconfigured 
antipathy toward centralized authority, which becomes the bête noire not only of the likes of 
Barry Goldwater but also many postwar progressives who drank liberally from European 
existentialist thought. The HUAC investigations during the 1950s and mounting public fears 
regarding global communism cultivated an environment hostile to the spectrum of progressive 
politics. An American idiom of existentialist thought augmented this transformation of U.S. 
political culture in a variety of ways, not the least of which was that this intellectual trend 
nurtured suspicions of centralized authority and organized politics. The coincidence of 
existentialist anti-establishment sensibilities and Cold War anxieties would help to recast public 
perception of a strong centralized federal authority as a marker of alienation and unfreedom, 
rather than a conduit for equality.  
Even as the spectrum of progressivism constricted during the immediate postwar decades, 
a new variety of modes of understanding society and the self competed for public viability on 
radio programs, television screens, and in the burgeoning book trade. The American “culture 
industry,” as Theodore Adorno argued in the 1940s, tended to subsume the particular under the 
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universal.68 One way that many intellectuals and, pace Adorno, even the culture industry itself 
reacted against such anxieties regarding conformist scripts was to affirm the individual, the 
particular, and explore certain explanatory frameworks that were attentive to the diversity of 
private experience. This aspiration affected American political culture under the influence of a 
developing range of professional psychologies, which framed angst and socially aberrant 
behavior in terms of the individual psyche. In other words, many postwar critics and artists—for 
reasons that were far from economically or socially conservative—redesigned the modes of their 
social thinking to attend to the particular psychological vicissitudes of individuals, which in turn 
not only marked a shift away from environmental and socio-economic narratives in fiction but 
also a depredation in the status of structural intervention among many intellectuals. The pseudo-
science of postwar therapeutic psychologies contributed to the political sensibility that whatever 
social ills an American might experience, those troubles were phenomena of a largely internal 
arena. Thus, during the 1950s, the personal first became the political, and the upshot was that the 
idea of “social welfare” among postwar liberals increasingly became a measure of individual 
opportunity, not guaranteed security. 
These particular shifts in the political culture of postwar America are limited but 
nonetheless important features of the transformation and dismantling of the New Deal. After 
FDR suffered what his cardiologist deemed a stroke on April 12, 1945, the challenges facing the 
New Deal quickly escalated. As Randall B. Woods puts it, “the political waters were roiled to a 
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degree the country had not seen since the onset of the Great Depression.”69 A conservative 
coalition in Congress, which had gathered steam and crossed party lines after the debates among 
New Dealers in 1938, immediately seized upon this sense of crisis and began to roll back 
wartime controls on the national economy. Soon, the New Deal was beset in Congress, which in 
September of 1945 “enacted the most far-reaching antiunion bill ever passed by a national 
legislature.”70 Even as legislative politics began to shift dramatically, an already diverse public 
political culture in the United States underwent considerable changes and further disarticulations. 
“So ended an era,” the novelist Allen Drury reportedly said upon hearing the news of 
Roosevelt’s death, “and so began another.”71 Many features of this new era, as the following 
chapters show, cannot be properly understood apart from the heterogeneous cultural and 
intellectual transformations in postwar American life. 
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CHAPTER 1:  A “WORLD OF INFINITE POSSIBILITIES”: INVISIBLE MAN 
AND THE TWILIGHT OF NEW DEAL AMERICA 
 
The bookends of Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man (1952) depict the nameless narrator at a 
moment when he has “take[n] up residence underground.”72 As the invisible man flees two 
policemen, who suspect that he has somehow been involved in a Harlem race riot, he 
inadvertently falls down a manhole.  In a figurative attempt to seal his fate, the policemen 
enclose the invisible man in the dark underground space by drawing the sewer’s metal cover.  
Being cordoned off from society as a “goddam black nigger sonofabitch,” as one of the 
policemen puts it, prompts the invisible man to draw larger conclusions from his social and 
political marginalization: “This is the way it’s always been,” he explains, “only now I know it” 
(566).  Not only does the invisible man’s forced retreat underground become something of a 
metaphor for black Americans in the postwar era—a symbol of their invisible and subhuman 
status within society, as well as their legally sanctioned segregation—but the invisible man’s 
narration from the underground also situates his story on an existentialist threshold between 
alienation and action: “The hibernation is over,” he claims. “I must shake off the old skin and 
come up for breath.  There’s a stench in the air, which, from this distance underground, might be 
the smell either of death or of spring—I hope of spring” (580).  
The “stench” that concerns the invisible man recalls the “bad air” that vexes Nietzsche in 
On the Genealogy of Morals (1887), where the philosopher asks, “What, of all things, am I 
unable to tolerate? The only thing which I find it impossible to deal with, which makes me choke 
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and languish? Bad air! Bad air!” Nietzsche later explains that this bad air circulates in a 
“workshop where ideals are fabricated—it seems to me to stink of nothing but lies.”73 For 
Nietzsche, metaphysical illusions and the lies society tells itself about morality create an 
intolerable house of cards, a constructed and self-deluded world. He looks instead for the 
truthfulness and bold self-assertion of an individual (on the model of his Zarathustra (1883-
1885)), who will demolish the teetering socio-philosophical structure.  Ellison’s invisible man, 
directing his critique against the manufactured color line that belts American society, has 
similarly come to “better understand my relation to [the world] and it to me.” Much like 
Nietzsche’s disgust with manufactured ideals, the invisible man arraigns the unrealized 
American values of equality and freedom—what he terms “The Great Constitutional Dream 
Book” (280). He has “come a long way from those days when, full of illusion, I lived a public 
life and attempted to function under the assumption that the world was solid and all the 
relationships therein” (576). The invisible man discovers a false rigidity underlying the color line 
of his society:  that world and its racial divisions, rather than being a fixed reality, are actually 
impermanent inventions. Far from being “solid,” the invisible man finds that his segregated and 
racially stratified world is constructed from a multitude of illusions.  
Ellison also avowedly stylizes the invisible man’s predicament after the fashion of the 
vacillating, erratic narrator of Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground (1864) (Invisible xix).74 
Dostoevsky’s underground man “settle[s] into” a “wretched, bad” corner of a room on the edge 
of Petersburg, and this vantage point affords him the distance and clarity of thought to evaluate 
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his society (7).  While critics such as Paul W. Nisly have long noted the parallels between 
Invisible Man and Dostoevsky’s novel, the political parallels of the allusion have often been 
overlooked.75 In particular, the underground man is especially galled by Nikolai 
Chernyshevsky’s radical novel What Is to Be Done? (1863), which was later a foundational text 
for Vladimir Lenin and the Russian Revolution. Chernyshevsky’s novel provides the subtext for 
much of the underground man’s harangues against rationality and deterministic forces.  More 
pointedly, the underground man casts thinly veiled ridicule upon Chernyshevsky’s philosophy 
for its socialist utopianism, advancing in its place a form of proto-existentialist individualism.  
Dostoevsky’s narrator asserts, for example, that in contrast to the “science” that grounds his 
opponents’ views, “the chiefest and dearest thing” is “our personality and our individuality” (28).  
The underground man explains that “choice can, of course, if it chooses, be in agreement with 
reason […] But very often, and even most often, choice is utterly and stubbornly opposed to 
reason” (25).  For Dostoevsky’s narrator, the burden of individual freedom—the capacity for 
“free unfettered choice”—is greater than the rational or socially profitable (23).  Collective 
planning and economic interest fall to the wayside when confronted with freedom, vacillating 
and contradictory as it may be.  As a cousin to the underground man and his notions on selfhood, 
Ellison’s protagonist likewise finds himself on the cusp of a world of freedom and self-creation 
at the expense of leftist politics. The narrator rejects “[Brother] Jack and the boys,” a leadership 
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suggestive of the political left in postwar America,76 along with their “scientific objectivity” 
about what is in the “best interest” of the masses (576, 505). Instead, the invisible man 
concludes, “I assign myself no rank or any limit, and such an attitude is very much against the 
trend of the times.” In contrast to the problems of class structures and rational socio-economic 
planning that avowedly preoccupy the Brotherhood, Ellison’s narrator concludes, “my world has 
become one of infinite possibilities” (576).   
Given the racist cruelty and social barriers that the invisible man encounters, his final 
assertion of a world of unlegislated possibilities at first seems paradoxical, if not outright 
contradictory. The atavistic “battle royal” in which the invisible man is thrust by white men from 
his Southern town, the deceptions of Dr. Bledsoe that frustrate his employment in the North, the 
injuries and torturous shock treatment he receives at the paint plant—all of these affronts appear 
to undermine the idea that his world is “one of infinite possibilities.” In fact, the invisible man 
seems to encounter limited opportunity at every turn.  His otherwise contradictory set of 
conclusions makes sense, however, when set in the context of the postwar decline of leftist 
politics and the rise of existentialism to cultural and intellectual importance in postwar America. 
As Arnold Rampersad explains, Invisible Man presents existentialism “to be uniquely authentic 
to the story of [the invisible man] and the Negro,” at least insofar as existentialism is “properly 
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identified in its Negro strain.”77 In other words, the invisible man transforms his alienated 
underground position into a liminal space, a threshold for the prospect of individual self-
production and existential possibility. Being forced into the role of an outcast, he retreats into the 
self and articulates a form of freedom tied to individual self-assertion.  Emerging in the wake of 
his damning representations of the communist-like Brotherhood and the radical black nationalist 
leader, Ras the Destroyer, the invisible man has been ostracized from all other political and 
societal collectives, and thus he construes “freedom” and “action” as burdens of the self. 
Despite the invisible man’s assertion that his existential humanism putatively contradicts 
the “trend of the times,” Ellison’s novel actually figures as an archetypal case in the eroding 
public consensus for progressive politics. To be sure, Invisible Man marks a transitional moment 
in the life of its author from his youthful leftism in the 1930s and 40s to his later alliances with 
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in the 1960s. As Michael Szalay has shown, Ellison 
would later motivate support through his essays and unfinished novel for a Democratic Party that 
had recently reinvented itself through a public commitment to civil rights.78 Situated between 
this later pragmatic liberalism and his early radical commitments, Invisible Man is thus a marker 
of Ellison’s development as an intellectual and, more broadly, the declining fortunes of leftist 
politics in the United States—of both the communist and New Deal varieties. Through its 
positioning of the invisible man outside the institutional mainstream of American society as well 
as nationalism and communism, Ellison’s novel marks a watershed in American cultural and 
political history for the felt crises about collective belonging it helps to define and, in turn, the 
sensibilities about the self that it helped to circulate.  
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Invisible Man, the Vicissitudes of the Left, and the Twilight of New Deal Liberalism 
Ellison was completing Invisible Man as Senator Joseph McCarthy began a witch-hunt 
for communists. While it is not the case that Ellison simply kowtowed to early rumblings of the 
so-called Second Red Scare (1950-1956), this vitriolic conservative movement is nonetheless a 
marker of the shifting winds of the postwar era with which Invisible Man is in dialogue. Indeed, 
Ellison’s unfavorable representation of the Brotherhood signals the waning intellectual and 
cultural legitimacy of leftist politics in New Deal America—a problem of societal validity that 
participated in the gradual decline of FDR’s welfare state. Ellison’s protagonist first encounters a 
representative of leftist politics when he meets a member of the Brotherhood.  This organization 
approaches the narrator after he delivers an impassioned speech against the eviction of an elderly 
couple in Harlem. “Sister” Provo and her eighty-seven-year-old husband had lived in the 
apartment for over twenty years. However, having failed to pay the rent one month, a leasing 
agent evicts the couple, which incites a group of Harlem residents to disgust and anger.  Before 
the group turns violent on the white “paddies” enforcing the eviction, the invisible man 
intervenes and delivers his second public speech of the novel. He insists that, rather than turning 
to violence, the group ought to be “law-abiding” and “Organize” (276).  After learning that the 
elderly man is a “day laborer,” the invisible man asks, “Where has all his labor gone?” Then, 
rather than isolating the couple’s plight, the invisible man signals that their suffering is 
representative of a collective problem: “we’re out in the snow with them” (279). Perhaps 
recalling the title of Chernyshevsky’s novel that was so enervating to Dostoevsky’s protagonist, 
Ellison even has his narrator ask, “What is to be done?” (277). The invisible man answers this 
question by leading the group to force their way back into the apartment and return the elderly 
couple’s evicted possessions.  
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The invisible man’s speech thus invokes categories that resonate with the concerns of the 
working-class, and he even inspires action against an instance of socio-economic injustice. A 
member in the leadership of the leftist organization, Brother Jack, observes the invisible man’s 
intervention, and he offers him a position in the Brotherhood as its representative in Harlem. At 
first, the invisible man is hesitant because, among other reasons, he is suspicious of how Brother 
Jack dismisses the importance of the elderly couple’s plight on an individual level.  Yet, after 
returning to his apartment in Harlem, the invisible man decides to accept Brother Jack’s offer 
because he would otherwise fail to pay his rent.  The narrator quickly becomes prominent in the 
Harlem branch of the Brotherhood, even as he earns an income that far exceeds his earlier 
limited economic opportunities. He also has access to certain social circles—mainly among 
upper-class, white progressives—that he never encountered during his life in the South.   
Yet the narrator also discovers the racially toned fissures in this edifice of leftist equality 
when he reaches the ceiling for leadership set for the organization’s black members. Brother 
Wrestrum, a jealous gadfly in the Harlem offices, accuses the narrator of being a “petty 
individualist” (401), and the allegation of self-aggrandizement prompts an internal review 
requiring the narrator to “slow down.” The racial undertones of the Brotherhood’s decision 
dawns on the narrator after he is reinstated and returns to Harlem, where he finds that his friend 
and fellow member of the Brotherhood, Tod Clifton, has disappeared. The narrator eventually 
finds Clifton selling “Sambo” dolls on the street. A caricature of the obsequious slave, the 
Sambo doll serves as Clifton’s symbol for how the Brotherhood uses its Harlem members—and 
the black masses more generally.  Clifton signals as much during his “spiel” about the doll: 
He’ll make you laugh, he’ll make you sigh, si-igh. 
He’ll make you want to dance, and dance— 
Here you are, ladies and gentlemen, Sambo, 
The dancing doll. 
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Buy one for your baby.  Take him to your girl friend and she’ll love you, loove 
you! 
He’ll keep you entertained. He’ll make you weep sweet— (431) 
 
In an attempt to sell the dolls, Clifton sexualizes the entertainment. Sambo will make the 
audience “si-igh,” incite “loove,” and even elicit a pleasurable or “sweet” sorrow. Alluding to the 
sexualization of black Americans in the white imaginary, the entertainment that Sambo provides 
is also a symbolic characterization of the role played by the black members of the Brotherhood.  
Clifton explains that Sambo “lives upon the sunshine of [his audience’s] lordly smile” (432).  
Sambo’s existence is predicated upon the entertainment and benevolence he elicits.  He croons 
and bows for “the brotherly two bits of a dollar” (433).  Like Sambo, whatever brotherhood 
Clifton had experienced is, the performance suggests, only the “two bits” buying his loyalty. The 
black members of the Brotherhood are, in other words, merely token cases for equality; their 
actual function is to please the organization’s wealthy supporters, to make their bleeding 
progressive hearts “weep sweet.”  The presence of Harlem representatives is itself only a 
performance. 
Clifton’s Sambo doll also recalls for the narrator an earlier moment in his life prior to 
emigrating north.  Before he is forced into the Battle Royal, one of the rich white Southerners 
uses “Sambo” as a racial slur to describe the narrator (26). In this earlier instance, a white 
audience forces the invisible man into a dehumanizing situation for their pleasure in exchange 
for a college scholarship. Like the invisible man’s “Sambo” performance, Clifton’s doll suggests 
the dehumanizing place assigned to black members of the Brotherhood:  in exchange for a 
livable income and admission to parties at the Chthonian Hotel, these “brothers” stage 
performances of racial equality and leftist action. Indeed, when the narrator is first inducted into 
the Brotherhood, he attends a large party where he is given a new name.  Emma, a wealthy 
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progressive, promptly gives the invisible man three hundred dollars for his rent and clothing.  
Then, after a toast, Brother Jack says to the narrator, “Now for some pleasure,” and sweeps him 
away to be “introduced by [his] new name” (310, 311). He becomes the center of the party, 
eliciting support for the organization and its work in Harlem. Clifton’s performance calls this 
event into question, however, as the “Sambo” doll becomes a figure for the black man not only 
among white Southerners but also northern leftists. Indeed, these “Sambo” performances in the 
novel suggest that the social gulf between the two—the leftist intellectuals and racist 
Southerners—is not actually all that wide.  
This imbrication of leftist politics and a performing racialized figure surfaces again after 
the invisible man is temporarily “demoted” to promoting women’s rights.  One evening the 
narrator gives a speech explaining the party’s position on the equality of women, and afterwards 
a member of the organization lures him into her apartment under the pretext of discussing “my 
little ideological twists and turns” (412).  What becomes evident about these “twists and turns,” 
however, is that this woman’s interest in the party’s doctrine blends with her erotic view of the 
narrator as its exotic representative. She explains to the narrator, “you convey that great 
throbbing vitality of the movement.” His presence, she exclaims, is “so powerful, so—so 
primitive!” (413). The invisible man is representative of phallic power (“throbbing vitality”) but 
also an exotic interest (“primitive”). In fact, as the narrator continues to explain his “ideas” about 
“the Woman Question,” the “rapid, moth-fluttering of her lids become the softness of her lips.” 
His dissemination of political doctrine becomes a sexual act, a form of foreplay rather than 
intellectual “self-expression” (414).  Presentation thus becomes representation:  she “sees” not 
the invisible man but a pleasure-producing performance, which is as much representative of her 
exotic fantasies as of the role that he plays in the Brotherhood. 
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Presaging Clifton’s Sambo doll, then, the narrator makes the woman “si-igh” as he at 
once becomes a symbol for a marginalized group and also a source of pleasure or entertainment. 
The novel’s presentation of this leftist organization, then, calls into question the degree to which 
this form of collective politics is actually concerned with the wellbeing of racial minorities. In 
fact, when the narrator learns from Brother Hambro of the organization’s decision to withdraw 
its support from Harlem, his suspicions about the sincerity of the Brotherhood are confirmed.  
Brother Hambro explains that, although the residents of Harlem have been moved to action, the 
Brotherhood now believes “they must be brought along more slowly.” Seeing the color line that 
marks Hambro’s statement, the invisible man asks, “Are you sure you’re not saying that they 
must be held back?” (504). Indeed, Hambro earlier explains that some members are 
“expendable,” that “some must make greater sacrifices than others” (501, 503). The narrator 
counters that these sacrifices are, quite conveniently, always made by “my people” (503).  He 
realizes that, at its best, his presence in the leftist organization is little more than a token nod to 
equality, a form of entertainment requiring him to serve as an obsequious novelty.  At its worst, 
though, the narrator suggests that minorities become the fodder for the left’s sacrificial fires.  As 
he puts it after Clifton is killed, “their entertainment had been his death” (446). 
This damning depiction of the Brotherhood represents a transitional moment in Ellison’s 
political and intellectual life.  Beginning with his migration to New York in 1936, Ellison was 
incorporated into a milieu rife with popular front politics and left-leaning intellectuals.  He 
became acquainted with Richard Wright, for example, through the generosity of another leftist 
writer, Langston Hughes.  Wright helped Ellison with his first story “Hymie’s Bull” and also 
encouraged his younger friend to pursue a career in writing rather than music. A significant part 
of this patronage involved tutelage in communist politics, although neither Ellison nor Wright 
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felt beholden to walk the official lines of the Communist Party. According to Rampersad, Ellison 
“probably became, at least for a while, a dues-paying Party member. […] Later, Ralph only 
hinted at close ties to the Party during these years,” undoubtedly because membership had 
become increasingly unpopular as Cold War tensions were escalating in the early 1950s.79 
Ellison’s exact relationship to the Communist Party USA is less important, though, than the fact 
that he was part of a broad spectrum of leftist politics in the 1930s and 1940s.   
While some critics do not distinguish the political vision of Invisible Man from Ellison’s 
work during the 1930s and 1940s,80 several scholars have begun to reevaluate Ellison’s early 
career and his relationship to the left, presenting the author’s complicated position within the 
fluid intellectual life of New York. In the late 1990s, Barbara Foley revived the debate about 
Ellison’s early political allegiances, which his publishers seemingly tried to hide when the book 
was published.81 Foley argues that Ellison’s stories from the 1930s and 1940s—many of which 
were only published in the posthumous collection, Flying Home and Other Stories—demonstrate 
not only his early affinity for leftist politics but also his more or less orthodox Party ideology. 
Foley argues that “A Party Down at the Square,” an early short story that went unpublished until 
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Flying Home, evinces Ellison’s unwavering commitment to a leftist vision that he later scorns in 
Invisible Man. “A Party Down at the Square,” Foley explains, depicts a brutal lynching in which 
racism “inflict[s] gruesome brutality upon blacks,” even as it “produces a pro-capitalist false 
consciousness among white workers and divides the proletariat, leaving it vulnerable to 
complicity with fascism.”82 Furthermore, considering early drafts of Invisible Man, Foley argues 
that Ellison’s leftism was not simply abandoned when he began the novel. Rather, in early drafts 
of Invisible Man, the narrator treats the Brotherhood with considerably less hostility. As a result, 
Foley argues that Ellison’s novel is “a conflicted and contradictory text bearing multiple traces of 
his struggle to repress and then abolish the ghost of his leftist consciousness and conscience.”83 
In other words, Invisible Man is a palimpsest of the left’s waning influence upon Ellison’s 
intellectual life. 
Michael Denning similarly situates Ellison’s career during the 1930s and 1940s within 
what he calls the “cultural front,” or the cultural activities of popular front politics.84 Ellison 
edited The Negro Quarterly with Angelo Herndon, a prominent communist intellectual, and he 
published almost exclusively in leftist magazines, such as his story “Slick Gonna Learn,” 
published in 1939 in Direction, and “The Birthmark,” published in 1940 in New Masses, which 
was explicitly associated with the Communist Party USA.  While Denning and Foley are at 
variance about the leftist orthodoxy and activism of Ellison’s early years, they mount a 
convincing argument about his pre-war commitment to a broad leftist political orientation. In 
                                                
82 Barbara Foley, “Reading Redness:  Politics and Audience in Ralph Ellison’s Early 
Short Fiction,” Journal of Narrative Theory 29.3 (Fall 1999), 327. 
 
83 Foley, Wrestling with the Left, 7. 
 
84 Michael Denning, The Cultural Front:  The Laboring of American Culture in the 
Twentieth Century (New York:  Verso, 1998), 332. 
  58 
particular, Ellison’s association with the left was defined by his commitment to class as a 
fundamental impetus for racial conflict, and his intellectual labor from this period is thus 
oriented toward documenting the plight of the dispossessed and working-class people.   
According to Rampersad, Ellison first experienced significant conflict about his 
commitment to Communism around 1941, when his essays begin to cast a “vision of liberal 
cosmopolitanism” foreclosed by the Party.85 During the war, Ellison began to distance himself 
from the radicalism of “black Communists” who idealized the Soviet Union, which had ruled 
that racial discrimination was illegal.  Yet Ellison was also disgusted with the political violence 
of Soviet-style communism, and so the mid-1940s fostered political ambivalence as he fashioned 
a role of “artist” that increasingly excluded “political activist.” Nonetheless, as late as 1948 
Ellison quietly preserved hope that some form of communism might “survive and become a 
force again,” particularly given the sluggish postwar economy and scarcity of goods.86  
In contrast to the work of his early career and his mid-1940s drift from communism, 
Invisible Man signals a shift in the contours of Ellison’s politics. Raymond A. Mazurek explains 
that, with the novel’s publication, Ellison suppressed many of his early stories and essays—as 
well as his place on the spectrum of leftist politics—“as he became a major U.S. writer during 
the early years of the Cold War.”87 Mazurek implies that the novelist was shrewd about his 
political past, but he rejects Foley’s suggestion that Ellison presents a distorted picture of the left 
for the sake of his own career in McCarthy-era America. While Ellison may have prevaricated 
about his relationship as a young intellectual to the Communist Party or the left more generally, 
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Mazurek argues, Invisible Man is more importantly representative of a common postwar 
response toward the Party by African Americans.  Mazurek cites, for example, Larry Neal’s 
famous essay, “Ellison’s Zoot Suit,” where Neal recalls “the detrimental role that the left wing 
has played in our struggle for self-determination and liberation.”88 Furthermore, Mazurek argues 
that Ellison’s commitment to the black vernacular in Invisible Man refutes the idea that the 
novelist abandoned the concerns of the African American working class through his critique of 
the Brotherhood (a charge levied against him by the Black Arts Movement). Instead, Mazurek 
claims, “class politics are part of the ideological subtext of Ellison’s later work, even while his 
explicit position rejected the working class militancy of the popular front and became a 
celebration of American democracy.”89 Mazurek argues, then, that the novel’s commitment to 
the vernacular, or the narrator’s famous affirmation of black Southern working-class identity (“I 
yam what I yam!”), undermines a critical taxonomy dependent upon rigid binaries between 
communism and American democracy (266). 
Invisible Man is more than a reflection of Ellison’s personal relationship to leftist politics, 
however, for the novel’s depiction of the Brotherhood is also exemplary of a common 
phenomenon among postwar intellectuals. As Denning explains, a prominent part of the political 
scene of the 1930s and 1940s, contrary to the anxieties and consensus culture enforced by Cold 
War-era politics, was the “radical social-democratic movement forged around anti-fascism, anti-
lynching, and the industrial unionism of the CIO.”90 According to Denning, this non-liberal 
leftist movement did not center on either the Communist Party USA or the American Workers 
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Party; rather, there was a diverse spectrum of leftist politics that was primarily concerned with 
securing equality and fair working conditions domestically, and opposing fascism abroad in the 
regimes of Italy, Spain, and Germany. Rather than collapsing leftism into Soviet-style 
communism, then, Denning offers a more inclusive account of the left by characterizing it in the 
terms of “popular front” politics. In other words, while the postwar era tended to think of leftism 
in terms of the Communist Party, the non-liberal left of the 1930s and 1940s was comprised of a 
spectrum of progressives who gained a great deal of intellectual and popular traction in their 
opposition to fascism. Indeed, following Denning, Wendy Wall explains that the “popular front” 
progressives successfully billed communism as “twentieth-century Americanism” during the 
early years of the New Deal era.91 The “radical thirties” thus garnered intellectual and political 
legitimacy for the American left during a time when fascism (rather than Soviet-style 
communism) was seen as the primary force antithetical to American political and social values. 
Thus, while the intellectual landscape was more diverse than the consensus culture of the 
Cold War years, the political landscape of 1930s New Deal America was also less preoccupied 
with anti-communist anxieties. The programs and policies of the New Deal often cooperated 
with segments of the non-liberal left in attempts to achieve common domestic ends, such as the 
maintenance of unions and strong labor laws. For example, this selective cooperation occurred 
within the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), one of the first projects initiated by President 
Roosevelt. As Aaron D. Purcell argues, many TVA employees participated in union organizing, 
a function of the project’s goal of fostering white-collar unions. This relationship to the unions 
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would later incite intense investigations of many TVA employees during the McCarthy era.92 
Indeed, in 1948 Whittaker Chambers, an editor at Time magazine and a former member of the 
Communist Party, would testify before Congress that other party members had “infiltrated” 
several New Deal agencies.  However, in contrast to the historical and political rewriting of the 
1930s and 1940s that later occurred during the Cold War era, the relationship between the non-
liberal left and the projects and policies of FDR’s New Deal were not a form of espionage or 
treason, an undermining of American democracy.  The notion of “infiltration,” in other words, 
draws on what Marcel Cornis-Pope characterizes as the binary logic of Cold War culture (e.g. 
Marxism / American democracy).93 Instead, the American political spectrum of the 1930s lent 
itself to greater fluidity as many non-liberal leftists at once supported U.S. domestic projects as 
well as an international progressive vision. 
The legitimacy of a social democratic left also proceeded from certain institutional 
formations. For example, prominent New Deal legislation, such as the Wagner Act in 1935, 
fostered a period of ascending labor power. Seizing upon the opportunities created by this labor-
friendly legislation, influential organizations such as the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(CIO) successfully organized industrial workers across the United States.  However, like the 
“New Deal era” itself, the CIO was far from homogenous:  it nurtured progressives and 
conservatives alike, and as the Second World War intensified the internal differences of the CIO 
were also aggravated.  Beginning in 1940, in particular, the rising tide of anti-communist 
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anxieties in America began to transform the CIO by requiring its members to denounce loyalty to 
“isms,” including “fascism, nazism, and communism.”94 The conflation of the three political 
philosophies was a sign of things to come, a harbinger for the eroding legitimacy of non-liberal 
leftists who cooperated with—and were accepted within—New Deal projects for the shared goal 
of “domestic reform.”95 
Indeed, although organizations like the TVA and CIO provided institutional outlets for a 
more pluralistic progressive democracy during the 1930s, the inclusivity of leftist politics in the 
New Deal Coalition was never uncontested.  In 1938, for example, the House Committee on Un-
American Activities (later known as HUAC) was formed to investigate the alleged Communist 
Party ties of both private citizens and public employees.  However, President Roosevelt was 
often censorious of the committee, which prompted HUAC’s own criticisms of the 
administration. Martin Dies, Jr., a congressman and Democrat from Texas who began to oppose 
the New Deal after the Wagner Act, led the committee’s investigations. This rising anxiety was 
initially stunted by the popularity of President Roosevelt and his federal programs. However, the 
mounting anxieties of the Second World War, along with the conflation of fascism and 
communism as America’s enemies within popular sentiment, created footholds for those 
elements in Congress and corporate America to assert a less progressive definition of American 
democracy.  As Gilbert Gall explains, “energy of Progressive politics of the New Deal era, and 
along with it the vitality of the American labor movement, would be sapped by the 
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anticommunist fears of the American people.”96 The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, for example, 
severely hurt the legitimacy of union leaders and organizations like the CIO, as it required them 
to swear under oath that they were not communists. Many CIO leaders refused simply upon 
principle.  
Furthermore, many of President Roosevelt’s early supporters took pains to distinguish 
between the New Deal “revolution” and Soviet-style communism, insisting that FDR’s 
liberalism could not be collapsed into communism on the grounds that the former retained the 
notion of private property rights and created economic opportunities for non-state capital 
production.97 Yet even those efforts to parse out New Deal liberalism from the communist 
regime of the U.S.S.R. defined the former in terms of its heterogeneity: “In the United States, 
unlike Russia, Italy, and Germany, there is no party with an explicit philosophy and body of 
dogma to account for the policies and procedures of the Federal Administration.”98 Indeed, the 
early years of the New Deal formalized a democratic consensus with fewer polarities than the 
ideological battles that were later waged by Senator McCarthy. However, as Wall explains, 
beginning in the late 1930s New Deal liberals and leftists “generally saw [the nation’s] enemy as 
fascism and tried to unite Americans in an anti-fascist consensus.”99 Even during the Second 
World War, when the spectrum of nations collected under the idea of the “Axis powers” raised 
questions about the left’s relationship to the United States’ enemies, American liberals, leftist 
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intellectuals, and labor organizers had joined together in a common international agenda:  
support for the Popular Front coalitions that opposed fascism in France, Spain, and Germany. 
This American coalition promoted a common foreign policy, as Wall puts it, under the banner of 
“a more democratic and egalitarian social, political, and economic order.” In other words, an 
anti-fascist foreign policy was the nodal point for the progressives of the early New Deal 
Coalition. Wall shows that the alliances between liberal Democrats and leftists on pressing 
foreign policy issues allowed them to “extend the economic agenda of the New Deal and to 
promote ethnic, religious, and racial equality.”100 During the 1930s and the Second World War, 
New Dealers and leftists opposed European fascism through economic planning—an imbrication 
of domestic and foreign agendas for the sake of promoting economic and social equality. 
Yet the tide begins to turn in the mid-1940s with the rise of anti-communist anxieties that 
ballooned into animus toward progressive politics more generally. Landon R. Y. Storrs 
demonstrates that anti-New Deal conservatives began to incite and exploit anxieties about Soviet 
espionage immediately following the war in order to undermine liberals who advocated 
redistributive and regulatory policies.101 For example, in 1947 a federal employee loyalty 
program was formalized that either marginalized or forced to the political center many officials 
on the progressive wing of the New Deal Coalition.  The anxiety during this so-called Second 
Red Scare was that members of the Communist Party were manipulating U.S. policy to the 
advantage of the Soviet Union.  President Truman, less popular than FDR, more anxious about 
communism, and less able to stand up to a stronger conservative coalition, instituted the federal 
loyalty program. According to Storrs, these anxieties prompted a collapsed distinction between 
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communism and leftism more generally during the mid-1940s, which altered specific policy 
fields of the New Deal agenda, “including labor and civil rights, consumer protection, national 
health insurance, public assistance, worker education, public works, public housing, Native 
American rights, and international aid.”102 Admittedly, Truman introduced his reform agenda, 
the “Fair Deal,” which included national health insurance and civil rights legislation.  He also 
integrated the military by executive order in 1948.   President Truman, in other words, 
augmented the institutional pressures put on the New Deal welfare state through his anxious 
reaction to the rising Red Scare. 
President Truman also participated in the rolling back of the New Deal’s progressive 
policies through his escalation of the Cold War.  President Truman institutionalized anti-
communist anxieties in 1948 when he introduced the European Recovery Program (also known 
as the Marshall Plan) and began to develop an interventionist foreign policy aimed at 
“containing” communism. Many conservatives seized upon the underlying anxieties of the 
President’s foreign policy and depicted New Deal agencies such as the TVA and WPA as “un-
American,” which became fodder for the fire of the 1950s witch-hunts.  Indeed, Earl Latham 
claims that in 1950 the momentum shifted decisively in favor of those who associated New Deal 
economic planning with progressivism.  That year began with Alger Hiss’s conviction of perjury 
about his communist past in January and Senator McCarthy asserting in February that the 
Department of State knowingly employed communists. Other anti-leftist spectacles then began to 
snowball, such as the arrest of Julius Rosenberg and the HUAC investigations into communist 
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activity in Hawaii, both of which received almost daily media attention.103 Similarly, Purcell 
argues that these postwar fears were put to use during the McCarthy era as a way of undermining 
New Deal agencies and the economic agenda of the welfare state. “At the end of 1947,” Purcell 
summarizes, “many former New Dealers found themselves at odds with the national political 
climate. Gains by Republicans during the elections of the previous year, a tougher foreign policy 
against Soviet-bloc countries, and efforts to uncover domestic subversives formed the bedrock 
layers of a cold war culture that would last for decades.”104 The point is that conservative 
opponents who were suspicious of FDR’s progressive policies on industrial unionism, regulatory 
intervention, economic planning, social security, and a welfare state more broadly, tried to 
disrupt the politics of the New Deal era from its beginning.  This resistance gained significant 
ground when the left’s legitimacy and relationship to “Americanism” came into question.  
Ellison’s critical depictions of both the Brotherhood and black nationalism are part of this 
political and cultural conversation about the role of non-liberal progressivism in American life. 
The invisible man rejects (and is rejected by) the black nationalist Ras the Exhorter because, as 
one woman in the Brotherhood puts it, “His hoodlums would attack and denounce the white meat 
of a roasted chicken” (365).  As a member of the Brotherhood, the narrator follows the 
organization’s official position that such black nationalism is a “gang of racist gangsters” whose 
first response is to reject white Americans categorically and then resort to violent confrontation 
(421).  The narrator never explicitly states why he continues to reject Ras and his politics after he 
scorns the Brotherhood, although presumably his violent tactics and absolutism justify the 
invisible man’s rejection of black nationalism. Yet Ras nonetheless causes both the narrator and 
                                                
103 Earl Latham, The Communist Controversy in Washington:  From the New Deal to 
McCarthy (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1966). 
 
104 Purcell, White Collar Radicals, 136. 
  67 
Clifton to reconsider their assimilation within the Brotherhood. In particular, after an altercation 
with the Exhorter, Clifton contemplates whether there might be something significant about Ras’ 
extremism: “I suppose sometimes a man has to plunge outside history,” Clifton muses, lest he 
“kill somebody, go nuts” (377).  Clifton’s enigmatic obiter dictum, when coupled with his later 
Sambo performance, suggests that “history” (at least as the Brotherhood conceives it) appears to 
be weighted against black Americans.  What he finds compelling about Ras’ approach, in other 
words, is that living “inside” history means being determined by its racially exploitative patterns.  
“History” has tended to consign black Americans to the margins, and structuring one’s actions 
according to such a general concept results in madness, frustrated violence.   
While the narrator initially rejects Clifton’s sympathy with Ras because of the place 
within “history” that the Brotherhood supposedly provides him, he later revaluates that position 
after Clifton’s death.  A policeman accosts Clifton for not having a permit to sell the Sambo 
dolls.  Clifton puts the policeman “on his ass” for repeatedly pushing him, and in turn he is shot 
(438).  The narrator retreats to the Brotherhood’s district office, where he broods on the situation.  
In an attempt to avoid any personal responsibility he might have for Clifton’s death, the narrator 
tells himself, “The incident was political.” The invisible man’s understanding of “politics” at this 
point follows the Brotherhood’s definition. He explains, “politically, individuals were without 
meaning. The shooting was all that was left of him now, Clifton had chosen to plunge out of 
history and […] only the plunge was recorded, and that was the only important thing.” Clifton’s 
act is isolated, its “politics” are individual. Therefore, the narrator concludes, the “political 
equivalent” of his actions are “death” (447). Whatever larger significance Clifton might have had 
is cancelled out because he acted only as an individual. 
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The invisible man nonetheless decides to organize a funeral for Clifton and use the event 
to articulate a “greater” meaning to the murder (448). During the funeral, an “old man” in a 
“husky baritone” sings “There’s Many a Thousand Gone.” The spiritual moves the crowd, but 
the narrator explains, 
It was not the words, for they were all the same old slave-borne words; it was as 
though he’d changed the emotion beneath the words while yet the old longing, 
resigned, transcendent emotion still sounded above, now deepened by that 
something for which the theory of Brotherhood had given me no name. (453) 
 
The ideology of the Brotherhood fails to explain fully the nameless “something” provoked by the 
old man’s song and the crowd’s response.  The organization’s analytical criteria fail in the face 
of an emotion or existential longing “deeper than protest, or religion” (453). This spiritual begins 
to unravel the narrator’s assumptions about the Brotherhood and its definitions of politics and 
history, for his “transcendent emotion” suggests that the most fundamental register is not the 
political but, perhaps, the self’s freedom: “No more peck o’corn for me,” the famous lyrics 
proclaim, “No more, no more, / No more peck o’corn for me.” Indeed, this longing becomes an 
affirmation of freedom while everywhere black Americans are still in systematic chains. 
The invisible man’s unsettled ideology inflects his speech as he laments Clifton in mock-
bureaucratic style: “Place of birth:  U.S.  Some southern town. […] Address:  unknown.  
Occupation:  unemployed. Cause of death (be specific):  resisting reality in the form of a .38 
caliber revolver in the hands of the arresting officer […]” (458).  The bureaucratic categories of 
the eulogy symbolize the elision of Clifton’s individuality, and the narrator casts this impersonal 
framework in stark terms: “he was black and they shot him” (456). The “facts,” he argues, are 
simple because the laws of the state boil down to such simple “facts”:  a black man may be shot 
with impunity.  Indeed, Clifton is not an individual with a distinct past; rather, the policemen 
view him only as “black.” His address is now a box that is “far, far too expensive a dwelling,” 
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for it corresponds not only to his death but also his facelessness (458). Yet the narrator’s 
response to Clifton’s elided individuality is to turn away from impersonal analytics in his eulogy 
and instead cast his friend’s death in subjective terms: “when he fell there was a hole in the heel 
of his socks” (456). What the narrator conveys is not the economic forces underwriting the white 
policemen’s false consciousness, as perhaps the writer of “A Party Down at the Square” might 
have. Rather, the narrator presents an individual tragedy, the loss of self within a society rife 
with racially configured alienation. 
The narrator’s invocation of strikingly personal imagery, along with his mocking 
presentation of Clifton’s elided individuality, dominates his eulogy.  In fact, his concern with 
Clifton as an individual prompts him to conclude afterwards, “I had let [the eulogy] get away 
from me, had been unable to bring in the political issues” (459).  He senses that his subjective 
lament and mock-bureaucratic style somehow run against the grain of the Brotherhood’s 
expectations. The invisible man reflects that he has been unable to utilize what seems to be a 
critical space for denouncing structures of oppression, for identifying the “political” or 
“economic” meaning of Clifton’s death (447).  In fact, in a moment of narrative irony that the 
narrator himself does not recognize, his eulogy suggests that the Brotherhood shares with 
Clifton’s murderers a racialized pattern of thought:  both fashion their political visions by eliding 
a black individual.  However, the narrator’s sense of failure begins to ebb away as the 
significance of the old man’s spiritual dawns on him after the ceremony. Looking over the crowd 
gathered to mourn Clifton, the funeral participants are transformed in the narrator’s eyes from a 
conglomerate social body—a single organism with undifferentiated parts. Instead, he suddenly 
finds this generic body differentiated: “I saw not a crowd but the set faces of individual men and 
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women.” While the Brotherhood’s politics subsumes the self under impersonal forces, Clifton’s 
moving funeral unravels this ideological fabric.  
Significantly, the invisible man’s vision of the “flesh and blood” of individuals rather 
than the “masses” as an abstract idea bears the imprint of Clifton’s decision to step outside 
“history” (459). Clifton’s enigmatic actions are, as the narrator would later describe his own 
withdrawal from “history” underground, “very much against the trend of the times” (576).  He 
acts as an individual, his symbolic Sambo performance serving as a rhetorical figure that at once 
recalls his socially constructed subhuman status while also affirming the self that is being denied. 
Clifton himself becomes this rhetorical figure through his death, which defamiliarizes the 
invisible man’s own predicament.  The funeral finally prompts the invisible man to see the elided 
black self at the heart of the Brotherhood’s activities because Clifton’s own actions are so 
unintelligible, unfamiliar.  Yet even as Clifton’s decision to step outside “history” defamiliarizes 
the narrator’s predicament, it also becomes a model of individual exemplarity, or action that 
originates from the self but that speaks on the “lower” or foundational frequencies (581). “He’s 
in the box and we’re in there with him,” the invisible man explains, “It’s dark in this box and it’s 
crowded. It has a cracked ceiling and a clogged-up toilet in the hall.” Clifton’s “short bitter life,” 
the narrator begins to perceive, becomes a model of individual action that has collective 
implications. Clifton’s decision to abandon the leftist organization represents a singular 
individual act, but his death also allows him to represent the “box” that houses too many of his 
fellow black Americans.  As the invisible man’s allegiances to the ideology of the Brotherhood 
begin to fracture, then, he perceives that Clifton has actually become “part of history” by 
performing as a rhetorical figure for the exemplary self (458).  The narrator’s emerging 
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sensibility about individual exemplarity, then, inverts his former leftist ideology by placing the 
self, rather than the masses, at the center of “history.” 
If the invisible man finds in Clifton’s Sambo performance and sudden death a 
condemnation of the self’s elision, his final rejection of the Brotherhood signals a related 
suspicion of collective action. The narrator harbors this suspicion throughout his affiliation with 
the Brotherhood, but he suppresses it until after Clifton’s death. When Brother Jack and the 
narrator first meet, for example, the former is impressed with how the invisible man “aroused” 
the group of onlookers “so quickly to action” (289).  Brother Jack thinks of the narrator’s 
“effective piece of eloquence” as a way to motivate a collective, to get the masses involved.  The 
invisible man demurs at the way Brother Jack subsumes the Provos under a larger “type” that is 
“ground up by industrial conditions” (290). Following this socio-economic analysis, Brother 
Jack even instructs the invisible man, “But you mustn’t waste your emotions on individuals, they 
don’t count.” The invisible man is confounded, but Brother Jack argues that any individual 
concern for the elderly couple is a consequence of an “old agrarian self,” which the narrator 
ought to “throw off” and “emerge [as] something new” (291).  Registering one’s concerns on the 
level of individual burdens and injustices is, Brother Jack suggests, the fallout of a pre-capitalist, 
pre-industrial mindset. Individualism is a function of a bygone era when problems were local, 
not structural. What’s more, he explains, “sometimes the difference between individual and 
organized indignation is the difference between criminal and political action” (293).  To think of 
the burden of action in personal terms is, according to Brother Jack, at once futile and misguided.   
Brother Hambro later confirms the invisible man’s suspicions about the elision of the self 
from the Brotherhood’s philosophy.  As Hambro explains the Brotherhood’s withdrawal from 
Harlem, he asserts, “All of us must sacrifice for the good of the whole” (502). Rather than base 
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political value or agency on an individual register, then, the characterization of leftist politics in 
Invisible Man insists that the narrator must “have confidence in those who lead you—in the 
collective wisdom of Brotherhood.” Put more baldly, Hambro advises, “we as individuals must 
sympathetically debunk ourselves” (505). The invisible man discerns, however, that this self-
negation is far from neutral.  He instead recognizes that black Americans occupy a double bind 
within the terms of the political left: “Outside the Brotherhood we were outside history; but 
inside of it they didn’t see us” (499). In other words, outside of a leftist political vision, the plight 
of African Americans is mistakenly isolated from the political and economic conditions that 
contribute to their alienation. Yet, as a part of that organization, black Americans retain their 
invisibility because of the Brotherhood’s own racially stratified hierarchy and its abstract, 
dehumanizing categories, such as “class” or “industrial conditions,” which obviate the 
significance of the individual (290).  Thus, despite his persistent suspicions, the narrator longs to 
find a home in this leftist organization, but he finds himself alienated within its collectivist terms. 
The Brotherhood only sees “figments of their imagination”—not human beings but instances of a 
category or class (3). Apart from affirming what is distinctively individual about the self, he 
concludes, black Americans find themselves doubly damned.  
In a sense, then, the invisible man’s final eulogy is as much for the ideas of “class” and 
“economic conditions” as it is for Tod Clifton.  Progressive configurations of society in terms of 
political groups and economic oppression become, for the narrator in his underground space, 
worse than the disease they are meant to cure.  Admittedly, the invisible man never abandons the 
notion of collective problems, but he still casts suspicion upon collective political agency and 
affiliation. As he puts it in another moment of unrecognized irony, “I’m a cog in a machine.  We 
here in the Brotherhood work as a unit” (396-97). When agency is inflected through such 
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organizational terms, the self becomes negligible, nondescript, merely a movable part. Therefore, 
even if Invisible Man is concerned for working-class politics through its presentation of the black 
vernacular, as Mazurek argues, the narrator nonetheless finds himself alienated from leftist 
collective politics and suspicious of its dehumanizing logic. He becomes increasingly distrustful 
of anything but the self as the provenance for action and social responsibility.  
 
Richard Wright Goes to Europe 
Ellison’s suspicions about leftist politics are not new to twentieth-century African 
American fiction.  Chester Himes’s Lonely Crusade (1947), for example, narrates the failures of 
a black union organizer during the Second World War.  The protagonist, Lee Gordon, organizes 
other workers at a wartime aircraft factory in Los Angeles, and he soon becomes the darling 
symbol of the leftist organization that employs him.  Yet Gordon is eventually divested of his 
dignity or “manhood” through party strife and, it becomes apparent, is merely grist for the leftist 
mill in its wrangling with conservative business groups. Thus, much like Ellison’s imbrication of 
the Brotherhood and mainstream white society, Himes undermines the sincerity of the left’s 
concern for black Americans.105 Similarly, Richard Wright’s work from the 1940s and 1950s 
documents his growing antagonism with the Communist Party USA.  Wright joined the Party in 
1933 through the John Reed Club.  He also found employment in the Federal Writers’ Project 
and the Federal Theatre Project from 1935-1936, working mostly in publicity offices. During the 
war, Wright discovered that the Communist Party would not take legal action against the 
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government for its support of Jim Crow laws, and this refusal precipitated his official break from 
the Party in 1942.106 Wright and his wife, Ellen, who was an important Party organizer in 
Brooklyn, came to believe that “the Party was using the Negro for its own ends,” and so they 
effectively cut all ties with it.107  
Wright elaborates upon his souring relationship with the Party in his autobiography Black 
Boy (American Hunger) (1993). Explaining his mounting suspicions, Wright describes the 
Party’s “Negro Communists” as impenetrable silos filled with uncompromising ideology:  
An hour’s listening [to their speeches] disclosed the fanatical intolerance of minds 
sealed against new ideas, new facts, new feelings, new attitudes, new hints at 
ways to live. They denounced books they had never read, people they had never 
known, ideas they could never understand, and doctrines whose names they could 
not pronounce. Communism, instead of making them leap forward with fire in 
their hearts to become masters of ideas and life, had frozen them at an even lower 
level of ignorance than had been theirs before they met Communism.108 
According to Wright, toeing the Party line is more than an expectation; it is a blind obsession.  
Indeed, Wright inverts the critiques of other novels from the late 1940s and 1950s, such as Sloan 
Wilson’s The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit (1955), which questions the conformism at the heart 
of “mainstream” America.  Rather than questioning the generic pattern of the so-called American 
Way, Wright questions the compulsory conformity of the radicalism that challenges that 
mainstream existence.  Wright’s “Negro” with the red armband is as much a symbol as Sloan’s 
businessman of self-possession undermined by conformity. 
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Wright also justifies his migration away from communism in his famous essay, “I Tried 
to Be a Communist” (1944). After Wright reads magazines given to him at a meeting of the John 
Reed Club, he “was amazed to find that there did exist in this world an organized search for the 
truth of the lives of the oppressed and the isolated.” In communism, Wright finds a compelling 
account of “the similarity of the experiences of workers in other lands, by the possibility of 
uniting scattered but kindred peoples into a whole,” and this political vision first attracts him to 
the Party.109 However, this time Wright provides two general reasons for his disillusionment with 
the Party: first, because of the ease with which its revolutionary fervor melds into madness;110 
second, due to the anti-intellectualism rampant throughout the membership. As a “quiet black 
Communist” gently explains to him, “We’ve kept records of the trouble [the Party has] had with 
intellectuals in the past.  It’s estimated that only 13 per cent of them remain in the party.” Wright 
asks why they leave, and the man responds, “Most of them drop out of their own accord.”111 
Wright takes this response as symbolic of the Party’s animosity toward critical reflection, new 
ideas, and even different cultural traditions.  However, Wright also explains that, while finally 
“failing” to be a Communist, he nonetheless remains committed to a vision of “uniting” groups 
into a “whole.” The difference between this vision of unity and the conformism that sours 
Wright’s view of the Party is that the former is delineated in terms of collective identification or 
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solidarity.  Rather than conformity, which insists, “Be like us,” Wright searches for ways of 
identifying “kinship” among suffering people.112  
Thus, Wright’s distrust of the Communist Party did not translate into a rejection of the 
left as such.  In fact, his immigration to France in 1946 allowed Wright to explore other forms of 
Marxism beyond the increasingly narrow scope of postwar leftism. Wright’s exploration 
becomes colored in the hue of existentialism when he strikes up a correspondence with Sartre 
and Simone de Beauvoir in the early 1940s, eventually joining them in Paris.  Sartre’s postwar 
project of reconciling Marxism and existentialism appealed to Wright, and in 1948 he began to 
read deeply in existentialist philosophy and literature. In that same year he participated with 
Sartre and Camus in the leadership of the Rassemblement Démocratique Révolutionnaire (RDR).  
The RDR at once opposed Soviet-style communism and the United States, advancing instead the 
political solidarity imagined in Sartre’s later existentialism.  In fact, Wright eventually writes an 
existential novel, The Outsider (1953), which received its greatest acclaim among French 
intellectuals.  The Outsider marks a decisive break with Communism as Cross Damon, the 
novel’s protagonist, murders a Communist for his anti-humanist denial of individual “life” and 
“consciousness.” The Outsider thus decries violations of the self in a way not unlike Sartre’s 
existential humanism, and it solidified Wright’s commitment to the non-Communist left.  He 
would later support Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir as they opposed the rise of General de Gaulle 
in 1958.   
Thus, while Wright’s misgivings about Communism in America deepen in the 1940s and 
prompt a turn toward other forms of Marxist leftism in the 1950s, he differs from Ellison in that 
he does not collapse the Party with the left as such. Even as the broad strokes of their trajectories 
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are similar—early affiliations with communism, growing discontentment and wartime rejection 
of the Party, and an intellectual affinity for existentialism—Wright and Ellison differ in their 
responses to the racial inequities of New Deal America in important ways. Indeed, the 
differences between Wright and Ellison illuminate the latter’s construal of agency and 
responsibility in the narrative frames of Invisible Man.  For example, Wright’s early novel Native 
Son (1940) charts the structural social conditions that produce Bigger Thomas, a black twenty-
year-old who grows up in an impoverished area of Chicago.113 Bigger comes of age in an urban 
jungle of newspapers, magazines, movies, radios, and towering buildings. His environment 
preaches a gospel of success and material wealth, even as it forecloses those opportunities to 
black Americans. Bigger’s environment is even so limited that it does not afford him the 
opportunity to imagine alternatives. “But what could he do?” he reflects early in the novel. “Each 
time he asked himself that question his mind hit a blank wall and stopped thinking.” Instead, he 
only looks out his window and sees the “miserable” opportunities of workers in “overalls” (12). 
As he explains in the essay “How Bigger Was Born” (1940), Wright’s protagonist “is a product 
of a dislocated society; he is a dispossessed and disinherited man.”114 
The environmental forces that produce Bigger’s alienation continue in the tradition of 
earlier American novels such as Stephen Crane’s Maggie: A Girl of the Streets (1893) and 
Theodore Dreiser’s Sister Carrie (1900).  Rather than establishing a simplistic, one-way 
causality in which environments always determine individuals, these novels of urban naturalism 
represent the structural conditions that preclude self-determination.  As Ellison perceptively 
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explains in his review of Wright’s autobiography, the question of individual humanity “had as 
little chance of prevailing against the overwhelming weight of [his environment] as Beethoven’s 
Quartets would have of destroying the stench of a Nazi prison.”115 Following this assertion, 
Ellison observes that the combination of forces before which the individual feels powerless is 
itself an assertion of individuality, or at least a “groping” for it.116 In other words, if the 
environment swallows up the individual in Native Son and Black Boy, these narratives suggest a 
form of social protest that wants to reform that environment, to make structural space for the 
individuality of the black man whose humanity those forces deny. Wright’s urban naturalism, 
then, directs his readers’ attention to the adverse and tumultuous conditions of capitalist society 
that shape modern consciousness, and he thereby places the burden of reform at an institutional 
and structural level.117 Indeed, as part of Wright’s complicated support for the New Deal’s relief 
and public works programs, Susan Louise Edmunds reads Native Son as revising the tradition of 
domestic and sentimental literature in order to reform the reformer, so to speak. Bigger, as 
another “problem boy” who works in the home of a white, sentimental couple,  racial inequalities 
of the US welfare state. 
Perhaps even more than Native Son, Wright’s novella “The Man Who Lived 
Underground” (1942) sketches this view of the self subject to the alienating and inequitable 
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structures of capitalist society.118 Indeed, the narrative frame of Invisible Man alludes to 
Wright’s novella, which follows the “underground” life of Fred Daniels, whose name is only 
once mentioned in the narrative.  The namelessness of Ellison and Wright’s protagonists 
suggests that they are both in some sense alienated from their individuality. During an interview 
with the police, for example, Daniels is asked, “What’s your name?” He “opened his lips to 
answer and no words came.  He had forgotten.  But what did it matter if he had? It was not 
important” (1442).  Although Daniels has just emerged from underground with a revelatory 
“statement” for his society (1441), he experiences a loss of self:  the marker or sign of his 
individuality is “not important” to the truth of the surface world he has reentered to announce. As 
a matter of fact, while walking to the police station to “clear up everything, make a statement,” 
Daniels asks himself, “What statement? He did not know. He was the statement” (1441). 
Wright’s protagonist babbles incoherently during his interview with the police, becoming 
something of an unheeded prophet whose words fall on indifferent ears. Thus, since he himself is 
the “statement,” Daniels’ lost individuality is the “truth” of his modern world. The policemen, 
who fail to hear his prophetic message, have in fact produced Daniels by forcing him to make a 
false confession to a crime and thus driving him underground.  Daniels’ dehumanized self is the 
fallout of a racially inequitable legal system, an individuality suppressed, pathologized, and 
criminalized by corrupt law enforcement. 
Like Ellison, Wright also patterns his marginalized narrator on Dostoevsky’s estranged 
Underground Man.  Fred Daniels’ flight into the sewers to escape hostile policemen affords him 
a position in which all the subterranean aspects of his society are on view.  As in Dostoevsky’s 
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Notes, the subterranean space of Wright’s story is at once a metaphor for the foundations of 
society as well as those people, truths, and activities that are hidden from view.  The 
“underground,” in other words, is society’s ideological base as well as its omissions, its elided 
margins. For Wright, in fact, the two are one and the same.  His narrative demarcates the 
connecting lines between socio-economic structures (the base of society) and the idea of racial 
alienation (the part of the world consigned from view).  From his “underground” perspective, 
Daniels is able to perceive that the “various currents of life swirling aboveground” are in fact 
polluted with violence and emptiness (1432). For example, he steals money from a guarded safe, 
lining the walls of his cave with the currency and trampling on other purloined diamonds.  
Daniels’ act of mocking and deprecating these objects that are attributed such significant value in 
“the world aboveground” become a form of triumph.  His “discovery,” he insists, is that currency 
and precious stones are empty objects, arbitrary symbols constructed by a world “filled with 
death” (1433).  Yet that constructed society is nonetheless the cause of his alienation—a double 
bind that seemingly drives Daniels to madness. 
Fred Daniels and the invisible man both experience some degree of enlightenment 
through the alienation forced upon them by the racially inequitable social structures of their 
“aboveground” worlds.  Yet, unlike Ellison’s protagonist with his world of “infinite 
possibilities,” Wright suggests that the social structures of Daniels’ environment will inevitably 
reject him. “The Man Who Lived Underground” concludes with one of the policemen shooting 
Daniels in the chest because, as the officer claims, “You’ve got to shoot his kind.  They’d wreck 
things” (1450).  Daniels falls back underground into the currents of his city’s sewers.  When he 
lands, he becomes “a whirling object rushing alone in the darkness, veering, tossing, lost in the 
heart of the earth” (1450).  In this ignoble ending, Daniels becomes devoid of humanity and 
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agency:  like the excreta of the sewers, he is not only subject to forces beyond his control—
“veering, tossing” in the currents—but also he is inhuman, a mere “whirling object” that does not 
belong in human society.  The structures of Fred Daniels’ world have no place for him as a 
political agent, much less as an individual. 
Ellison shares Wright’s anxieties about the racial norms embedded within institutional 
and societal structures, particularly in those moments when the invisible man is confronted with 
the “white” logic of citizenship within the American welfare state. For example, when the 
invisible man chauffeurs Mr. Norton, an important white donor to the local college for African 
American students, he feels a deep commitment to the college’s vision of the respectable citizen.  
The protagonist accidentally exposes Norton to Jim Trueblood, a lower-class man who relays the 
story of his incestuous relationship with his daughter. As Norton and the narrator return back to 
the college after his unsettling encounter, the invisible man reflects, “I wanted to stop the car and 
talk with Mr. Norton, to beg his pardon for what he had seen; […] to assure him that far from 
being like any of the people we had seen, I hated them” (99).  The invisible man longs to 
demonstrate his difference from Trueblood because, among other reasons, he nurtures hopes of 
one day becoming an assistant to Dr. Bledsoe, the school’s president.  Therefore, the narrator 
initially feels that he must convince Norton of his respectability:  the invisible man must embody 
a set of social and, as it turns out, racial mores that differentiate him from others.   
These norms soon become clear as the narrator inadvertently delineates the “self” implicit 
in the vision underlying his college by describing what is not characteristic of such an individual.  
The affirmation takes on a creedal structure:  
I believed in the principles of the Founder with all my heart and soul, and that I 
believed in his own goodness and kindness in extending the hand of his 
benevolence to helping us poor, ignorant people out of the mire and darkness.  I 
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would do his bidding and teach others to rise up as he wished them to, teach them 
to be thrifty, decent, upright citizens, contributing to the welfare of all […]. (99) 
 
In yet another moment of unrecognized irony, the invisible man does not perceive the racial 
norms underlying his confession.  He instead suggests that being an “upright citizen” is 
antithetical to “the mire and darkness” that characterizes “us poor, ignorant people.” The 
association of “darkness” with “us” is surely suggestive, recalling the blanket racial norms that 
contribute to his invisibility.  Furthermore, given the fact that the narrator includes himself in this 
“us,” not just Trueblood or the rowdy customers at the Golden Day, such ideals of betterment 
and welfare refer to black Americans in general. The principles of the college thus have a raced 
incapacity for autonomy that subjects the black to the white, intimated by the narrator when he 
says, “I would do his bidding.” The invisible man becomes primitive—almost subhuman—apart 
from the status he could (though never seems to) achieve as a “decent” citizen. The marginalized 
narrator thus finds that his social status is a node of power, the point at which he is either cast 
into the “darkness” or subjected to racial norms. Indeed, his subjugation is particularly 
pernicious because it is cloaked in the discourse of benevolent “welfare.” 
More pointedly, the norms of being “decent” in the Jim Crow South (where the narrator’s 
college is located) actually mean that black “citizens” are segregated from full social inclusion.  
The logic of the black “decent, upright citizen,” in other words, not only presents whiteness as 
normative but also entails, despite its surface rhetoric of national belonging, the paradoxical 
exclusion of black citizens. To be a citizen of the Jim Crow South, New Deal or not, equates to 
being juridically marginalized.  While this logic of exclusion-by-inclusion is evident in the 
servile attitude and false consciousness about “darkness” that the narrator’s college promulgates, 
the invisible man later encounters other instances that demonstrate his alienation within 
American “welfare” discourse. After being expelled from the college, he moves to New York but 
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finds it difficult to be a “thrifty” citizen in the city. Dr. Bledsoe blocks several of the narrator’s 
opportunities for employment by maligning him to the college’s New York donors, although he 
eventually finds work at a paint plant.  But the invisible man is manipulated as a laborer, too, for 
he is fired after being hurt in an accident at the plant.  He is therefore repeatedly cast out from 
avenues of capitalist belonging.  Indeed, finally perceiving the exclusionary logic of postwar 
“welfare” discourse, the invisible man describes the policeman who murders Tod Clifton as a 
“good citizen”:  by shooting Clifton, the officer does not violate the law but fulfills it (457). 
Such suspicions about national belonging give articulate form to the growing animus 
among minority groups toward the New Deal. Black Americans traditionally voted for the Party 
of President Lincoln until the 1936 election, when nearly 75% of black voters switched to the 
Democrats in order to support President Roosevelt’s reelection bid. At that point, black 
Americans supported the administration’s New Deal because of the economic relief it provided 
during the throes of the Depression. The WPA and the National Youth Administration (NYA) 
provided economic support to black and white Americans equally. Indeed, Richard Wright 
worked for the Federal Writer’s Project during the 1930s, and many critics have noted his vocal 
support for the relief and public works programs of the New Deal.119 Similarly, Ralph Ellison 
praised a central New Deal program, the WPA, which he said had “allowed many Negroes to 
achieve their identities as artists.”120  
On the other hand, these authors were keenly aware that the relationship between racial 
equality and New Deal economic relief was a vexed one, at best. New Deal programs such as the 
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Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) and the Fair Housing Administration (FHA) 
systematically weighted their interventions in favor of white Americans. The FHA, for example, 
supported de facto segregation by refusing to guarantee mortgages to black homeowners, 
whether in the North or the South, when they applied to live in white neighborhoods. Many 
historians are wont to claim that, if it were not for the Southern Democrats, the New Deal 
legislation would have resolutely passed civil rights legislation long before the 1960s. And there 
is some legitimacy to this view. During the 1948 Democratic National Convention, for example, 
the so-called Dixiecrats dissented from the introduction of a civil-rights plank in the Party 
platform. Threatening to fracture the coalition, the Dixiecrats offered Strom Thurmond as their 
candidate and nearly cost Truman his reelection campaign. However, when viewed solely in 
terms of congressional votes, northern New Deal Democrats during the 1930s-1950s voted more 
conservatively regarding civil rights legislation than Republicans.121 The portrait of this voting 
record suggests that, while there were certainly exceptions in the Democratic Party, the New 
Dealers were deeply divided regarding racial inequality and civil rights—and the Mason Dixon 
line by no means cleanly marked such divisions. The point, then, is that Ellison’s exposition of 
the exclusionary logic of “welfare” citizenship marks this discontentment with the 
unresponsiveness of New Deal legislation toward the “invisible” status of black Americans.  
While Invisible Man documents the growing disillusionment with New Deal America, the 
fact that Ellison’s novel wins the 1953 National Book Award also signals the rising demand 
within the cultural and intellectual marketplace for the United States to provide social “visibility” 
to the plight of black Americans. Indeed, Schickler, Pearson, and Feinstein argue that the New 
Dealers’ perspective on civil rights began to shift in the late-1940s. Certain segments of the New 
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Deal voting bloc, particularly CIO unionists, liberal intellectuals, and the burgeoning Civil 
Rights movement, began to demand changes from congressional Democrats with growing 
support among the Party’s northern base.122  The unanimous Supreme Court decision of Brown v. 
Board of Education in 1954 provided further institutional support for this faction of the New 
Deal Coalition. As the rising tide of civil rights eventually forced the hand of New Democrats, 
electing President Kennedy under the banner of moderate reform, the diversity the Democratic 
Coalition’s bloc led to its own internal fracturing.  While the CIO and the Civil Rights movement 
demanded equality, Carmines and Stimson show that southern farmers and white landowners 
shifted their support during 1963-64, precipitated by the aggressive administration of Lyndon 
Johnson and Barry Goldwater’s presidential campaign.  President Johnson’s landmark Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965 alienated much of the South from the 
Democratic Party, and consequently there were irreparable fissures in the edifice of the New 
Deal Coalition.  
Ellison would later register his support for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, 
leveraging his cultural position for the Democratic Party in his influential essay “The Myth of 
the Flawed White Southerner.”123 By the time of Ellison’s rhetorically savvy essay, however, he 
had moved away from the response to American racial inequality that he offers in Invisible Man.  
Because Ellison’s narrator is repelled by the violence of Ras the Exhorter, manipulated by the 
Brotherhood with its elision of the individual, excluded by the benevolence of the New York 
philanthropist and his welfare citizenship, he finds himself outside all collectives. All other 
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options being foreclosed to him, the invisible man retreats into the self.  Ellison’s narrator is 
alienated from collectives both social and political, so he consequently enters a state of 
“hibernation” (580). Yet what is significant about this retreat into the self, as the invisible man 
characterizes it, is that it casts the burden of action, responsibility, and freedom upon the 
individual. Rather than a disruption of the binary politics of Cold War anxieties, the narrator’s 
ambivalence and paradoxical affirmation of a world of “infinite possibilities” is, I argue, a 
construal of his alienation in existentialist terms (576). Indeed, in a way quite distinct from 
Wright’s Bigger or Fred Daniels, the invisible man’s response to his alienation becomes an 
affirmation of choice and individual expression as the irreducible terms of freedom.  In fact, the 
existential attitude characterizing the bookends of Invisible Man underwrites the novel’s flight 
from collectivist politics, while its existential construal of freedom also anchors the novel’s 
location of political agency and possibility within the self. 
 
Existentialism Comes to America 
The type of individualism that frames Invisible Man is clearest when Ellison rewrites 
Fred Daniels’ alienation and dehumanizing death.  Like Daniels, Ellison’s narrator momentarily 
accepts his “underground” position—the invisibility of his humanity—in order to take 
possession of his self and prepare for action.  As the invisible man puts it, his “hibernation” is “a 
covert preparation for a more overt action” (13).  The narrator’s marginalization from all 
collectives does not translate into despair; instead, he transforms that alienated status into an 
opportunity for self-creation: “I was pulled this way and that for longer than I can remember. 
And my problem was that I always tried to go in everyone’s way but my own.  I have also been 
called one thing and then another while no one really wished to hear what I called myself.  So 
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after years of trying to adopt the opinions of others I finally rebelled” (573).  While Wright’s 
“The Man Who Lived Underground” culminates in Fred Daniels forgetting his own name, the 
novel’s end is the beginning of the invisible man’s opportunity to discover “what I called 
myself.” By choosing to stay underground, he explains, he chooses a form of freedom (571). 
Whereas Wright’s protagonist becomes a passive “object rushing alone in the darkness, veering, 
tossing, lost in the heart of the earth” (1450), Ellison’s narrator retreats from those social forces 
that try to pull him “this way and that.” If Fred Daniels is the detritus of a socio-political system 
that denies agency and individuality to black Americans, the invisible man asserts the contingent 
or malleable nature of that system by calling attention to the fact that society is not “solid” but 
illusory, a construction (576). What’s more, Ellison’s narrator responds to those forces that pull 
him “this way and that” by rebelling, affirming instead his capacity for radical self-creation and 
individual self-determination.   
The invisible man discovers the possibility of self-production through a series of chance 
encounters in which he is mistaken for a man named Rinehart, who it turns out is a protean 
figure, a shifting signifier of freedom. While fleeing Ras and his gang, the narrator puts on a 
disguise of dark green sunglasses and a wide-brimmed hat and is quickly misidentified by one of 
Rinehart’s lovers. The narrator decides to assume the guise of Rinehart, and this new identity 
transforms his vision: “the world took on a dark-green intensity” (484).  It is not, the narrator 
suggests, that the clothes makes the man; rather, it is the glasses, his way of viewing the world.  
After a half-dozen cases of being mistaken as Rinehart by various people, including hipsters and 
policemen, churchgoers and “zoot-suiters,” the invisible man realizes that Rinehart is a sign of a 
larger truth: 
Rine the runner and Rine the gambler and Rine the brider and Rine the lover and 
Rinehart the Reverend?  Could he himself be both rind and heart?  What is real 
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anyway?  But how could I doubt it?  He was a broad man, a man of parts who got 
around.  Rinehart the rounder.  It was true as I was true.  His world was possibility 
and he knew it. (498) 
 
With Rinehart, the invisible man discovers that his self, much like his society, is not “solid.” He 
can make the rounds, become at once a Reverend and a runner for the police.  Rinehart plays the 
system that tries to exploit him.  Thus, the invisible man discovers, as he would later put it, that 
his “world has become one of infinite possibilities” (576).  Ellison’s narrator senses that Rinehart 
is “years ahead of me” simply because this protean figure intuits that the “world in which we 
lived was without boundaries” (498).  Rinehart therefore becomes the narrator’s exemplar for 
self-production within a “vast seething, hot world of fluidity” (498). 
The invisible man tries to follow Rinehart’s model after he decides to undermine the 
Brotherhood, yet he admittedly “bungled it from the beginning” (516).  Indeed, he later states, 
“But what do I really want, I’ve asked myself.” The narrator vacillates, “I can’t figure it out; it 
escapes me,” even asserting that he does not want “the freedom of a Rinehart or the power of a 
Jack, nor simply the freedom not to run” (575).  For one, the invisible man’s assertion represents 
a kind of ambivalence akin to Dostoevsky’s underground man, who claims “any consciousness at 
all is a sickness” (8).  Even as the underground man insists that “the chiefest and dearest thing” is 
“our personality and our individuality” (28), he soon dismisses this very notion as “fancy” and 
explains, “I’m grinding my teeth as I joke.” Speaking to interlocutors, he confesses simply, 
“Gentlemen, I am tormented by questions” (30).  Freedom, for Dostoevsky’s narrator, becomes a 
difficult burden to assume—a choice that itself prompts vacillation.  Similarly, after Ellison’s 
narrator rejects Rinehart, the invisible man almost immediately returns to him as a “master” of 
“imagination,” of stepping “outside the narrow borders of what men call reality” (576). He 
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presents Rinehart as an exemplar to emulate, even as he is plagued by questions about the 
freedom that such a figure sketches.   
Beyond his vacillations and ambivalence, the invisible man also suggests that Rinehart’s 
free self-creation is somehow lacking.  Despite the world of possibilities that he illuminates, the 
invisible man also views Rinehart’s self-invention as socially irresponsible or egoistic. 
Rinehart’s protean self lacks a public vision, the narrator claims, denying the “possibility” that 
“even an invisible man has a socially responsible role to play” (581).  Indeed, Rinehart is only 
one of several figures that the invisible man finds exemplary.  He seems to balance Rinehart’s 
world of possibilities with Mary, a Harlem resident who takes in the narrator after his accident at 
the paint plant. The invisible man says he “found living with [Mary] pleasant except for her 
constant talk about leadership and responsibility.” He pays rent with his severance money from 
the plant, but otherwise the narrator is without work or, as he puts it, he has “lost [his] sense of 
direction.” Mary’s beliefs, rather than obscuring the narrator’s difficulties, actually serve as “a 
force, a stable, familiar force like something out of my past which kept me from whirling off into 
some unknown which I dared not face.” That is to say, in the midst of a hostile society and unjust 
social structures, Mary is a stable point for the invisible man—a center that actually does hold.  
As the narrator puts it, “Mary reminded me constantly that something was expected of me, some 
act of leadership, some newsworthy achievement; and I was torn between resenting her for it and 
loving her for the nebulous hope she kept alive” (258). 
Yet the narrator also suggests that irresponsibility—a retreat from society—is a necessary 
precondition for the kind of action and social commitment that he endorses. “But to whom can I 
be responsible,” he asks, “and why should I be, when you refuse to see me?” (14).  The kind of 
individual responsibility that Mary preaches is seemingly swallowed up by systemic inequality, 
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and instead the narrator searches for ways to short-circuit the system.  Indeed, he finally realizes 
that he cannot return to Mary’s after his retreat underground because that would not be 
“mov[ing] ahead” (571).  Mary’s ideals about community leadership, he implies, are stuck in the 
past. While admirable, responsibility to the black community does not change the fact of their 
invisibility. Thus, like the negative of a photograph, the figures of Rinehart and Mary allow the 
invisible man to imagine positive prints of the selfhood that he longs to develop.  While finding 
them exemplary, he nonetheless concludes, “I must come out, I must emerge” (581).  The 
invisible man’s status as an “I,” as a conscious and acting subject, resides at the heart of his 
response. As he searches both for social responsibility and self-production, the narrator’s 
“hibernation” leads him to locate the provenance of this search within the self.  
Ellison’s framing of the invisible man’s search is far from idiosyncratic. As the narrator 
suggests, he does “speak” on “the lower frequencies,” striking a register that extends beyond his 
individual voice (581). While Foley rightly notes that the narrator’s enigmatic final statement 
marks a “paradigm shift” in the left’s eroding authority,124 the invisible man also speaks for his 
implied audience in the sense that his response resonates within a wider postwar phenomenon:  
the growing public interest in and intellectual legitimacy of existentialism. Ellison was first 
exposed to French existentialism during the summer of 1945, when American magazines began 
to disseminate the intellectual life and struggles of postwar France. The immigration of 
existentialism to America inspired a variety of reactions to the movement. Different spheres of 
postwar American life engaged with European existentialism in various and uneven ways. In 
fact, as a part of its attempts to create and trade on the faddism of American consumers, the 
American popular press first circulated existentialism during the immediate postwar years as 
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cultural symbol of French life and fashion. As George Cotkin explains, among its avenues for 
arriving on the postwar American scene, existentialism first became popular cultural “fad”:  
American audiences were introduced to French existentialism in the pages of Life, 
the New York Times Magazine, Time, Newsweek, and fashion magazines such as 
Vogue and Harper’s Bazaar. These popular discussions stressed Simone de 
Beauvoir’s lifestyle and Jean-Paul Sartre’s attachment to the bohemian café scene 
more than their ideas. A cult of personality developed whereby the general 
renown of existentialism became intimately connected to the personal life of the 
philosopher and even to the circumstances of the nation he or she represented.125 
 
American media outlets often presented this “cult of personality” with ironic distance. “Fun is 
being poked at the pretentiousness of both the French and their American acolytes,” Cotkin 
explains, even as these popular media outlets traded on the pervasive fascination among 
Americans with French life and thought.126  
Stanley Donen’s comedic film Funny Face (1957), starring Audrey Hepburn and Fred 
Astaire, signals the apex of the popular circulation of existentialism. At once capitalizing on the 
allure of French life while also satirizing its philosophical life, Funny Face tells the story of Jo 
Stockton (Audrey Hepburn), who is a shy book clerk at a recondite bookshop in Greenwich 
Village called Embryo Concepts. Stockton, who “thinks as well as she looks,” as Dick Avery 
(Fred Astaire) puts it, is a dilettante philosopher enamored with French thought. The narrative 
arc of Funny Facy charts Stockton’s eventual drift away from her philosophical preoccupation 
with anxiety and alienation toward her romance with Avery, an upright fashion photographer.  
Avery convinces Stockton to visit Paris for a fashion shoot, although the latter is reticent because 
a French philosopher she admires “doesn’t approve of fashion magazines. It’s chichi and it’s an 
unrealistic approach to self-impressions, as well as economics.” After arriving in Paris, Stockton 
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tours the city and sings with pleasure, “I want to see the den of thinking men, like Jean-Paul 
Sartre / I must philosophize with all the guys around Monmartre.” The film tempers Stockton’s 
overtly philosophical ambitions, for she explains, “My philosophic search, has left me in the 
lurch.” Rather than choosing isolation, at the end of the film Stockton dawns a fashionable 
wedding dress and meets Avery at a small French church, signaling the film’s preference for 
comedic resolution and love above Stockton’s earlier angst.  Yet if Funny Face signals such a 
preference, it also marks the widespread intelligibility of Sartre and existentialism within the 
terrain of popular culture. Indeed, Stockton’s choice of Avery over “the den of thinking men, like 
Jean-Paul Sartre” is presented as an existential dilemma. Avery’s fashion world is, as his 
magazine’s editor Joan Prescott explains, “a cold lot—artificial and totally lacking in sentiment. 
So how can you possibly be in love?” Indeed, when the French philosopher that Stockton 
admires makes a pass at her, she repudiates the “den of thinking men” as a veil for sexual 
interests rather than “pure” philosophical inquiry. As both the world of fashion and French 
philosophy are cast in disrepute in the film, Funny Face subtly inflects existentialist sensibilities 
about authenticity and free choice, while emptying those sensibilities of the angst and alienation 
that underwrite Sartre’s argument. That is to say, Stockton and Avery are faced with a choice 
between authenticity—the life they will—and “artificial” forms of bad faith or social conformity. 
While Funny Face inflects that existential dilemma through a middle-class American 
domesticity that is at odds with French thought, they nonetheless share complementing positions 
on a cultural spectrum regarding the self and its authentic mode of being. By the mid-1950s, 
then, existentialism had been repurposed in Hollywood as a widely marketable—if not foreign 
and fraught—cultural signifier.   
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While one route for the arrival of existentialism comes through the popular press and the 
culture industry, there were also a handful of intellectuals and cultural figures based mainly in 
New York who adapted the thought of Sartre, Albert Camus, and Simone de Beauvoir during the 
1940s.127 This relatively small group was so successful in their advocacy that existentialist 
sensibilities began to flower among intellectuals and writers in the late 1940s. As Cotkin notes, 
Ellison and Wright were among these initial advocates who insisted upon the applicability of 
existentialism to the exigencies of the postwar moment in America.128 During the summer 
months of 1945, Ellison discovered synopses and then translated works by Sartre, Albert Camus, 
and Simone de Beauvoir, although he had previously encountered the writers that the 
existentialists considered their predecessors:  Søren Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche.  In 
1945, Ellison wrote to Wright that the contemporary French existentialists “view the role of the 
individual in relation to society so sharply that the leftwing boys, with the possible exception of 
Malraux, seemed to have looked at it through the reverse end of a telescope.”129 Ellison suggests, 
in other words, that the political left presents the individual as diminutive and distorted, while the 
new group of French philosophers provides an account of actual existing beings.  Society 
comprises the lived conditions for the self, according to this new philosophy of existence, rather 
than being a determining structure.  
Ellison’s enthusiasm for the new French philosophy was a growing intellectual trend in 
the postwar years.  One of existentialism’s early advocates was an editor of Partisan Review, 
William Barrett, who wrote frequent apologias for the legitimacy of Sartre and his compatriots.  
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The French philosopher-poet, Jean Wahl, likewise disseminated the intellectual outline of 
existentialism in the New Republic in 1945.130 Wahl continued to promote existentialism through 
dozens of articles as well as in university courses at the University of Chicago.  Existentialism 
was widely discussed in the immediate postwar years through a variety of popular media and 
well-circulated magazines.131 Many renowned theologians, such as Karl Barth and Paul Tillich 
also began to grapple with the writings of Heidegger and Sartre,132 while academic philosophers 
such as Jacque Barzun began to evaluate Sartre’s work, although with much less enthusiasm and 
fewer dialogue partners.133 Indeed, Ann Fulton argues that American academic philosophers 
were initially even hesitant to consider, much less embrace, Sartrean existentialism.134 Part of the 
reason, Fulton shows, was the slow translation of Sartre’s more technical works. Fulton also 
suggests that influential academics, such as Sidney Hook, disparaged Sartre’s work because of 
his blending of existentialism and Marxism—a period in Sartre’s career that was only later 
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translated for American readers.135 More importantly, though, the rising tide of existentialism in 
Europe was coterminous with the emerging hegemony of the analytic tradition within American 
philosophy departments:  the two modes of philosophy were thought to be at odds because of 
their disparate methodologies and concerns.  According to American academics, Sartre’s work 
lacked “a solid philosophical structure,” a lack of rigor that undermines the appealing facets of 
his strand of existentialism. Nonetheless, Fulton shows that by 1952, Sartre’s “emphasis on 
individual freedom, personal responsibility, and authenticity” garnered significant intellectual 
traction.136 Thus, a wide swath of public figures and academics, as well as popular magazines for 
business people such as Time, discussed Sartre’s “radical liberty,” in which “authenticity was the 
result of awareness of individual freedom to create values.”137  
The popular circulation of existentialism thus provided intellectual and cultural 
legitimacy to a radical form of individualism that emphasized authenticity and choice, with the 
self as their center of gravity. Of course, summarizing or debating existentialism does not 
amount to embracing it. Yet, as the critic Stark Young says after the 1946 American premiere of 
Sartre’s play No Exit, “It should be seen whether you like it or not.”138 The postwar circulation of 
existentialism, in other words, is a marker of an emerging felt sensibility, the legitimation of a 
structure of feeling among other competing intellectual tastes. The idea of the self as a center of 
gravity for authenticity, freedom, and politics became a fact of the intellectual and cultural 
marketplace in postwar America.  Ellison, responding to and adapting this sensibility for his own 
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purposes, helps bring definition to the rising demand for a vision of social and personal life that 
embeds freedom within individual choices and experiences. As Rampersad suggests, the variety 
of existentialism that surfaces in Invisible Man “did not lend itself easily to building social 
institutions that could form a reliable bulwark against chaos.”139 That is, not unlike most strains 
of existentialism, Invisible Man presents an anti-institutional air that leaves Ellison’s protagonist 
atomized, cut off from institutional reform, and instead assuming private responsibility for 
“action” (579).  Ellison’s novel, as it positions itself in dialogue with the rising legitimacy of 
existential individualism, offers a counterweight to the waning influence of the non-liberal left, 
with its socio-economic analysis and privileging of collective conditions for life. Thus, while the 
invisible man leaves the “old skin” of past sensibilities behind, what emerges with him is a new 
figure of the self for the postwar era (581). 
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CHAPTER 2:  THE AGE OF ANXIETY:  PATRICIA HIGHSMITH, EXISTENTIAL 
PSCYOLOGY, AND THE “DECLINE” OF NATURALISM 
 
Theodore Schiebelhut, the young and independently wealthy painter in Patricia 
Highsmith’s A Game for the Living (1958), has difficulty explaining why “all his conscious ideas 
were those of a pessimist.”140 Theodore insists that his moods and bleak outlook have “no causes 
that he or anybody else could discover.” Conventional psychological explanations—such as his 
family history or general sexual repression—do not apply in his case. Rather, Theodore at first 
believes his pessimism to be a function of his abstract commitment to a philosophy maintaining 
that “the world had no meaning, no end but nothingness, and that man’s achievements were all 
finally perishable—cosmic jokes, like man himself” (5). When Theodore discovers that his 
“mistress,” Lelia Ballesteros, has been raped, murdered, and mutilated, his abstract pessimism is 
confronted with the violent realities of a senseless world. Her death is a pointless tragedy 
perpetuated by Carlos Hidalgo, an alcoholic friend who becomes infatuated with Lelia. Indeed, 
the meaninglessness of the trauma confirms Theodore’s pessimism, albeit not without 
ambiguity—why, for example, is such violence requisite for his enlightenment? Still, Theodore 
is forced to piece together an existence that is otherwise absurdly irrational. He finds himself 
driven to make sense of a senseless world by what his friend Ramón characterizes as the 
former’s “Existentialist’s conscience” (76). Theodore’s search for the murderer of his lover is 
driven less by a demand for moral order than by the vicissitudes and private exigencies of his 
psyche. Detective fiction becomes the stage for existentialist angst.   
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Much like Theodore’s attempts to navigate an often-hostile world by drawing on the 
philosophical resources of existentialism, Patricia Highsmith’s novels from the 1950s bear the 
imprint of the flourishing of American existentialist thought during the postwar era. However, in 
a way quite distinct from Ellison, Wright, and Mailer, Highsmith’s fiction blends existentialist 
sensibilities about choice, angst, and authenticity with another prominent postwar development:  
what Nathan Hale characterizes as psychoanalysis’s “golden age of popularization” in the United 
States (276). Highsmith’s novels from the decade—particularly her widely read Strangers on a 
Train (1950) and The Talented Mr. Ripley (1956)—explore these entwined intellectual threads, 
which I argue helped to redefine the political sensibilities of the postwar moment. In particular, 
this chapter charts the nascent development of the existential psychology movement and, more 
broadly, the normalization of therapeutic psychology following the Second World War. The 
growing public purchase of these developments had significant consequences for American 
intellectual life:  in effect, the ego and its vicissitudes—rather than socio-economic or 
environmental conditions—became the normative template in the 1950s for understanding 
society and the self. Highsmith’s novels helped to shape this intellectual terrain by representing 
public phenomena such as violence, class envy, and social alienation as existential crises of an 
embattled private realm.  
In her construal of the darker phenomena of human experience, Highsmith is at pains to 
distinguish her work from the literary naturalists who dominated the American cultural scene of 
the 1930s and early 1940s. I argue that Highsmith frequently adapts and revises certain tropes of 
the naturalists in order to repudiate a narrative world governed principally by structural, socio-
economic, and environmental conditions. Highsmith’s revisionist project reinforces a prevalent 
assertion of the “decline” of naturalism by postwar intellectuals, who hail instead a new cultural 
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order focused upon the interior life of the self. Indeed, the temporary deflation in literary 
naturalism’s cultural authority—a phenomenon I trace through the work of intellectuals such as 
Philip Rahv and the influential Partisan Review—is a marker of the growing public currency of 
psychological templates for understanding society. I demonstrate that this trend was itself a 
central feature of a wider crisis in the intellectual legitimacy of the New Deal welfare state 
during the 1950s. As the cultural fortunes of naturalism declined, existentialism and a spectrum 
of therapeutic psychologies flourished in the United States, and one consequence of these shifts 
is that violence and class conflict were increasingly construed as phenomena of the largely 
autonomous arena of the psyche. Such trends in American cultural history, I argue, helped to 
erode the intellectual grounds for a progressive managerial state, which was predicated upon 
intervening in structural conditions for the welfare of its citizens.  
 
Professional Psychology, Psychoanalysis, and Their Discontents 
The “age of anxiety”—a phrase whose wider circulation begins with W.H. Auden’s 
book-length poem, The Age of Anxiety (1947)—is the child of converging historical phenomena 
and intellectual sensibilities.141 Beyond the emerging nuclear threats and existentialist angst of 
the immediate postwar years, the anxious zeitgeist of the early Cold War is entangled with both 
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the popularization and professionalization of psychological discourse in postwar America. 
Psychology took its first steps toward becoming a formalized discipline in the United States 
through the work of William James, whose two-volume The Principles of Psychology (1890) and 
popular undergraduate courses at Harvard institutionalized the field in America. Admittedly, 
“psychology” as an object of inquiry existed in less formalized ways long before the late 
nineteenth century. The roots of American “psychological” fiction, for example, stretch at least 
as far back as Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Fall of the House of Usher” (1839). (What might be called 
“psychological” fiction has an even longer history in Europe.) Yet, unlike these earlier varieties 
of psychological experience, the postwar years saw an unprecedented expansion in the use of 
personal trauma and formal mental categories as explanatory mechanisms for everyday 
experience. The psychological mapping of ordinary life, in other words, became not just 
common but also normative for behavior.  
One strain of this expansion began when Sigmund Freud visited the United States in 
1909.  American writers and intellectuals were familiar with Freud not long after the turn of the 
century, yet his lectures at Clark University were the first time the American media reported on 
his theories.142 The year before his visit, Freud’s followers met in Salzburg, Austria, to convene 
the first International Psychoanalytic Congress.  Among the small group were a New York-based 
clinician, Abraham Brill, and Ernest Jones, a neurologist and clinician in London.  After the 
Congress, Brill and Jones began to spread Freud’s work throughout the English-speaking world.  
Jones, in partnership with another early Freudian, the Harvard neurologist and psychologist 
James Jackson Putnam, eventually founded the American Psychoanalytic Association in 1911. In 
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that same year Brill would also found the New York Psychoanalytic Society.143 Before these 
organizations came together, however, Jones led efforts to disseminate Freud’s work among 
academics and members of the American medical establishment, playing an important part in the 
decision of G. Stanley Hall, a psychologist and president of Clark University, to invite Freud to 
give five lectures in September 1909. Freud called this event “the first official recognition of our 
endeavors,” particularly because he was met with an audience much more open to his theories 
than he had yet experienced in Europe.144 The usually staid local press reported accurately, albeit 
succinctly, Freud’s controversial theories about sexuality. The coverage was undoubtedly a result 
of the fact that the event itself was a who’s who of intellectuals on the subject.145 Even a 
suspicious William James attended the lectures.  
Freud’s visit became the germ for what would later cause psychological questions to 
come to the forefront of the American cultural imagination. Admittedly, that spread was quite 
slow at first. “In the 1920s and 1930s,” John Burnham explains, “psychoanalysis spread among 
special parts of the population, frequently in forms that Freud and other purists disdained.”146 As 
a comprehensive psychological theory of everyday life—tics and slips, dreams and private 
wishes—psychoanalysis was confined to a relatively small group of intellectuals and authors. 
Dorothy Ross argues that the members of this group were, first and foremost, advocates of 
modernism. This dual interest in modernism and Freud makes sense, according to Ross, because 
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modernism itself is “a set of ideas and works of art […] that revolved around the exploration of 
subjectivity.”147 Even as Freud was one of the first to chart our interior lives, modernism, at least 
according to its initial reception in the United States, is a romantic artistic movement concerned 
with exploring the tortured beauty, ambivalence, and isolation of modern consciousness. Also, 
beyond its anxieties, modernists like Mann, Joyce and Kafka garnered such currency in the 
postwar moment because, as Irving Howe puts it, their sensibilities gravitate toward “the one 
uniquely modern style of salvation:  a salvation by, of, and for the self.”148 Other advocates of 
Freud by-way-of-modernism included Lionel Trilling and Herbert Marcuse, Betty Friedan and 
Daniel Bell, Erik Erikson and Philip Rahv. This motley congregation insisted upon Freud’s 
importance not only to their academic counterparts but also to an educated middle-class public. 
Furthermore, these advocates had a political motive for their interest in a science and literature of 
subjectivity because, according to Ross, they had “turned inward, away from their destroyed 
Marxist hopes of the 1930s to wartime nationalism and a chastened Cold War liberalism.”149 
Thus, as modernism became staple fare for critics and public intellectuals and was entrenched in 
American universities, so were the broad strokes of psychoanalysis.  While these strokes were 
variously presented and unevenly received, the impulse to analyze common behavior for its 
psychological import garnered popular currency in unprecedented ways. 
From the germ of Freud’s visit, to the legitimacy cultured by intellectuals, psychoanalysis 
grew into a mature and widespread intellectual movement during the 1950s and early 1960s. As 
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Burnham explains, it was during this moment “that Freud’s ideas exerted the greatest influence 
on American culture.”150 Some of the key terms of psychoanalysis became common—albeit 
often disputed—among the middle- and upper classes. Seizing upon this new currency, Frank 
Wheeler declares in Richard Yates’s Revolutionary Road (1961),  
This country’s probably the psychiatric, psychoanalytical capital of the world. Old 
Freud himself could never’ve dreamed up a more devoted bunch of disciples than 
the population of the United States—isn’t that right? Our whole damn culture is 
geared to it; it’s the new religion; it’s everybody’s intellectual and spiritual sugar-
tit.151 
 
This hyperbolic condemnation of the intellectual consensus given to psychoanalysis in the 
United States is ironically a way for Frank to shore himself up against his rage at his own 
suburban existence. Frank’s discontentment with having ended up in suburbia rather than a wider 
and ostensibly more important world prompts him to turn against this middle-class form of life. 
Yet his disavowal is deeply ironic in the sense that, even in the private motivations of his war 
against Freud’s theories of the ego, Frank confirms its status as an explanatory template for his 
own life. When Frank finishes his diatribe, his wife and friends “looked mildly relieved, like 
pupils at the end of a lecture.”152 Not finding their customary assent to his outbursts, Frank is 
nonplussed and withdraws to the kitchen. It becomes apparent that his anti-mainstream rebellion 
is itself a function of his ego, and the sad irony of the episode is that even dissent against the 
privileged status of psychoanalysis is rooted within an internal, private arena. There is even a 
psychological explanation, Yates suggests, for the rejection of psychoanalysis. 
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The early years of American television, while not necessarily affirming the scale of 
Frank’s assertion, nonetheless confirms his sentiments about the mass appeal of psychology. In 
an age when the American television industry enjoyed rapid expansion and largely consolidated 
audiences, programming often drew heavily upon psychological discourse when featuring 
violence or socially aberrant behavior.153 This fact is clearest in one of the most popular shows of 
the 1950s, Alfred Hitchcock Presents (1955-1965). The series was created to ride the coattails of 
Hitchcock’s successful films, such as Rope (1948) and Dial M for Murder (1954), as well as his 
adaptation of Highsmith’s Strangers on a Train (1951). Whatever Hitchcock’s inheritance from 
psychoanalysis—his film Spellbound (1945) features a character who undergoes treatment by a 
psychoanalyst, but Freud’s influence is otherwise an open question—his work pushed questions 
of individual psychology and the irregular, if not aberrant, dimensions of the human psyche to 
the forefront of American cultural attention.154  
Almost every episode of Alfred Hitchcock Presents explores some form of violence, 
framing such trauma through a psychological lens. For example, the first episode of the series, 
“Revenge,” is as Hitchcock puts it a story about “ordinary folk”:  a middle-class husband, Carl 
Span, who is an engineer at an aircraft plant, and his wife, Elsa, a former ballerina who has 
recently suffered from a “small breakdown.” Carl, a figure of the working professional, has taken 
Elsa to a new town for “fresh air” and to recover from her breakdown. After settling into a small 
trailer park, Carl leaves for his first day of work. Not long after he departs, Elsa is attacked by a 
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man in a “grey suit” who, she enigmatically explains, “killed me.” Elsa experiences something 
like a fugue after the trauma—a loss of personality in which her self (“me”) is for all practical 
purposes destroyed. She becomes nonresponsive, her blank face staring aimlessly at the ceiling. 
A doctor visits Elsa, and he explains to Carl: “I don’t think her condition is too serious, 
physically that is, Mr. Span.  Otherwise, well, she’s been through a very emotional shock. And 
coming so soon after the breakdown—well, I can’t tell you anything for certain.” Questioning 
Elsa about the episode, the doctor explains, could even result in “permanent damage.” After Carl 
moves her to yet another town, Elsa identifies an ordinary-looking man in a grey suit as her 
attacker. Carl follows the man into a hotel room and murders him with a pipe. Afterwards, Elsa 
repeatedly identifies other men in grey suits as her attacker, and Carl slowly realizes that he has 
killed an innocent person. 
This first episode of Alfred Hitchcock Presents locates Elsa’s trauma within the world of 
“ordinary folk”—a democratization of psychological experience that would become the norm for 
the series. Carl and Elsa are not members of the intelligentsia or upper classes; they are not 
cloistered from the working or professional world. Rather, the nuances of psychological analysis 
map onto their middle-class experience. Beyond the actual settings of the episodes, this 
democratization of individual psychology is also evident in Hitchcock’s distinctive filmic 
technique of using the camera’s point of view to create a voyeuristic relationship between the 
viewer and a character. The technique allows the viewer to imagine herself as the character 
within the episode, as if the individual viewing the trauma were also its experiential subject. 
Hitchcock’s nearly obsessive close-up of faces similarly places an emphasis on the individual 
emotional responses of characters. The audience thus becomes Elsa, or feels Carl’s nauseous 
recognition at murdering an innocent businessman. The viewer is invited to employ Elsa’s 
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“emotional shock,” her psychological trauma, when riding along Main Street at the end of the 
episode. Furthermore, putting one’s self in Elsa’s place, any man wearing a gray business suit 
becomes the attacker. His attire, as Sloan Wilson’s 1955 novel employs it when describing the 
world of Tom Rath, is the hallmark of the organized business community.155 In Hitchcock’s turn 
on this professional signifier, sociopaths are not confined to the fringes of society; instead, 
violence is latent within the American Everyman. Hitchcock’s techniques, in other words, 
construe the violence that causes Elsa’s loss of personality as darker manifestations of human 
consciousness. Although Alfred Hitchcock Presents is occasionally attentive to economic 
markers—e.g., the attacker’s professional status, or the fact that Carl and Elsa live in a trailer 
park—the television series nonetheless invites the viewers to understand the trauma as 
psychological phenomena.  
Indeed, Alfred Hitchcock Presents shows the extent to which psychological experience 
and the symptoms of internalized trauma had become not only relevant for cultural 
representation but also widely marketable. Recognizing the mass appeal of Hitchcock’s films, 
the television series was conceived by an advertising agency and pitched to Hitchcock.156 The 
agency’s intuition paid off, as Alfred Hitchcock Presents began as one of the most consistently 
popular programs during a time when the audience size for television was growing despite the 
fact that the options for channels and programming were relatively consolidated.157 Admittedly, 
psychological programs were never as successful as, say, The $64,000 Question, which aired on 
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CBS in 1955 and was the top-viewed program on U.S. television. However, given its longevity 
and relative popularity in the growing television marketplace, the program became a touchstone 
for subsequent film and television.158 
While Alfred Hitchcock Presents marks the democratization and mass market appeal of 
psychological templates of the everyday, Highsmith’s relationship to these cultural developments 
signals the heterogeneous threads being braided in the changing fabric of postwar American 
intellectual life. Highsmith’s fascination with modern psychology began when she was eight 
years old. In a 1989 interview, Highsmith says that as a precocious child she studied Karl 
Menninger’s The Human Mind: “They’re case histories of crackpots, sadists, murderers, and 
other nuts,” she explained, “but it’s like reading Edgar Allan Poe.”159 This inaugurated 
Highsmith’s lifelong interest in the grotesque and psychologically “abnormal.”160 She began 
studying Freud as an eighteen-year-old not long after discovering Karl Marx’s writings. Yet 
Highsmith quickly became suspicious of both Marxism and American psychoanalysis, 
eventually resigning from the Youth Communist League in 1941 after two years of membership. 
Her suspicions of psychoanalysis, though, were slow to calcify and never led to such a radical 
break. In 1943 she wrote in her diary, “The highest good is the use of the subconscious mind 
entirely, almost to the exclusion of the conscious mind, which is patterned after those around us. 
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Within the subconscious lies all one’s oil, one’s fire, one’s flavor, and the measure of divinity 
allotted to all of us.”161 Although Highsmith would question certain dimensions of her youthful 
enthusiasms in later works such as Edith’s Diary (1977), she never broke with Freud’s notion of 
the unconscious, which he insists is autonomous from and prior to the rational mental states and 
conformist impulses of everyday life. The unconscious similarly becomes something like an 
authentic self in Highsmith’s fiction, uninhibited by the strictures and compulsory behaviors of 
socialized existence.  
Yet Highsmith was anything but an orthodox Freudian. Part of her discontentment with 
psychoanalysis developed when she underwent therapy in 1948 with the New York 
psychoanalyst Eva Klein Lipshutz. Highsmith decided to attend this course of therapy to “cure” 
her from the disgust she felt during sexual experiences with her fiancé, Marc Brandel. In effect, 
she wanted to become heterosexual, despite her numerous same-sex affairs.  American 
psychoanalysts, to a degree perhaps foreign to Freud, tended to pathologize same-sex desire. 
However, while Americans had become accustomed to visiting a therapist about such 
“abnormal” behavior, psychoanalysis for the “non-aberrant” had also become equally as 
commonplace in urban centers. Anatole Broyard recounts that there was in New York “an 
inevitability about psychoanalysis. It was like having to take the subway to get anywhere. 
Psychoanalysis was in the air, like humidity, or smoke.” Among the reasons for this seemingly 
pervasive experience, Broyard explains, “The war had been a bad dream that we wanted to 
analyze now. […] There was a feeling that we had forgotten how to live.”162 Highsmith’s 
decision to visit a psychoanalyst was therefore part of the ethic of the moment; private therapy 
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had become integral to the behavior of postwar Americans. Yet her therapist’s view of 
lesbianism as a mental illness was never fully convincing to Highsmith. Eva Klein Lipshutz’s 
diagnosis, in effect, was that Highsmith’s same-sex desires derived from her strained relationship 
with her mother:  paradoxically, her sexuality proved that she actually hated women. This 
formulaic cause-and-effect explanation failed to convince Highsmith that her familial past 
explained her desires, and in fact she began writing what has become known as her “lesbian 
novel with a happy ending,” The Price of Salt (1953), during her sessions with the 
psychoanalyst.163 In May 1949 after forty-seven therapy sessions, Highsmith determined that her 
sexual aversion to men was unchanging and, leaving on a European tour, she never again trusted 
conventional psychoanalytic therapy.  
Highsmith wrote Strangers on a Train before these abortive attempts to find a “cure” for 
her same-sex desires. She learned a few days before her last session of therapy that Harper & 
Brothers had agreed to publish the book. Despite the uncertainties that marked her life during the 
years preceding her first novel’s publication, Highsmith found a philosophical anchor for 
Strangers on a Train in European existentialism. Not unlike psychoanalysis, Highsmith was 
attracted to the nuanced accounts of human angst and the subversion of a rational construal of 
life that preoccupies this body of philosophy and literature. Highsmith began reading Dostoevsky 
as a thirteen-year-old. As a young adult, she read several works by Franz Kafka in 1943 and 
Albert Camus’s L’Étranger (1942) in 1946.  Highsmith found that Kafka’s work traced the lines 
of her pessimism regarding the rationality of “God, government or self,” while the alienated 
existence of Camus’s narrator Meursault became a doorway for her into work by Sartre’s 
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existentialism.164 She read Crime and Punishment again in 1947, declaring that Dostoevsky was 
her “master” (as she would also later say about Kierkegaard).165 Indeed, Strangers on a Train 
borrows Dostoevsky’s technique in Crime and Punishment of depicting the murder perpetrated 
by Raskolnikov as a psychological phenomenon as much as a physical act. Murder and its 
attendant guilt similarly becomes an idée fixe for Guy:  at first, he is only beleaguered with guilt 
for the murder of his first wife, Miriam, by the wealthy sociopath Charles Bruno. By chance Guy 
meets Bruno on a train as they each are travelling to their respective homes. Both men disclose 
their frustration with a specific person who inhibits their ambitions:  Miriam is pregnant with 
another man’s child and wants a divorce in order to marry her lover, Owen Markham, which 
seemingly injures Guy’s professional prestige; while Bruno’s father has numerous affairs—some 
Oedipal relationship is conspicuous between the son and mother—even as the elder Bruno also 
refuses to release his share of the inheritance from his mother’s wealthy family. In response to 
these disclosures, Bruno proposes a “perfect murder” in which he and Guy commit the crime on 
the other’s behalf. While Guy is disgusted by the proposition, he nonetheless finds Bruno 
strangely appealing.  
Mistaking Guy’s reticence for the unconscious consent of a virtuous man, Bruno 
strangles Miriam and later compels Guy to fulfill his end of the agreement. As Bruno’s pressure 
becomes more forceful and disturbing, the murder of Bruno’s father becomes the governing 
center of Guy’s psychological life. Based on Bruno’s repeated letters detailing how the elder 
Bruno might be murdered, Guy develops a clear mental image of the act. Much like 
Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov, Guy first enacts the murder in his imagination:  
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It would be so simple, as Bruno said, when the house was empty except for his 
father and the butler, and Guy knew the house more exactly than his home in 
Metcalf. […] He must not let his mind go there again. That was exactly what 
Bruno wanted his mind to do. […] But having been there once, it was easy for his 
mind to go there again. In the nights when he could not sleep, he enacted the 
murder, and it soothed him like a drug.166  
 
Much like Raskolnikov’s paradoxical disgust and fascination with Svidrigailov, a wealthy 
profligate, Guy is at once repelled by and finally feels bound to Bruno. After the latter drunkenly 
(but perhaps intentionally) falls off Guy’s boat, Guy risks his life by jumping into a tumultuous 
sea to save him. “Where was his friend,” Guy asks himself, “his brother?” (263). 
Guy’s ambiguous identification with Bruno is the first instance of a doubling technique 
that Highsmith would rely upon throughout her career. Whereas Nabokov’s technique of 
doubling is a function of his subjective idealism, as if his characters only discover iterations of 
themselves in the world, this technique for Highsmith signals the Gothic sensibilities that 
underwrite her psychological realism:  even ostensibly upright and socially responsible human 
beings have not only the capacity for evil but also a desire for it. Thus, in a moment of dire 
reflection, Guy frames the doubling like this: “But love and hate, he thought now, good and evil, 
lived side by side in the human heart, and not merely in differing proportions in one man and the 
next, but all good and all evil.” He construes evil as a product of the self, as an internal proclivity 
that is distinct from materialist explanations or external influences. Guy perceives that this 
internal provenance for evil—its borderless relationship to the good and its origins within the 
“heart,” the psyche or soul—explains his contradictory emotional responses to Bruno: “And 
Bruno, he and Bruno. Each was what the other had not chosen to be, the cast-off self, what he 
thought he hated but perhaps in reality loved” (180). Bruno is a “double” of Guy not because 
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they are seemingly trapped within their own subjectivities but because the human capacity for 
violence and evil is, according to Highsmith, a universal fact of the human condition. Indeed, 
distinct from this doubling technique, Guy explains his refusal to discard the revolver after the 
murder: “it was his, a part of himself, the third hand that had done the murder. It was himself at 
fifteen when he had bought it, himself when he had loved Miriam and had kept it in their room in 
Chicago, looking at it now and then in his most contented, most inward moments.” During these 
“inward moments”—pauses from his life as a promising architect when Guy turns toward his 
psyche—the value of the weapon becomes most apparent. It is “[t]he best of himself,” he 
explains, the apogee of his psychological life (178). 
Guy’s insistence that what passes for “evil” is within himself positions Strangers on a 
Train as the heir of a tradition of fiction that includes Poe and Horace Walpole. Yet, perhaps 
more tellingly, these sensibilities about evil also differ from the Judeo-Christian notion of 
humanity’s total depravity. Guy’s belief that the human heart is “all good and all evil” is related 
to, but differs from that religious tradition in a way that recalls the existentialist proclamation of 
the death of God. The Hebrew prophet Jeremiah says that humanity’s heart is “deceitful and 
desperately wicked” (17:9), while one psalmist bemoans the fact that “None is righteous, no, not 
one; no one understands; no one seeks for God” (Psalm 14:3). Seizing upon such claims in 
Hebrew scripture, early Christians insisted that all human beings “are under sin” and “no one 
does good, not even one” because “[a]ll have turned aside” from God’s laws (Romans 3:9, 12). 
Within this strain of the Judeo-Christian tradition, evil takes root within the soul after humanity 
fails to meet the dictates of a divine order. Evil, in this sense, is a function of God’s laws and 
humanity’s fallible will. The fifth-century theologian Augustine would develop the idea further, 
arguing that humanity inherited “original sin” from the first human beings who violated God’s 
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will in the garden of Eden. Within the Augustinian modification, then, total depravity is 
synonymous with human nature; it is now an inevitable fact of the soul, which by nature is 
alienated from God.167   
In contrast to this tradition, Highsmith’s early work is indebted to Nietzsche’s moral 
philosophy, which dismantles the concepts of “good and evil” by identifying them as vestiges of 
a failed religio-philosophical system. According to Nietzsche, these ideas are moored in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition but have persisted in the modern world after the “death of God,” or the 
collapse of transcendental explanations for human existence and behavior.168 Highsmith first 
encountered this line of argumentation in 1939 when she read Nietzsche’s autobiography Ecce 
Homo as an undergraduate at Barnard.169 Highsmith was fascinated with the subversive quality 
of Nietzsche’s philosophy: “I am not a man,” he proclaims, “I am dynamite.”170 The destructive 
thrust of Nietzsche’s moral philosophy resides in his claim that the weak of society perpetuate 
the lies of “good” and “evil” in order to rein in the strong, despite the “death” of the 
transcendental and metaphysical explanations that gave rise to those concepts. What passes for 
“evil,” Nietzsche insists instead, is actually the impulses and proclivities of worldly human life. 
In contrast to such authentic expressions of the will, Christians and humanists are in fact nihilists 
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because they deny the importance of this life:  as they grope for spiritual things, they eschew 
their wills and thus their moral concepts are little more than vapors.  
Impressed by Nietzsche’s argument, Highsmith at first embraced this position by 
rejecting transcendental or metaphysical grounds for our conceptions of good and evil, and 
eventually she would adapt Nietzsche moral philosophy for her own novelistic purposes. The so-
called amorality that characterizes many of her most intriguing characters—especially Bruno, 
Tom Ripley, and David Kelsey in This Sweet Sickness (1961)—displaces the conventional 
concern for moral order that underwrites much of crime fiction, searching instead for what Julian 
Symons, the novelist and former president of the Detection Club, characterizes as “a different 
and wholly personal code of morality.”171 For Highsmith, evil is only a construct produced by 
her characters’ guilt, while the figure of the criminal is a symbol for the self that asserts its will. 
Thus, when Guy perceives that the revolver is “[t]he best of himself,” the weapon becomes a 
symbol of what, though society has deemed it “evil,” is actually an assertion of Guy’s will (178). 
Guy’s moment of perception about the “evil” within himself is, in other words, a window into 
the life that he wants, bringing into full view the amorality required to realize those desires. 
Following Nietzsche’s sentiment, Highsmith’s seemingly Gothic sensibilities about humanity’s 
universal penchant for “evil” become an avenue for replacing a discourse about crime and 
morality with concerns about authentic existence. She presents a narrative world beyond good 
and evil, identifying instead the authentic willing of a self as the narrative center of gravity. 
Highsmith’s shift away from moral categories toward these sensibilities about 
authenticity created confusion and discomfort among many early reviewers of the novel. For 
example, one critic with the New York Herald Tribune Book Review lamented that Strangers on 
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a Train “is not always credible, and the characters are not entirely convincing” because it is 
difficult to see how a respectable architect would fail to inform the police once he is convinced 
of Bruno’s guilt, much less commit such a murder.172 Indeed, Hitchcock seems to have similar 
reservations, for Guy does not actually go through with the murder in the film version of 
Strangers on a Train. Rather than viewing the novel as the story of a corrupted “good” man who 
longs only to live happily with his new fiancé, Anne, Highsmith stages Guy’s crime and 
attendant guilt as a struggle between two selves—one that knows the power and prestige he 
wants and another plagued by fear, compulsions, and socially constructed prohibitions. This 
struggle surfaces most clearly in the tension he feels between his ambitions as an architect and 
his former life with Miriam. On the train Guy shares his frustrations about Miriam with Bruno, 
situating his disdain for her within the context of his own tentative commission to design the 
Palmyra Club in Palm Beach.  As Bruno puerilely says about the commission, “You’re gonna be 
famous, hum?” and, in fact, there is significant professional prestige if Guy’s design is successful 
(32). As Bruno rambles about his own artistic dalliances in the past, Guy reflects about the social 
capital that his modern design would acquire for him:   
He sipped his drink absently, and thought of the commissions that would come 
after Palm Beach. Soon, perhaps, an office building in New York. He had an idea 
for an office building in New York, and he longed to see it come into being. Guy 
Daniel Hanes. A name. No longer the irksome, never quite banished awareness 
that he had less money than Anne. (32)  
 
While Guy earlier says that he has no interest in “making money” (20), the Palmyra affords him 
the opportunity to gain enough social capital that he can pursue his architectural and artistic 
interests unencumbered by financial concerns. He would become a “name,” a public figure with 
social clout. Furthermore, the Palmyra commission would obviate Guy’s concerns about his 
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inferior socio-economic position with Anne, whose wealthy family is among the upper classes 
of New England. Miriam, however, threatens to “lose him the commission” by spoiling his 
social capital, either by demanding a divorce because of her love for Owen Markham or ruining 
his social clout with Clarence Brillhart, the manager of the Palmyra Club (33). In either case, he 
fears, Miriam will prompt Brillhart to deny or withdraw the commission.   
When Guy learns that Miriam wants to go to Palm Beach with him for “protection” 
during her pregnancy (her lover is currently married and first needs to get a divorce), Guy is 
distraught. He imagines Miriam moving to Palm Beach with him while carrying another man’s 
child, anticipating that a scandal would surface. He also imagines an equally disastrous scenario 
in which the small-town, unsophisticated Miriam meets Brillhart, ruining Guy’s image as a 
member of the cultural elite. Guy thus becomes convinced that Miriam cannot accompany him 
to Palm Beach. “Yet,” Guy suddenly realizes, “it was not the vision of Brillhart’s shock beneath 
his calm, unvarying courtesy […] but simply his own revulsion that made it impossible. It was 
just that he couldn’t bear having Miriam anywhere near him when he worked on a project like 
this one” (43). Even if she does not pollute his social circle, Miriam would pollute his 
imagination—his ability to work on such an important project. In almost any scenario, then, 
Miriam obstructs or devalues the social capital that Guy gains by the Palmyra commission. Her 
unrefined presence would sully his slow climb from his home in Metcalf, Texas into the upper 
echelons of New York society. Given his revulsion and anxieties, Bruno’s proposal to murder 
Miriam is in fact a manifestation of Guy’s will.   
However, such a Nietzschean reading of Strangers on a Train is not without its problems. 
What, for example, makes the life that Guy wills—his desire to be a “name”—any less a social 
construct than the morality that inhibits the realization of his goal? And, in terms of Nietzsche’s 
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argument, what makes the will-to-power any more “natural” than the meanings and values that 
human beings produce? Are not the “natural,” the “vital,” and even “this life” concepts with 
their own contingent histories? This set of tensions often prompts readers to argue that social-
historical critiques underwrite Highsmith’s novels. Joshua Lukin, for example, argues that 
Guy’s desire to climb the social ladder through his profession is the object of Highsmith’s 
criticism of a constellation of pressures on the postwar professional-managerial class. Through 
his ostensible commitment to aesthetic purity—to the art of architecture rather than “making 
money”—Guy thinks of himself as “classless” when in fact this professional fantasy is a 
product of the “psychic pressures” of a booming market for mass consumption and the demands 
of social mobility.173 These two streams of “psychic pressure” lead Guy to embrace a pair of 
paradoxical desires:  social mobility and the “classlessness” of an aesthetic life apart from mass 
consumer culture.  Recalling Andrew Hoberek’s Twilight of the Middle Class, Lukin argues that 
Guy understands himself as something like the dispossessed bourgeoisie, forced into vulgar 
labor and longing for lost social autonomy.174 Lukin thus glosses Guy’s acquiescence to Bruno 
as the former’s paradoxical desire for social mobility and classlessness—a function, that is, of 
his professional status.  
Yet Highsmith presents Guy’s violence and Bruno’s obsession with murder as much 
more than outcomes of their professional and socio-economic status. Indeed, Bruno and Anne 
share the same economic status, even if the latter is more adept culturally and socially. Rather 
than capitulating to socio-economic forces of their class, Highsmith presents Bruno’s 
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motivations and violence as manifestations of a psychological realm. For example, after 
Miriam’s murder, Bruno imagines that he has finally achieved something important, as if the 
murder were an accomplishment that bolsters his ego. As Guy puts it, Bruno takes “personal 
pride in his, Guy’s, freedom” (102). More importantly, after Guy has murdered Bruno’s father, 
Bruno later muses that their freedom enables them to have intimacy with one another: “Guy and 
himself! Who else was like them? Who else was their equal? He longed for Guy to be with him 
now. He would clasp Guy’s hand, and to hell with the rest of the world!” (167). The two murders 
are in fact different forms of pleasure: Bruno’s murder of Miriam is violently intimate, as he 
chokes her to death, while Guy murders the elder Bruno as he lies in his bed.  
Bruno fantasizes that these two intimately construed murders become something like a 
consummation of his and Guy’s relationship. They are wedded to one another, Bruno believes, 
through the freedom of a prior lover’s death and the murder of an oppressive father. Indeed, 
Bruno even fantasizes about removing Anne as a competitor for Guy’s affections: “If he could 
strangle Anne, too, then Guy and he could really be together” (250). Bruno’s Oedipal desire for 
his mother, which he wears on his grey flannel sleeve while talking with Guy on the train, 
transfers to the surrogate murderer of his father. The crime becomes something like a form of 
narcissism:  Bruno loves the man that has done what he could never do, the self that he wishes he 
could be.175 Indeed, Guy has enabled them both to become “supermen,” as Bruno drunkenly 
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proclaims:  Nietzschean übermenschen who will the life they want (261). Thus, the explanations 
for Bruno’s murder of Miriam, his subsequent pressure on Guy, and his homoerotic fantasies 
about a union through violence are rooted within the realm of the ego and his desire for an 
authentic expression of the self. The arena of psychology therefore serves as the bedrock of the 
narrative:  Highsmith presents her characters’ violence and guilt as performances within a theater 
of the will and the self.  
 
Existential Psychology and the “Decline” of Literary Naturalism 
Highsmith often signals her interventions in literary history by alluding to or adapting a 
previous novelistic forebear. In The Talented Mr. Ripley, Herbert Greenleaf notes that his 
proposition to Tom Ripley is not unlike the one that Lambert Strether receives in Henry James’s 
The Ambassadors. In contrast, Highsmith’s reworking of a literary forebear in Strangers on a 
Train is much subtler and more suggestive: much like Highsmith’s novel, Theodore Dreiser’s 
Sister Carrie (1900) begins on a train with a chance meeting between two seemingly antithetical 
characters, Carrie Meeber and Charles Drouet.176 Highsmith’s small-town waif desires to be 
upwardly mobile even as Carrie, like Guy, is at first suspicious of the man on the train who 
seems to be observing her with peculiar and ambiguous interest. The narrator informs the reader 
that Drouet is a “masher,” or “one whose dress or manners are calculated to elicit the admiration 
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of susceptible young women.”177 Carrie, on the other hand, is a “waif amid forces,” an ostensibly 
innocent young woman who leaves her childhood home in order to “reconnoitre the mysterious 
city [of Chicago] and dreaming wild dreams of some vague, far-off supremacy” (2, 3).  Carrie, as 
a “fair example of the middle American class,” allows her naïve ambitions to lead her into 
situations that are far from her original intentions (2). Indeed, both Highsmith’s aspiring architect 
and Dreiser’s middle-class waif seemingly destroy their lives even as they achieve semblances of 
their desires. For Carrie, her “wild dreams” are seized and manipulated by the city’s “large 
forces which allure with all the soulfulness of expression possible in the most cultured human” 
(2). Carrie eventually becomes Drouet’s mistress after she experiences the difficulties of life in 
Chicago—her sister’s stifling home, work in a factory, poverty.  Rather than returning to her 
small town or finding other lower-class employment, Carrie’s desire for “some vague, far-off 
supremacy” prompts her to search for an avenue of escape from her difficulties.  
Indeed, Carrie’s “vague” desires are defined for her as she is exposed to the alluring 
promises realities of urban life. For example, after losing her job, Drouet takes Carrie to dinner 
and orders an expensive sirloin. His charm and liberal spending “captivated Carrie completely” 
(67). Furthermore, Drouet’s interactions with “noted or rich individuals” also cast a spell over 
Carrie (51). His munificence and social standing prepare Carrie to assume “the cosmopolitan 
standard of virtue,” as the narrator puts it, by justifying the decision to become his mistress for 
the sake of the material opportunity that the relationship affords (2). “Ah, money, money, 
money,” she muses before agreeing to become Drouet’s mistress, “What a thing it was to have. 
How plenty of it would clear away all these troubles” (74-75). Carrie has absorbed this fantasy 
about money through her fleeting exposure to upper-middle-class life, and thus when Drouet 
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proposes to “take care” of her, Carrie hears the proposition “passively,” as if it were “the 
welcome breath of an open door” (77). The “waif,” as Dreiser calls her, is slowly carried away 
by the currents of Chicago’s larger forces.  
Having become intimate with this stranger she meets on a train, Carrie allows Drouet to 
buy her expensive clothes, secure a spacious apartment, and he even enables her to play the 
heroine in a theatrical performance. In short, Drouet helps define and fulfill Carrie’s desires. 
However, although this waif appears to be a passive subject to Drouet’s charm, forces beyond 
this “masher” also influence Carrie. She is “the victim of the city’s hypnotic charm,” the narrator 
explains before her older sister, Minnie, has a nightmare of Carrie being swallowed up by dark 
waters (89).  Minnie’s dream presumably serves as an occluded sign of the “something” that is 
“lost” with Carrie—that is, her virginity and, in Dreiser’s view, her innocence along with it (90). 
But also Minnie’s dream recalls the larger forces swirling around Carrie’s life. Environmental 
imagery pervades the dream, much like the way it recurs throughout the novel, particularly when 
representing Carrie’s “mental state.” The early implications of this imagery is that Drouet is only 
one among many forces, a fact confirmed when Carrie begins an affair with George Hurstwood, 
the manager of an upscale bar. Hurstwood, Carrie tells herself, is “more clever than Drouet in a 
hundred ways” and also more attentive to her (106). Yet even these shifting desires, Dreiser 
suggests, are products of institutional and socio-economic conditions. The psychological is little 
more than an aftereffect: “A blare of sound, a roar of life, a vast array of human hives,” the 
narrator explains, “appeal to the astonished senses in equivocal terms” (2). 
Through her vacillating affections, Dreiser presents Carrie as a reed in the wind:  her 
desires are largely unknown to herself and, given the recurring prominence that the narrator 
attributes to the city, those desires are most often constituted by impersonal “forces.” The 
  122 
narrator provides such an explanatory template for Carrie’s behavior not long after her decision 
to become Drouet’s mistress. Dreiser’s narrator, seemingly in an attempt to create empathy for 
Carrie’s situation, reflects on her “mental state” in relation to “the true answer to what is right.” 
The narrator remarks that much of modern society’s standards for moral judgment are 
“infantile,” merely applying principles as an uncritical recitation of popular conventions (101). 
Indeed, Carrie’s “average little conscience” similarly replicates “the world, her past environment, 
habit, convention, in a confused way” (103). The narrator’s point, however, is not that morality is 
merely a conventional construct. Rather, even Carrie, whose “mind [is] rudimentary in its power 
of observation and analysis,” finds that her conventional conscience is “never wholly 
convincing” (2, 104). The unsophisticated Carrie is able to criticize the received standards for 
social behavior.  She is more than a product of her social world. Instead, the narrator suggests 
that the more forceful determinants exist on a larger register: “There was always an answer [to 
her conscience], always the December days threatened. She was alone; she was desireful; she 
was fearful of the whistling wind. The voice of want made answer for her” (104). Carrie’s 
“morality”—her ethic, the underpinnings of her behavior—is driven by the threat of poverty and 
being cast out into an indifferent world. By framing Carrie’s behavior in relation to the cold 
“December days” and the risk of exposure to natural elements, the narrator connects such supra-
human forces and structural conditions—e.g., the city—to the earlier question about “the true 
answer to what is right” (101). Carrie’s “mental state,” in other words, is a creature struggling 
against the material conditions and structural realities that are its creator. 
The history of the reception of Sister Carrie is—not unlike the novel’s publication 
history—a contentious problem. The editors at Harper and Brothers rejected the first version of 
the novel on the grounds of the “illicit relations of the heroine” and the possibility that it might 
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offend readers.178 Dreiser eventually took the book to Doubleday Page, where the naturalist 
author Frank Norris served as the book’s reader. Norris’s enthusiasm for Sister Carrie led the 
publisher to sign a contract with Dreiser and print the book.179 After this signed contract, Dreiser 
and later scholars alike dispute Doubleday’s publication of Sister Carrie as well as the novel’s 
critical reception. According to Dreiser, before the novel was actually circulated, “Mrs. Frank 
Doubleday read the manuscript and was horrified by its frankness.”180 The publisher therefore 
refused to circulate Sister Carrie, and the enthusiastic Norris was able to send only a handful of 
copies to book reviewers. In 1901, William Heinemann published Sister Carrie in London, 
where the novel was a success. In the United States, on the other hand, Dreiser maintained until 
1931 that the novel elicited “outraged protests [that] far outnumbered the plaudits.”181 However, 
Jack Salzman contests Dreiser’s account because, in fact, Doubleday sent three reports of sales to 
the author during 1901-1902. Rather than refusing to circulate Sister Carrie, as Dreiser’s 
insisted, Doubleday simply did not sell very many copies of the novel—less than 500 in fact.182 
Furthermore, as Christopher P. Wilson argues, Doubleday’s contentious relationship with 
Dreiser was, given the reorientation of the publishing industry toward long-term promotion costs, 
driven “not [by] the novel’s ‘immorality’ but whether Dreiser would submit to the firm’s 
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management of his literary career.”183 Doubleday simply wanted to republish Sister Carrie after 
Dreiser wrote other more marketable books, while Dreiser simply refused to have a publishing 
house determine his career. 
The critical reception of Sister Carrie did not meet as much resistance as Dreiser and 
many early scholars maintain, either. Surveying the early reviews of the novel, Salzman shows 
that the majority of critics responded favorably to the novel in 1900-1901. The Chicago-based 
Times Herald even remarks Dreiser appears to be Zola’s equal.184 Admittedly, no major 
magazine or American journal published early reviews of Sister Carrie, but several large and 
prestigious journals in England published enthusiastic reviews, which in turn “made a marked 
impression on the American reviewers and was instrumental in the revival of interest in Sister 
Carrie in the United States.”185 While Salzman perhaps overstates the influence of English tastes 
on Dreiser’s reception in the United States, he demonstrates that the cultural marketplace had 
become extremely amenable to Dreiser’s urban “realism,” as most early reviewers characterized 
it, by 1907. Indeed, by 1918 the editors of the Modern Library were eager to include Sister 
Carrie in the series, although Dreiser delayed its inclusion for economic reasons.186 Following its 
provocative but largely enthusiastic critical reception in the decades following its publication, 
Dreiser’s novel had become a prominent part of the American cultural arena by the 1920s. 
Through the support of influential intellectuals such as H. L. Mencken and the aggregating 
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financial value of the original manuscript, Kevin J. Hayes demonstrates that Sister Carrie 
underwent a canonization process among the cultural elite during the 1920s and 1930s.187 
The reception history of Sister Carrie maps onto the wider literary history and cultural 
legitimacy of American naturalism. The early critical reception of naturalism—restricted at first 
to Norris, Jack London, and Stephen Crane—was largely skeptical:  the first naturalist novels 
were often dismissed as muckraking fiction that appealed to a mass audience on sensational 
grounds. Among the first postwar critics to look back at American naturalism, Malcolm Cowley 
explains the early skeptical reception as a function of the challenge naturalism posed to 
conventional literature. During the 1890s, Cowley argues, the movement developed as a literary 
rebellion against the “genteel tradition” of American letters. While putatively “genteel” novels, 
such as William Dean Howells’s The Rise of Silas Lapham (1885), document the moral struggles 
that accompany the desire for wealth, Cowley says that such late-nineteenth-century novels 
obscure the turpitude and plight of American urban life and the working class. These difficulties 
begged for representation, Cowley explains, and the naturalists rebelled against “genteel” literary 
conventions to document such sordid aspects of human experience.188 Similarly, Philip Rahv, the 
New York intellectual and influential founding editor of Partisan Review, argues that naturalism 
is a product of a nineteenth-century world of industry and science, protesting the conditions of 
the former through the resources of the latter. He even connects naturalist sensibilities to the 
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proletarian novels of the 1930s.189 Naturalism, Rahv explains, “revolutionized writing by 
liquidating the last assets of ‘romance’ in fiction and by purging it once and for all of the 
idealism of the ‘beautiful lie’—of the longstanding inhibitions against dealing with the underside 
of life.”190 For Cowley and Rahv, then, naturalism began on the margins of the literary 
marketplace as a rebellion against the socio-economic of industrial, urbanized existence.  
In fact, much like the Dreiser’s overstatement that “outraged protests far outnumbered the 
plaudits” of Sister Carrie, the style of naturalism had a significant critical following at the turn of 
the century. In part, this was due to the perception that American naturalists drew heavily from 
Émile Zola’s novels, and this perceived European debt gave “naturalist realism” significant 
cultural and intellectual capital. Lars Ahnebrink, for example, records and perpetuates this early 
perception of naturalism as an Americanized version of Zola’s European school.191 Charles C. 
Walcutt, however, expands the origins of American naturalism beyond its status as European 
imitation or a young, rebellious literary movement. Walcutt argues that two streams of political 
and philosophical discourse characterize American naturalism:  an optimistic school 
underwritten by “progressivism and social radicalism,” and a pessimistic stream governed by 
deterministic theories of behavior, such as social Darwinism.192 For Walcutt, American 
naturalism is a response to philosophical, scientific, and political trends rather than literary tastes. 
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Walcutt’s characterization of the intellectual sources of American naturalism thus restricts the 
movement to the decades of 1890-1930, when the relevant forms of social and biological 
sciences had achieved ascendancy. Donald Pizer, on the other hand, argues that the movement is 
“characterized by similarities in material and method, not by philosophical coherence.”193 For 
Pizer, naturalism became institutionalized in the 1920s and 1930s, and its reception has become 
so significant that later writers such as William Styron and Norman Mailer replicate naturalist 
literary mechanisms. However, Pizer’s readings of naturalist methods among postwar writers, 
though perceptive in documenting the influence of the movement, fails to distinguish these later 
literary methods from the wider stream of realism.  
Still, even if later writers employ naturalist methods of representation, by the mid-1940s 
the intellectual conversation surrounding naturalism had changed. As early as 1942, Philip Rahv 
argues that the “endless book-keeping of existence” that characterized literary naturalism was in 
decline. While the genre had come to the front of cultural attention in the 1930s with 
publications such as John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath (1939) and John Dos Passos’s U.S.A. 
trilogy (1930, 1932, 1936), Rahv observes that a newer generation of writers had begun to “want 
to break the novel of its objective habits.”194 Rather than offering historically objective narratives 
that explore the structural or environmental conditions of human life, Rahv suggests that new 
intellectual currents were prompting American writers to become introspective about art, the 
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artist, and the individual. Rahv perceptively explains that the growing intellectual discontentment 
with the naturalist style has its impetus in the political animus toward progressive politics, with 
its (perceived) view of the individual. In opposition to “the political movement in the literature of 
the past decade [1930s],” Rahv contends, there has been “a revival of religio-esthetic 
attitudes.”195 Rahv formulates an objection against naturalism that would be reiterated among 
many intellectuals for the next two decades:  naturalist novels envision a “closed world,” one in 
which “the environment displaces its inhabitants in the role of the hero.”196 In contrast, Rahv 
argues, larger intellectual trends have deposed that ordering of the narrative world. Among the 
most important of these forces, Rahv cites “the growth of the psychological sciences and, 
particularly, of psychoanalysis.”197 Such trends (predating the influence of existentialism upon 
American intellectual life) have prompted literature to turn inward, creating a crisis in 
interpreting human experience. The literary devices and intellectual resources of the naturalist 
style, in other words, could not adequately interpret a newly disassembled world. 
By the late 1950s, so many scholars were convinced of the “decline” of the naturalist 
style that Edward Stone collected an anthology, What Was Naturalism? (1959).198 The title’s 
past tense suggests an expired phenomenon, and indeed Stone explains that the purpose of the 
anthology is to introduce “the mind of a buried generation” to young scholars.199 The “materials” 
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that Stone associates with the movement suggest why he feels that the intellectual era of the 
naturalists had passed—in particular, selections from Thomas R. Malthus’s An Essay on the 
Principle of Population, Marx’s A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and 
Capital, and Herbert Spencer’s The Principles of Sociology. These selections represent the “gist” 
of “a mind,” or the intellectual milieu that inspired Hamlin Garland, Crane, London, Norris, and 
Dreiser.200 The critical and intellectual shifts of the postwar cultural marketplace mitigated—if 
not “buried,” as Stone suggests—the sociological accounts of society and individuals that had 
influenced naturalist writers. Also, American attitudes toward progressive accounts of politics 
and economics, particularly toward Marxism and its perceived relationship with fascism, led 
many postwar critics and readers to distrust the narrative worlds that naturalism represented. 
Stone’s anthology, then, suggests how postwar intellectuals not only associated naturalism with 
environmental determinism and progressive sociology, but also with radical politics. Indeed, 
novels such as Crane’s Maggie: A Girl of the Streets (1892) and Norris’s The Octopus (1901) 
document the squalor created on the margins of urban capitalist society in ways that appealed to 
the aesthetic tastes of many critics even as it helped to disseminate a sociological and economic 
explanatory template for the phenomena of violence and the psychological consequences of 
indigence.  
In reality, the felt cultural “decline” of the naturalist style was a temporary symptom of 
the intellectual trends of the 1940s and 1950s. A decade later, critics began to evaluate Charles 
Walcutt’s taxonomy of the movement, leading to renewed scholarly interest in naturalism and its 
intellectual sources. Mass-market presses such as Penguin would also reprint many naturalist 
texts during the 1980s, discovering through the mechanism of canonization that naturalism had a 
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marketable afterlife. Thus, when the “decline” of naturalism appeared as an ostensible fact of the 
cultural arena in the 1940s and 1950s, it signals important shifts in intellectual history as much as 
the changing literary tastes of American critics. Picking up on Rahv’s proclamation in 1942, 
James Burkhart Gilbert traces the dwindling cultural fortunes of naturalism in relation to a 
revolution in the editorial policies of the Partisan Review. In 1934, Rahv and William Phillips 
founded the magazine to “defend the Soviet Union, to combat fascism and war, and to promote a 
literature which would express the viewpoint of the working class.” The magazine soon folded, 
however, and its new editorial board in 1937 replaced “proletarian literature” with “intellectual 
literature.”201 Thus, during the late 1930s the editors abandoned their ambitions of leading a 
political vanguard—most often through publishing naturalist fiction and political essays—and 
transferred those aspirations to the arena of cultural tastes. On the one hand, this was an 
economic decision:  the masses don’t buy proletarian fiction. On the other, it also signals the 
changing intellectual winds of wartime America, in which intellectual vanguardism shifted from 
a set of political dogmas to cultural values. By the early 1940s, then, the Partisan Review 
generally refused to publish work that was either naturalist in style or Pro-Soviet in its politics.202 
These shifts, Gilbert argues, involved growing anti-communist sensibilities in the 1940s, but, 
more to the point, the editors had decided to turn “back to the era of the symbolists, the 
surrealists, and the exiles.” The standards for publication established the avant-garde as its gold 
standard, privileging literary style above political vision. Consequently, the poetry and prose of 
the Partisan “was less likely to belong to the genre of American writing exemplified by Frost, 
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Steinbeck, or Sandburg. […] Marxist realism, even the naturalism so evident in the early 
magazine, was banished and replaced by writing that corresponded more to that printed in the 
Dial during the 1920s.” As the cultural stock of avant-garde modernism soared, the editors of 
Partisan Review tended to devalue realism and naturalism. Admittedly, the differences between 
American naturalism and the literary avant-garde is, as Gilbert admits, an “exaggeration” 
perpetuated by the Partisan editors. Nonetheless, literary naturalism fell out of favor with the 
leading American editors and critics of the 1940s, even as writers like Kafka, Joyce, and Eliot 
began to dominate aesthetic tastes.203  
While naturalist fiction emerges from the 1930s as a cultural icon, its “decline” in the 
1940s is not only due, as Rahv suggests, to the “growth of psychological sciences” but also to the 
immigration of European existentialism into American cultural life.204 In fact, many therapists 
and intellectuals soon assimilated these twin phenomena into the existential psychology 
movement.  Existential psychology was a forerunner of the humanistic psychology movement of 
the 1960s, and both theories of therapy had profound effects upon popular sensibilities about the 
self and its route to authenticity.205 Rollo May’s edited anthology, Existence (1958), 
disseminated existential psychoanalysis to the wider psychiatric profession.206 May had first wed 
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existentialist sensibilities about authenticity with psychological analysis and therapeutic practice 
in Man’s Search for Himself (1953), which was a New York Times bestseller. This wedding was 
not unique to May, for his work drew heavily upon European existential psychology, particularly 
Ludwig Binswanger and Viktor Frankl. May used the salient terms of existentialism to revise 
elements from the early humanistic psychology movement developing in the writings of Carl R. 
Rogers and Abraham Maslow.207 In effect, this permutation of professional psychology casts 
therapeutic work as an avenue for unearthing and expressing an authentic self:  psychological 
analysis becomes the pathway to existential self-realization. 
Even as May, Rogers, and Maslow were inspiring the popularization of psychologized 
authenticity, other therapists began to employ psychological templates when analyzing social and 
political events. Most notably, in Escape from Freedom (1941) Erich Fromm accounts for the 
advent of fascism through “the character structure of modern man and the problems of the 
interaction between psychological and sociological factors.”208 For Fromm, fascism is a 
temptation born out of the psychological state of the modern individual:  while “modern man” 
has been freed from the strictures of “pre-individualistic society,” modern selves have also 
become anxious and isolated in their individualized freedom. The temptation confronting the 
modern self, Fromm argues, is to abandon the burden of freedom for political dependencies. 
Fromm thus construes fascism as a form of neurosis—an individual psychological template 
applied to collective behavior. Therefore, in a way distinct from the humanistic psychology 
movement’s emphasis upon the individual, Fromm’s version of existential psychology frames 
society and politics after a psychological pattern. This turn is not a retreat from politics, then, but 
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a reframing of it.  Indeed, the mechanisms of Fromm’s “psychosocial” analysis would become 
widely representative, if not directly influential, upon the early literature on totalitarianism, 
which tended to psychologize the loss of personality that seemingly characterized its 
supporters.209 Inverting the accounts of violence in both Malthusian sociology and Marxist 
political economy, the existential psychology movement embedded social and political behaviors 
within the explanatory resources of a diverse and growing body of psychological knowledge.  
The so-called age of anxiety therefore saw the proliferation of a spectrum of 
psychological templates for understanding the modern self and society. While existentialism and 
a heterogeneous body of popular psychotherapies were situating social phenomena within an 
arena of private authenticity in the 1950s, corporate interests also contributed to this shifting 
intellectual terrain. As Louis Menand explains, the popularization of psychology “had to do with 
what might be called the Cold War discourse of anxiety.”210 This discourse about anxiety—or 
“anxiety about anxiety,” as Menand puts it, not only wedded European existentialism and 
psychoanalytic theory, but also depended in large part upon the new discipline of 
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psychopharmacology and the promotional practices of the pharmaceutical industry.211 While 
psychoanalysis had influenced medical discourse about neuroses, a burgeoning postwar 
pharmaceutical industry promoted its own commercial interests through aggressive advertising 
campaigns that normalized pharmaceutical drugs. In short, anxieties from the trauma of the war, 
nuclear threats, and even ordinary feelings of existential insignificance, all became widely 
understood as medical disorders treatable by forms of psychological or psychopharmaceutical 
therapy. The consequences of this “discourse of anxiety” in the early Cold War years, Menand 
argues, was that “questions of psychology, and mental states generally, [were put] at the center 
of cultural attention.”212  
The complicated cultural fabric of the postwar moment thus includes the intellectual 
declaration of the “decline” of naturalism, the rising normalcy of psychoanalysis, and the 
wedding of existential psychology—phenomena that meet not only in Rahv’s explanation for 
changing literary tastes but also in Highsmith’s allusion to Sister Carrie in the opening of 
Strangers on a Train. While Carrie’s desires are caught within a web of structural conditions and 
a cold urban environment, Highsmith frames Guy’s ambitions and contradictory desires through 
the vicissitudes of an irrational psychological arena. Indeed, much like Dostoevsky in Notes from 
Underground, Highsmith documents the irrational undercurrents of the human psyche as a way 
of confronting deterministic accounts of human behavior. For example, when Guy and Bruno 
first meet, Guy is reading a volume of Plato’s philosophy. However, his mind consistently drifts 
from the book to Bruno, who has just sat across from him: “his mind wandered after half a page. 
He […] let his eyes wander to the unlighted cigar that still gyrated conversationally in a bony 
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hand behind one of the seat backs, and to the monogram that trembled on a thin gold chain 
across the tie of the young man opposite him.” The monogram, CAB, attracts Guy’s attention 
more fully than the book of philosophy. No matter how much he concentrates, Guy finds himself 
“reading” Bruno rather than Plato: “It was an interesting face, though Guy did not know why” 
(11). Dreiser’s Carrie also tries yet fails to read a novel, but what Florence Dore calls her “guilty 
reading” is a marker of the sexual norms and class-based cultural capital that preclude her from 
the “highbrow” world she desires to enter.213 Plato similarly represents Guy’s desire to enter a 
world of knowledge and order, yet what frustrates Highsmith’s protagonist is not the 
proscriptions of normative behavior but the psychological appeal of the violent and the irrational.  
After Guy does a thorough close reading of Bruno rather than Plato, he feels momentarily 
satisfied and is able to return to his book. “The words made sense to him and began to lift his 
anxiety,” the narrator explains. Yet the consolation of philosophy is short-lived: “But what good 
will Plato do you with Miriam, an inner voice asked him” (11). Bruno the sociopath soon 
provides a solution that Guy’s desire for order, virtue, and reason cannot. Indeed, Highsmith’s 
selection of Plato as the author of the volume Guy reads is telling. In Mary McCabe’s apt phrase, 
Plato’s dialogues constitute a “dramatization of reason”:  his philosophy searches for the best 
ordering for society and an individual’s life according to wisdom.214 Not unlike Guy the 
architect, Plato weds rational order with the artistic. While Plato has interesting things to say 
about the irrational, E. R. Dodds summarizes the intellectual consensus of Highsmith’s day when 
he explains that scholars read Plato as a “rationalist” in at least two senses:  Plato “believes that 
reason and not the senses provides […] the first principles on which scientific knowledge is 
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built,” and he maintains that “the life of man and the life of the universe are governed by, or are 
manifestations of, a rational plan.”215 Guy’s interest in Plato, then, serves as a retreat from the 
distractions of Miriam into planning, wisdom, and the resources of the Western cultural tradition. 
Yet, before Bruno even mentions his plan, Guy already has doubts about the efficacy of the 
rational order that Plato represents. An “inner voice”—one among many that will speak to Guy 
throughout the novel—questions whether such thought is sufficient for the situation he faces 
with Miriam. Could there be other consolations for Guy’s anxieties not bound up with reason and 
planning? Bruno’s proposition for a double murder seems to realize the irrational that repeatedly 
draws Guy toward the man “interesting face” (11).  
Later, Guy learns through a note from Brillhart that he has been awarded the Palmyra 
commission. In despair at the situation with Miriam, Guy tears up the letter and decides to turn 
down the offer (47). Along with Brillhart’s note, though, Guy also receives a letter from Bruno, 
who explains that Guy left his volume of Plato’s philosophy in Bruno’s room on the train. 
Almost as an incidental aside, Bruno says, “I keep thinking about that idea we had for a couple 
of murders. It could be done, I am sure” (47). When Guy finishes the letter, rather than tearing it 
up like Brillhart’s note, Guy finds that it “pleased him somehow. It was pleasant to think of 
Bruno’s freedom” (48). The juxtaposition between Brillhart’s note (an opportunity to draw up a 
blueprint and build a rational plan) and Bruno’s suggestion (an opportunity for violence with 
vague motivations) poses a choice between a world of order and one of irrational 
destructiveness. Guy’s pleasure in Bruno’s letter suggests yet again that his desire for order is 
interrupted by the appeal of the irrational. Indeed, Guy’s decision to preserve Bruno’s letter and 
tear up Brillhart’s—much like his refusal to turn Bruno into the police after Miriam’s murder—is 
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explicable only as an unconscious attraction to the “freedom” of Bruno’s proposition. Guy’s 
ambitions provide an inlet for an unconscious sea of irrationality to sweep across the ordered 
existence he has tried to design.  Highsmith therefore presents Guy the architect as a tragic figure 
for the age of anxiety:  he is the victim of psychological undercurrents and the hubris induced by 
rationality. 
While both Sister Carrie and Strangers on a Train are concerned with the mental states 
of their characters, the recurrence of the irrational in Highsmith’s novel presents a narrative 
world governed primarily by the disordered and contradictory psychological life of its characters. 
Highsmith’s allusion to Dreiser’s novel, then, reframes the conditions of possibility for the 
mental states of her characters, removing them from the largely deterministic structures that 
concern the naturalist novel. Dreiser presents Carrie’s desires as either a product of structural 
conditions—e.g., the allure of consumerism in her urban environment—or as a weak haven from 
the whims of larger forces.216 Highsmith, on other hand, presents her characters’ behavior within 
a different nexus of forces. Bruno describes this nexus while having dinner with Anne one 
evening when Guy is working on a project. During a telling inversion of intimacies where the 
sociopath informs the lover, Bruno quotes Guy to Anne: “Every man is his own law court and 
punishes himself enough. In fact, every man is just about everything to Guy!” (252). Bruno, who 
seemingly knows Guy’s mind better than his wife does, adapts one of Guy’s ruminations to 
explain that “good and evil” are phenomena of an internal arena (251). What’s more, Bruno’s 
enigmatic assertion that “every man is just about everything to Guy” suggests that moral 
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judgments, like the criminal acts themselves, are almost entirely circumscribed by the individual 
and the chaotic court of the psyche. Sure, social norms and inhibitions influence human beings, 
Bruno suggests, but criminal acts are principally phenomena of existential conditions rather than 
structural or environmental ones. When, for example, Guy neglects to inform the police or even 
tell his fiancé that Bruno has obliquely confessed to Miriam’s murder in three letters, Guy 
justifies the decision because of “some sense of personal guilt that he himself could not bear” 
(95). On the one hand, Guy fears exposure if he were to go to the police. Yet this feeling is also 
irrational because, although Guy is strangely interested in Bruno on the train, he nonetheless 
rebuffs his proposal. Indeed, Bruno admits that Guy has rejected the idea of an exchanged 
murder, but he strangles Miriam anyway. Thus, Guy’s “personal guilt” is, as Russell Harrison 
glosses it, “an existential guilt, rather than guilt for a specific act.”217 The hesitancies plaguing 
Guy are a product of his own conflicted ego—they derive from the uncertainties about which self 
he desires to will. 
 
Tom Ripley, Kierkegaard’s Sickness, and the Devaluation of Structural Reform 
When Hitchcock bought the rights to Highsmith’s Strangers on a Train, he ran into 
difficulties with adapting its plot for the screen. He soon hired Raymond Chandler to turn the 
novel into a script. Chandler plodded through the job, but after submitting the manuscript he was 
promptly fired and Hitchcock hired another screenwriter for the film. In a pleading explanation 
that Chandler wrote (but never sent) to Hitchcock, he explains, “The great difficulty of the story 
always was to make it credible to an audience that Guy should behave in the damn-fool way in 
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which he did behave.”218 Indeed, Guy’s irrationality, as I have argued, makes his behavior 
inexplicable as the product of anything other than the crisis of his own tumultuous psyche; 
conditions external to that arena—Anne and her wealth, even Bruno’s pressure—do not cause 
him to behave in predictable or socially determined ways. Rather, Highsmith subordinates the 
socio-economic elements of her characters’ lives to the arena of psychology, which itself is 
underwritten by existentialist sensibilities regarding alienation and authenticity. Much like 
Chandler’s complaint to Hitchcock, these finely drawn nuances in the psychological lives of 
Highsmith’s characters lead many critics and readers to lament that her plots are “too subtle,” as 
one of her editors put it when explaining the poor sales of her books in the United States.219 
Reading her fiction for its subtleties rather than its surface tensions and evasions often proves to 
be difficult and tends to invite misunderstanding about her work.  
The Talented Mr. Ripley, perhaps more than any of her other novels, disorients the reader 
with its amoral presentation of Tom Ripley and the subtleties of his behavior. For example, 
explaining Tom’s obsession with Dickie Greenleaf’s affluent lifestyle, Edward A. Shannon says 
that Highsmith “focuses the reader’s attention on the political and economic contexts that define 
Tom Ripley, who is first and foremost an American bent on ascending the ladder of class and 
privilege.”220 The Talented Mr. Ripley thus is underwritten by Highsmith’s “critique of American 
ideas of class,” Shannon argues.221 However, while Tom is keenly attuned to the markers of 
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Dickie’s affluence, the deceptive subtleties of Highsmith’s novel frustrate the idea that a 
“critique” of American narratives of social mobility is underpinning the narrative. The 
innovation of Highsmith’s fiction is the way that she differentiates The Talented Mr. Ripley from 
earlier American novels, such as James’s The Ambassadors and Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby 
(1925), which present the ambiguities of class-based self-invention. Highsmith refashions these 
earlier iterations through her sensibilities about free choice and authenticity:  the ambiguities of 
Tom’s self-invention are rooted not in his class but his own oddly comic failure to assume his 
freedom. Tom is a figure for an almost Nietzschean individual willing to become the self that he 
chooses at any cost, yet paradoxically that self abandons his free choice when confronted with 
the burden of freedom. Tom, in other words, does not want to escape his class or social position 
so much as his self. 
The philosophical contours of Tom’s existential crisis become more pronounced in 
relation to Highsmith’s intellectual debts from the 1940s and early 1950s.  Highsmith recounts 
that the idea for the character Tom Ripley came to her one morning in 1952 when she and her 
lover, the sociologist Ellen Hill, were visiting Positano, a small fishing village on the Amalfi 
coast. One morning Highsmith walked onto their balcony and then “noticed a solitary young man 
in shorts and sandals with a towel flung over his shoulder, making his way along the beach from 
right to left. […] There was an air of pensiveness about him, maybe unease. And why was he 
alone? […] Had he quarrelled [sic] with someone?”222 Andrew Wilson, however, suggests that 
the seed for Ripley came three years earlier, when in 1949 she read an anthology of Søren 
Kierkegaard’s work. Highsmith describes the Danish philosopher as her “master,” a title she 
earlier gave to Dostoevsky. Kierkegaard’s investigation of despair in The Sickness Unto Death 
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(1849), which Highsmith quoted frequently in her journals, helps explain the paradoxes of Tom’s 
behavior.223 In the anthologized selections from The Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard writes 
about a person who experiences three types of despair: he or she is “in despair at not willing to 
be onself; or still lower, in despair at not willing to be a self; or lowest of all, in despair at willing 
to be another than himself.”224 The despairing person is driven to great lengths by their desire to 
become someone other than who they are, and thus, for Kierkegaard, the self in despair becomes 
a kind of ouroboros that destroys itself. The person in Kierkegaard’s lowest form of despair is 
“infinitely comic” because “this self gets the notion of asking whether it might not let itself 
become or be made into another than itself.”225  The comedy of such despair, Kierkegaard 
explains, is that the despairing self is so trapped within the immediacy of her crisis that she 
cannot see the “eternal” quality of the self. She wishes to change something that is unchanging, 
Kierkegaard maintains. However, Kierkegaard also identifies a paradox at the heart of this form 
of despair: 
such a despairer, whose only wish is this most crazy of all transformations, loves 
to think that this change might be accomplished as easily as changing a coat. For 
the immediate man does not recognize his self, he recognizes himself only by his 
dress, he recognizes (and here again appears the infinitely comic trait)—he 
recognizes that he has a self only by externals.226  
 
The despairing self wishes to be other than itself, and thus is caught within the immediacy of that 
crisis. This “comic” notion leads to the disintegration of the self—that is to say, the perception 
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that the self is only “dress,” the externals that may be exchanged. This kind of inauthentic self-
invention, Kierkegaard maintains, is in fact an especially pernicious form of despair. 
The “sickness” of despair within Kierkegaard’s framework construes the experiences of 
envy and social mobility as phenomena of an existential crisis. For this proto-existentialist, 
whatever social markers characterize the self-that-one-is-not, which is also the self that the 
despairer desires to become—those markers are peripheral to the crisis of the lowest form of 
despair.  Following the pattern of Kierkegaard’s though, then, when Tom Ripley murders Dickie 
Greenleaf and temporarily assumes his wealth and identity, his desires for mobility are moored 
principally in an ambition to change his self. When Tom’s forgeries of Dickie’s signature on 
three remittances from his trust fund have been discovered, it becomes clear that Tom’s self-
invention is principally an avenue of escape from his self rather than a desire for class status in 
itself. The Greenleaf trust and Dickie’s bank in Naples become suspicious of the forgeries, 
requesting that he appear in person to continue the remittances of the funds. Tom then realizes 
that he cannot continue impersonating Dickie, and so he laments,  
This was the end of Dickie Greenleaf, he knew. He hated becoming Thomas 
Ripley again, hated being nobody, hated putting on his old set of habits again, and 
feeling that people looked down on him and were bored with him unless he put on 
an act for them like a clown, feeling incompetent and incapable of doing anything 
with himself except entertaining people for minutes at a time. He hated going 
back to himself as he would have hated putting on a shabby suit of clothes, a 
grease-spotted, unpressed suit of clothes that had not been very good even when it 
was new. (181) 
 
Tom hopes to switch between being Dickie and himself, but, in Kierkegaardian fashion, his 
desire for self-invention suggests his self-hate and despair rather than his freedom. While 
becoming the wealthy Dickie allows Tom to become “somebody” rather than “nobody,” this has 
less to do with Dickie’s class as Tom’s self-appraisal:  the persona of “Thomas Ripley” is a 
“nobody,” akin to a “shabby suit of clothes.” Thus, taking on Dickie’s persona is, for Tom, only 
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a more sustained performance of impersonating a clown. In both cases, Tom escapes being a 
“nobody”—a boring self—through performativity.  
In fact, Tom’s lament at having to return to the “unpressed suite of clothes” that is his 
identity as “Thomas Ripley” recalls the moment when he first decides to become “Dickie 
Greenleaf.” Not long after assuming this new identity Tom visits Paris. Enjoying a slow walk 
through the city’s streets, Tom “rather liked the idea of going to bed hungry” but resolves instead 
to go to a restaurant. Despite his preferences, Tom has decided to gain weight so that his 
murdered friend’s clothes would be a better fit. In order to become Dickie—“He was Dickie, 
good-natured, naïve Dickie”—he must fit exactly the new externals of that persona (124). Yet 
Tom is unaware that such minor choices construe the self of another—and indeed his own self—
as incidental and easily removable as the clothes on his back. To gain the necessary five pounds, 
then, Tom goes to a bar-tabac and orders “a ham sandwich on long crusty bread and a glass of 
hot milk, because a man next to him at the counter was drinking hot milk.” The causality of 
Tom’s order—because another man ordered the milk—suggests that, even in the first moments 
of his newly chosen identity, Tom abdicates the burden of his decisions by opting for the 
preferences of others. “The milk,” he reflects, “was almost tasteless, pure and chastening, as 
Tom imagined a wafer tasted in church” (124). Instead of using the opportunities and freedom 
enabled by his murder of Dickie, Tom repeatedly looks to external sources to authenticate his 
decisions.227 Thus, like the wafer in the Christian sacrament of the Eucharist, his choice of milk 
seemingly imparts something “pure and chastening,” the significant and the sacred. However, 
rather than a sign of a blessed state, Tom’s mysticism signals the repudiation of the freedom that 
confronts him. Much like the existentialist critique of Christianity, in which Christians abandon 
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the burden of this life for the promises of heaven, even in such an ordinary decision Tom 
abandons his freedom and relinquishes his choice to another. Immediately following this 
alienating sacrament, Tom travels to Arles to discover the spots where van Gogh had stood to 
paint. His attempts are frustrated by poor weather, which keeps Tom from bringing his 
guidebook on his expeditions. As a result, when he searches for the “real” spots where van Gogh 
stood, Tom is forced “to make a dozen trips back to his hotel to verify the scenes” (124). This 
closely connected rosary of scenes is emblematic of the despair that actually underwrites Tom’s 
self-invention:  in the face of freedom he repeatedly turns toward external sources of verification: 
“Is this authentic?” his hesitancies seem to beg. 
Therefore, while social markers matter to Tom, Highsmith construes these desires as 
symptoms of his existential crisis, his oscillation between freedom and inauthentic self-
invention. Highsmith’s ironic framing of Tom’s freedom recalls the paradox that Kierkegaard 
diagnoses:  having achieved the transformation into a self-that-one-is-not suggests, for 
Kierkegaard, that one’s self has, in turn, become merely a set of externals. Much like 
Kierkegaard’s paradox of self-invention, Tom is similarly displaced within endless 
performativity—an eternal loop of becoming a self-that-one-is-not—and thus he suffers the 
deprivation of personality rather than its “authentic” expression. Tom’s version of self-invention 
in fact amounts to a loss of self, as if he is now only capable of putting on the mask of a persona. 
For example, after becoming reconciled to the death of the “Dickie Greenleaf” persona, Tom 
again adjusts to “his dreary role as Thomas Ripley” (183). That Tom describes his return to 
“Thomas Ripley” as a “role” suggests the extent to which his form of self-invention distances 
him from the authenticity that self-invention would putatively acquire for him. In other words, by 
wanting to become someone else—“Dickie Greenleaf”—Tom fails to become a self at all. 
  145 
What’s more, the subtle paradox of Tom’s self-invention is that even his self has become a 
“role,” an external as Kierkegaard would put it. Highsmith therefore does not frame Tom’s desire 
for Dickie’s flâneur lifestyle as a function of his class-consciousness; rather, for Highsmith, 
Tom’s form of self-invention and persistent dread signal his refusal to assume the burden of the 
self. This ironic framing of Tom’s “talents” suggests that the evaluative center of The Talented 
Mr. Ripley is, for Highsmith, not the murder of Dickie Greenleaf or its socio-economic 
implications but rather Tom’s inauthenticity and the dread he experiences as the fact of freedom 
confronts him. 
Highsmith’s presentation of the complex psychological and existential crises facing Tom 
is, significantly, dependent upon a narrative world of largely unrestricted performativity, as if 
Tom’s mobility across personae were almost entirely free and open. Class, history, Dickie’s 
social and cultural capital, and even Tom’s own biological traits—his weight, his hair color—are 
largely trivial or unobstructive.  Ripley has little trouble impersonating whomever he wants to 
become, and his persona is thus governed almost entirely by his will. In fact, Highsmith provides 
only minimal detail about Tom’s personal history, frustrating socio-economic readings that try to 
interpret his behavior as functions of the material conditions of his life. As Harrison explains, 
such a decision suggests Highsmith’s “denial of history, of a material analysis of character.” 
Whenever Highsmith does present the rare detail about Tom’s past, those facts are only 
“psychoanalytic clichés” and “the vaguest of biographical data.”228 Highsmith thus registers 
Tom’s angst and motivations under the auspices of an existential crisis regarding his self; as 
such, Tom is a creature of the present moment, for Highsmith subordinates the desire for socio-
economic mobility to the vicissitudes of Ripley’s existentially hued psychology. So, for example, 
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despite the fact that Tom is strapped for money at the beginning of the novel, the absence of 
information about his upbringing or education makes it impossible to read the novel as 
principally a critique of an ambitious individual climbing the class ladder because—again, unlike 
Dreiser’s Carrie or, similarly, Clyde Griffiths in An American Tragedy (1925)—the reader 
simply does not know what rungs on that ladder Tom has occupied in past.  
The absence of a significant narrative of Tom’s history thus disrupts the historicizing 
tendencies that naturalism and even Jamesian psychological realism require for explorations of 
American ideas of class and gender. The seemingly compulsive aggregation of biographical data 
is, as Jennifer Fleissner suggests, symptomatic of the “historical knowledge” that characterizes 
naturalist fiction.229 The omissions in Tom’s biography, in contrast, not only frustrate 
interpretations of the novel as a critique of American class consciousness, but also they present 
Tom as an undefined or undetermined character. Ripley is a person lacking a personality, and the 
reader’s exposure to him proceeds through successive impersonations, not personal revelations. 
First of all, Tom pretends to be a close friend to Dickie when Herbert Greenleaf proposes the trip 
to Mongibello. When Greenleaf offers to pay his way to retrieve his son, Tom ponders 
expressively, “as if he were even now going over the thousands of little ties that could prevent 
him” (15). He affects hesitation and intimates an untrue history in order to lead Greenleaf further 
into the proposition. While the reader learns very little about his employment or economic past, 
Highsmith soon delineates Tom’s skills as a performer after he arrives in Mongibello. When he 
attempts to ingratiate himself to Dickie, Tom explains his impressive range of talents: “I can 
forge a signature, fly a helicopter, handle dice, impersonate practically anybody, cook—and do a 
one-man show in a nightclub in case the regular entertainer’s sick” (59). He also has “an 
                                                
229 Jennifer Fleissner, Women, Compulsion, Modernity:  The Moment of American 
Naturalism (Chicago:  University of Chicago, 2004). 
  147 
unfortunate talent for figures,” and is adept at “valeting, baby-sitting, accounting” (58). To prove 
the point, he performs his “one-man show” for Dickie in pantomime, eliciting laughter and 
impressed praise. Performativity trumps the hand-to-mouth conditions that Tom leaves behind in 
the United States, and even his failure to graduate high school (among the few facts we are 
given) does not inhibit him from the cultural capital generally associated with the elite classes—
discerning tastes for high art, reading Malraux in French, a thorough understanding of European 
history and geography. He is, rather than bound to a rung on the ladder of social mobility, able to 
scale its length at will. Therefore, while Tom is not always able to determine the choices or 
options before him, he is the sole arbiter of his self when confronting those choices. As Sartre 
puts this existentialist sensibility, “Whatever our being may be, it is a choice.”230 Tom’s will 
freely determines his self, despite the fact that everywhere his freedom is constrained by 
“people,” as he exasperatedly laments (172). 
The paradox that plagues Tom Ripley’s self-invention certainly makes him an anti-hero, 
for once he has been cleared of all suspicion and has even inherited Dickie’s trust fund, Tom is 
still haunted by the specter of being caught. The novel begins with Tom’s fear that his scam 
collecting back taxes as an IRS agent has been uncovered by an investigator, who actually turns 
out to be Herbert Greenleaf.  Even as Highsmith begins the narrative with Tom’s dread of being 
discovered, the novel ends with Ripley obsessed with the possibility that all of his successful 
plans will collapse around him while fleeing to Greece. “He tried to imagine landing in Crete,” 
Highsmith’s narrator explains, but then he envisions “four motionless figures standing on the 
imaginary pier, the figures of Cretan policemen waiting for him, patiently waiting with folded 
arms.” Recognizing that the vision is not grounded in reality, Tom wonders, “Was he going to 
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see policemen waiting for him on every pier that he ever approached?” (273). The prospect of his 
guilt plagues every horizon, and on each prospective opportunity for freedom Tom’s guilt 
patiently awaits him. Much like the way Highsmith begins and ends the narrative, Tom’s life is 
bookended by the consequences of his despair. While despair can certainly be productive, as 
Kierkegaard admits and Camus and Sartre were later wont to remind their readers, for Tom it 
becomes the sickness that infects his self. 
After The Talented Mr. Ripley and A Game for the Living, Highsmith’s work begins to 
turn away from the existential concerns and subtleties of her 1950s novels. In particular, as 
Harrison explains, Highsmith’s work becomes more explicitly political beginning with The Cry 
of the Owl (1962): “the programmatic existentialism of her protagonists diminished,” Harrison 
says, while her criticism of American culture and politics becomes more pronounced. 
Americanism and its discontents begin to take center stage, although her subtle exploration of 
existential psychology never fades completely. In fact, she explicitly employs the work of the 
existential psychoanalyst, Erich Fromm, in Edith’s Diary (1977). Nonetheless, Highsmith’s 
novels from the 1950s, not unlike Ellison’s Invisible Man, help circulate existentialist 
sensibilities about authenticity and choice within the American cultural arena. Indeed, the 
differences between Ellison’s and Highsmith’s novels from the period represent the fact that the 
existentialist moment in postwar America was woven together by seemingly disparate cultural 
threads. Highsmith’s novels share in the circulation of existentialist sensibilities about the self 
and authenticity, but she also inflects them through sensibilities regarding amorality, criminal 
behavior, psychology, and her belief that social phenomena are subordinate to the drama of 
existential uncertainty. Highsmith also poses her novels in more direct opposition to literary 
traditions—particularly naturalism—that present the psychological lives of characters within 
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rationalistic or deterministic frames. Instead, she accounts for her characters’ behavior through 
the irrational vicissitudes of a psychological arena underwritten by existential crisis. Therefore, 
her inflection of several converging social and intellectual trends at once marks and helps define 
a felt sensibility that political and socio-economic conditions are insufficient explanatory 
templates for the complexities of a world more widely aware of the psychological phenomena 
surging throughout the tics, dreams, and desires of everyday life. 
Even as the emergence of existentialist sensibilities was a complicated and often-
contradictory moment in the United States, I have also tried to show that the prominent place of 
Americanized existentialism competed with other phenomena and sensibilities, such as the 
normalization of the therapeutic disciplines, the intellectual legitimacy of Americanized 
psychoanalysis, a burgeoning television industry, and larger shifts in literary tastes away from 
the naturalist style. None of these threads dominated the rich texture of the postwar moment, and 
certainly no single author or intellectual presided over its warp and weft. Nonetheless, this 
heterogeneous intellectual fabric helped to erode the legitimacy of New Deal liberalism on 
several accounts. For one, the wide and diverse circulation of psychological templates for 
everyday life began to reframe how Americans understood the conditions of their everyday 
possibilities. The emerging intellectual fabric of the 1950s also helped to legitimate public 
animus toward the New Deal consensus regarding the plausibility of structural and historical 
analyses.  Among the many later permutations of these shifting explanatory frames is the report 
by Assistant Secretary of Labor, Daniel Moynihan, entitled The Negro Family: The Case for 
National Action (1965).231 The Moynihan report attempts to account for the roots of poverty 
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among black Americans at mid-century. Conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor, the report 
concludes that psychologized social conditions—rather than structural ones, such as a paucity of 
jobs—explain the pervasiveness of poverty among black Americans. In particular, the Moynihan 
report attributes blame to a “tangle of pathology,” the center of which is the “weak family 
structure.”232 Slavery and decades of the Jim Crow laws precipitated the deterioration of the 
nuclear family among black Americans, the Moynihan report asserts, yet that “tangle of 
pathology” is now self-perpetuating.  Among its significant ideological elements, the Moynihan 
report presents the social and economic dimensions of its study within the terms of normative 
psychology. The supposed “weak family structure” of African American communities becomes a 
form of pathology, a psychosocial phenomenon that perpetuates itself within shared 
psychological experiences rather than material or structural arrangements. The Report even 
invokes the “tangle of pathology” in the African American community to explain the increased 
need for welfare programs.233 Indeed, the Moynihan report signals the institutionalization of 
psychological accounts for political and socio-economic circumstances. 
Beyond her modest part in legitimating psychological explanatory templates for 
understanding common behavior, Highsmith also helped bring definition to the felt crises of the 
so-called “age of anxiety” through inflecting the genre of “crime fiction” through her own flavor 
of existential psychology. In fact, the political resonances of this genre cannot be understated:  
Sean McCann, for example, uses the “hard-boiled” crime fiction that thrived from the 1930s until 
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the 1960s to understand the rise and fall of New Deal liberalism. For McCann, authors such as 
Dashiell Hammett, Raymond Chandler, and Chester Himes revise the classic detective story of 
Edgar Allan Poe and Arthur Conan Doyle, and this evolution of crime fiction “became a 
symbolic theater where the dilemmas of New Deal liberalism could be staged.”234 According to 
McCann, the conventional detective story functions as a “parable” of classical liberal political 
theory, in which evil can be abolished and the integrity of an imagined community restored 
through the governing order of law and rational self-interest. As one permutation of this political 
tradition, New Deal liberalism attempted to ensure public welfare through federal regulatory 
power. The vicissitudes of economic crisis are, according to McCann’s gloss on New Deal 
liberals, an anomaly that can be avoided by ferreting out errors and through reasonable 
intervention.  Yet the history of hard-boiled crime fiction charts the rise and fall of Roosevelt’s 
interventionist liberalism by offering increasingly dissonant images of the public arena. For 
example, Raymond Chandler’s crime novels, such as The Long Goodbye (1953), are 
underwritten by nostalgia for a “fraternally unified culture” that has “fall[en] victim to a society 
robbed of its cultural integrity and falsely joined by the market, mass media, and bureaucratic 
government.”235 In other words, while the political philosophy of New Deal liberalism depended 
upon the notion of an integrated public that manifested in a consensus culture, Chandler’s fiction 
documents the impossibility of such unity during the postwar moment. Phenomena such as 
suburbanization, mass consumerism, and a bureaucratic state had, for Chandler, undermined the 
fraternity that formed the basis for a liberal society.  
                                                
234 Sean McCann, Gumshoe America:  Hard-Boiled Crime Fiction and the Rise and Fall 
of New Deal Liberalism (Durham:  Duke University Press, 2000), 5. 
 
235 Ibid., 193. 
  152 
The sensibilities about individual existential crisis underwriting Strangers on a Train and 
The Talented Mr. Ripley, in contrast to Chandler’s nostalgia, signal a fervent rejection of an 
integrated, liberal view of the public arena. Through Highsmith’s framing of the isolation and 
free choice that persistently confronts the individual, the progressive liberal view of a society 
based upon fraternity and shared responsibility becomes intellectually and experientially 
dubious. Could society really be an integrated body capable of collective welfare if alienation is 
such a pervasive diagnosis? And why does an individual’s psyche explain the manifestations of 
that anxiety in more compelling ways than the impersonal accounts of socio-economic analysis? 
Highsmith’s existentialist sensibilities pose such a dialogue with the growing animus toward the 
social thinking that comprised the ideological underpinnings of an interventionist welfare state. 
Yet that is not to say that Highsmith’s fiction is analogous to the “paperback noirs” that, 
according to McCann, signal a turn toward the individualistic values of the Eisenhower era. The 
individual in her work is fraught, embattled, and obsessed with its own self-contradictions. But 
the very terms of that embattled selfhood nonetheless affirm and depend upon Highsmith’s 
sensibilities about authenticity and free choice. In contrast to Mickey Spillane’s rugged 
individualism, then, Highsmith investigates the felt crises of an anxious, ambivalent, and isolated 
age. Positioning her novels in relation to those felt crises, Highsmith offers something like a 
Pyrrhic victory over the sensibilities of postwar liberalism:  she not only affirms the burden of 
choice that confronts the individual, but she also insists that the darker possibilities of the self 
cast a long shadow over that burden.   
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CHAPTER 3:  SOUTHERN COMFORT:  AUTHENTICITY, ALIENATION, AND WALKER 
PERCY’S WAYFARING SEARCH 
 
Binx Bolling, the mock-hero of Walker Percy’s The Moviegoer (1961), maintains that on 
his thirtieth birthday he has so far “learned only to recognize merde when I see it.” Bolling 
asserts that this skill—“a good nose for merde, for every species of shit that flies”—is in fact his 
“only talent.” The sardonic assertion of his olfactory abilities prompts Bolling to cast a wide net 
of societal angst, for he professes to live in “the very century of merde.”236 For Binx, this 
derisive characterization of the twentieth century grows out of the anxious, existential soil of his 
search for authenticity, for the real that is apparently mired in excreta.  For example, at an earlier 
moment in the novel, Binx explains that while traveling for business he often confronts this 
existential bog while searching out the latest movie.  His moviegoing habit is to speak with either 
the ticket attendant or the owner of the theater because, he insists, he would otherwise “be lost, 
cut loose metaphysically speaking.  I should be seeing one copy of a film which might be shown 
anywhere and at any time” (75).  The possibility of becoming a mere iteration of some generic 
experience prompts Binx to “touch base” (74), to identify the particularities of a situation.  
Binx’s attempts to find the particular beneath the generic even cause him to make “a mark on my 
seat arm with my thumbnail” during an “absurd scene” in a John Wayne film.  He searches for 
authenticity—he wants to touch “this particular piece of wood”—under generic conditions that 
could otherwise occur “anywhere and at any time” (75).  In other words, underlying Binx’s 
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search for the authentic is his angst that all he has access to are nonspecific copies of reality, that 
his efforts to “touch base” with reality occur under vast alienating conditions. 
Many critics situate Binx’s anxious search for authenticity within religious angst, mass 
consumer culture, or the suburbanization of the South. For example, Lewis A. Lawson argues 
that Bolling’s search for “genuine salvation from alienation” is motivated by Percy’s theological 
vision that offers the chance to be “saved from history.”237 Philip E. Simmons situates Percy’s 
novel within what he calls the “historical imagination of late modernism” and its “double” view 
of mass culture.238 In Simmons’ reading, Percy affirms a “more ‘authentic’ past” and laments the 
loss of “master historical narratives” that account for Binx’s malaise, yet he confines that late 
modernist imagination to a commodified cultural arena.  Robert Lacy similarly describes Binx’s 
search as an effect of the “is-this-all-there-is? disenchantment with the fruits of affluence.”239 
Martyn Bone, following the critical taxonomy established by Lewis Simpson,240 contends that 
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Percy evinces a “postsouthern” skepticism regarding his protagonist’s “sense of place,” 
particularly as Bolling is troubled by the encroaching suburbanization of the South.241  
While such readings gloss the novel’s angst as a problem of religion, mass culture, or 
regionalism, Binx’s alienation also marks the emergence and legitimation of a particular kind of 
consciousness in the postwar era. If impersonal forces of mediation are the cause of Binx’s 
alienation, it is because The Moviegoer promotes an account of selfhood that valorizes what 
Percy elsewhere calls the “sovereignty” of the individual knower.242 Indeed, Binx’s alienation 
and search for authenticity is a function of being divorced from this “sovereignty” over his 
experience. Modifying Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialism, Binx’s search in The Moviegoer 
grounds authenticity in individual consciousness exerting control over the use of language and 
the meaning given to experience. Furthermore, Binx’s anxiety that vast impersonal forces 
mediate his experience of the world prompts him to turn a critical eye toward the state as an 
alienating external authority not unlike mass consumer culture. The state figures in The 
Moviegoer as an abstract institution that produces bureaucratic superfluities and generic 
configurations of the self. I argue that Binx’s view of the state, as a function of his search for a 
“sovereign” form of selfhood, brings definition to the felt crises of the New Deal era. In 
particular, Percy’s National Book Award-winning novel provides clarity and legitimacy to 
growing antagonisms toward the New Deal common sense about the self and the state within the 
postwar cultural marketplace. By retooling existentialist sensibilities about authenticity alongside 
anxieties about a bureaucratic state as an alienating institution, Percy helps give definition to the 
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242 Walker Percy, “The Loss of the Creature,” in The Message in the Bottle: How Queer 
Man Is, How Queer Language Is, and What One Has to Do with the Other (New York:  Picador, 
[1975] 2000), 50.  Hereafter cited parenthetically.  
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social angst that New Deal progressive politics warps and genericizes the self for the sake of 
social welfare. The political domain of the state fosters the “abstraction of the self from itself,” as 
Percy puts it, a kind of divorce of one’s authentic existence for the sake of an “abstract 
notion.”243  
Percy’s fiction after The Moviegoer teases out the ambiguities of Binx’s search for 
sovereignty, yet the idea of authentic existence centering upon the conscious life of the 
individual nonetheless comprises the central thread in the novelist’s corpus. As Percy argues in 
his essay, “Notes for a Novel about the End of the World,” published as the novelist was 
completing Love in the Ruins (1971), “The wrong questions are being asked. The proper question 
is not whether God has died or been superseded by the urban-political complex.” Rather, Percy 
explains, the right question is “whether it is possible that man is presently undergoing a 
tempestuous restructuring of his consciousness….”244 Even the religious concerns of Percy’s 
novels are underwritten by his philosophical inquiry into the nature of subjectivity and its 
capacity for an authentic experience of the real. This thread of sovereignty in Percy’s work 
marks one prominent way in which European existentialism—both in Sartre’s secular form and 
in religious inflections such as Kierkegaard and Gabriel Marcel—is transmuted in the United 
States. Much like Hester in Love in the Ruins (1971), this permutation of existentialism takes 
root in an American context that is “post-Protestant, post-rebellion, post-ideology” (49). That is 
to say, despite the radical or Marxist turn that European existentialism takes in the 1940s, 
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Percy’s work at once recuperates earlier existentialist sensibilities about individual authenticity 
while also contributing to the myriad ways those sensibilities are preserved and adapted during 
the postwar era. Percy’s exploration of the sovereign knower, I argue, divests existentialism of 
its radical politics in a way that validates intellectual animus toward an interventionist state while 
also challenging, on the grounds of the authentic life of the self, the notion of social welfare 
underwriting New Deal liberalism. 
 
Citizenship, the State, and Sartrean Authenticity 
In the opening pages of the novel, Binx describes his “very peaceful” suburban existence 
in Gentilly (6). Having settled into a job selling stocks at his uncle’s brokerage firm, Binx asserts 
that he is “a model tenant and a model citizen,” that he takes “pleasure in doing all that is 
expected of me” (6). Binx explains that an American consumerist economy rewards him for his 
behavior with a surplus of commodities, exemplified in “an all but silent air conditioner and a 
very long lasting deodorant” (7). Having found that such a “model” life entails a glut of 
credentials, Binx observes, “My wallet is full of identity cards, library cards, credit cards.” 
Indeed, he has collected a spate of documents that serve various legitimizing functions: “my 
birth certificate, college diploma, honorable discharge, G.I. insurance, a few stock certificates, 
and my inheritance:  a deed to ten acres of a defunct duck club down in St Bernard Parish” (6).  
This superfluity of papers that sanction and license his “model” life populate Binx’s daily habits, 
configuring his existence according to the surfeit markers of institutions and consumerist 
activities.  His “model” life, he sardonically concludes, seems to be crowded and structured by 
external and impersonal forces. 
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For Binx, these institutional markers—the birth certificate, the college diploma, even the 
deed to state-sanctioned private property—induce both irony and anxiety as he continues to 
reflect on his suburban existence. He asserts, “It is a pleasure to carry out the duties of a citizen, 
and to receive in return a receipt or a neat styrene card with one’s name on it certifying, so to 
speak, one’s right to exist” (7).  Binx’s statement alludes, on the one hand, to his recent military 
service—“honorable discharge, G.I. insurance” (6)—which the United States has recognized 
through the mass-produced document of a “styrene card.” In fact, Binx views the marker of his 
service and near-death in the Korean War as an object of generic representation:  his tenure of 
service culminates in a bureaucratic document of discharge, as though it were another of the 
receipts “certifying” the terms of his relationship with the military. That Percy couches this 
exchange in terms of the “receipt”—i.e., that he lumps the discharge papers in with credit 
cards—suggests that the state configures its relationship with the soldier according to a specific 
consumerist logic:  certain goods are provided in exchange for the soldier’s stint in the military. 
Binx likewise includes his “honorable discharge” among the “stock certificates” in his desk. His 
habit of lumping together the national and the consumeristic suggests that Binx construes his 
national identity—or, at least the way the state frames its relation to the citizen—in mass-
produced terms. That is to say, the “honorable discharge” becomes an artifact of a bureaucratic 
institution, as if military service could be neatly understood within the programmatic categories 
of “honorable” or “dishonorable,” much like the price of a stock can be clearly valued. His 
association of the national with the mass-produced leads Binx to wonder if his “pleasure” in 
being a model citizen has been manufactured as well. This suspicion haunts Binx, and he begins 
to wonder whether these tokens of “certification” divorce him from an authentic experience of 
the Korean War while also commercializing national life. 
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Even as Binx expresses ambiguous “pleasure” at “carry[ing] out the duties of a citizen,” 
he becomes skeptical of generic configurations of any form of experience, national or otherwise 
(7). For example, when Binx describes his daily routines as a stock and bond broker, he admits 
that he had “dreamed of doing something great. But there is much to be said for giving up such 
grand ambitions and living the most ordinary life imaginable, a life without the old longings” (9).  
As Binx’s later encounter with the “romantic” college graduate on a train ride from Chicago 
clarifies, the “old longings” that are now divested from Binx’s “most ordinary life” refer to the 
aspiration to live a singular existence. The young romantic’s “longings” prompt him to leave his 
Midwestern home in hopes of “find[ing] himself a girl, the rarest of rare pieces, and live the life 
of Rudolfo [sic] on the balcony, sitting around on the floor and experiencing soul-communion” 
(215-16). For this romantic, who is perhaps some version of the Kerouacan beatnik, life becomes 
meaningful precisely by avoiding an ordinary midwestern life and—through the allusion to the 
romantic iconoclast Rodolfo in Angelo, the Tyrant of Padua (1876)—thwarting social 
conventions. Binx, in contrast, does “all that is expected of me” (6). Indeed, when he learns of 
the romantic’s grand aspirations, he says simply, “I have my doubts” (216). At the beginning of 
the novel, then, Binx rejects romantic individuality—the search for something singular—and 
settles instead into the ordinary existence of a bourgeois businessman. 
In keeping with his earlier descriptions of receipts and identity cards, Binx initially 
describes his “life without the old longings” as embedded within institutional spaces. Describing 
the buildings in his neighborhood, for example, he says, “I stroll around the schoolyard in the 
last golden light of day and admire the building. Everything is so spick-and-span:  the aluminum 
sashes fitted into the brick wall and gilded in the sunset, the pretty terrazzo floors and the desks 
molded like wings” (10). The parish school—one of the many institutions that crowd his 
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neighborhood—is at once orderly and constructed from mass-produced materials (aluminum, 
brick, concrete). This particular institutional space gives Binx the “pleasant sense of the 
goodness of creation,” for he explains that “the brick and the glass and the aluminum [have been] 
extracted from common dirt” (10). The “creation” that elicits Binx’s pleasure is a constructed 
institution built through manufactured materials that transform organic matter. That is to say, 
Binx’s “pleasant sense” centers not on the natural (dirt) but on its synthetic derivation (concrete 
terrazzo). Thus, Binx intuits the “goodness of creation”—an allusion to God’s pronouncement in 
the book of Genesis (1:31)—only as it is refashioned in an artificial edifice. His meditations on 
this institutional structure suggest that he is at least once removed from—if not entirely out of 
touch with—a non-manufactured world. Binx inhabits a space that configures “creation” and the 
everyday human habitus within the terms of industrial production. 
That Binx begins to have misgivings regarding his “ordinary life” and the institutional 
forces that mediate it becomes evident when his “peaceful existence in Gentilly” is disrupted 
(10). Binx turns from describing the institution of the Gentilly school to insist, “But things have 
suddenly changed. This morning, for the first time in years, there occurred to me the possibility 
of a search” (10). In a subtle turn on Binx’s preceding commentary regarding the generic items 
that “certify” his involvement in the military, Binx recalls that the origins of the “search” were a 
traumatic experience in the Korean War: 
I dreamed of the war, no, not quite dreamed but woke with the taste of it in my 
mouth, the queasy-quince taste of 1951 and the Orient. I remember the first time 
the search occurred to me. I came to myself under a chindolea bush. Everything is 
upside-down for me, as I shall explain later. […] My shoulder didn’t hurt but it 
was pressed hard against the ground as if somebody sat on me. Six inches from 
my nose a dung beetle was scratching around under the leaves. As I watched, 
there awoke in me an immense curiosity. I was onto something. I vowed that if I 
ever got out of this fix, I would pursue the search. (10-11) 
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Introducing the trope of the “search” through this experience in the Korean War contrasts with 
the earlier generic documents that putatively certify Binx’s military service. Whereas a “neat 
styrene card” might identify Binx as a veteran, his memory is instead specific and experiential:  
the juxtaposition of the two calls into question the efficacy of the bureaucratic document.   
Binx’s awakening is also significant because it recalls the centerpiece of Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s existentialism. Sartre claims in his 1946 lecture-cum-essay, “Existentialism Is a 
Humanism,” that the origins of truth are grounded in “consciousness confronting itself.”245 In 
Sartre’s brand of existentialism, awareness of one’s self as a thinking being generates 
consciousness, or wills individual subjectivity as an object. Consciousness is thus at once the 
foundation for authentic knowledge and (paradoxically) the product of one’s awareness of being 
conscious. Redolent of this Sartrean arrangement between consciousness and the real, Binx 
explains, “I came to myself,” and he subsequently confesses for the first time to be “onto 
something” (10, 11). In this juxtaposition between the synthetic “styrene card” and the particular 
experience in Korea, Binx, like Sartre, establishes a connection between consciousness and 
authentic reality. That is to say, the contrast between the bureaucratic document of the 
“honorable discharge” and the experiential confrontation of “coming to one’s self” provokes 
Binx to become suspicious of mass-produced consumerism while also rousing his desire for an 
authentic encounter with the real. Binx’s “search” thus configures authenticity in terms of 
unmediated consciousness, of awakening to one’s self as distinct from the interpositions of 
external forces. Indeed, Percy’s avowed philosophical debt to Sartre and Søren Kierkegaard 
suggests what becomes more pronounced later in the novel:  the contours of Binx’s quest are 
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decisively existentialist, for it not only presupposes consciousness as the ground of knowledge 
but also sets up an authentic form of the self as the object of the search.246  
It is significant that Binx returns to his “search” later in his life while rummaging through 
the “little pile on his bureau” of items from his ordinary existence (11). These two moments that 
raise the possibility of the search—the personal experience of war and the everyday artifacts of 
bourgeois life—are, interestingly enough, connected in the figure of the dung beetle. Binx, like 
the beetle, “pokes through” the items on his bureau, as if seeing them for the first time (11). 
Also, presaging the passage at the end of the novel where Binx’s search for authenticity yields 
only his “good nose for merde” (228), the particular species of beetle rummaging in front of 
Binx’s nose is of the dung variety:  it rifles through leaves and other foliage in its expert hunt for 
“shit.” Binx’s “search” in Gentilly, in other words, becomes a form of shit-searching among the 
surfeit objects of his suburban existence:  the quest for the authentic requires Binx to identify 
excreta.  He must first sort through a pile of extraneous waste in order to uncover the real. 
One exemplary case of Binx’s shit-searching occurs later in the novel, after he has 
recently purchased a new Dodge sedan and decides to vacation with Marcia (his latest secretary 
and romantic interest). Binx explains, “When I first slid under the wheel to drive [the sedan], it 
seemed that everything was in order—here was I, a healthy young man, a veteran with all his 
papers in order, a U.S. citizen driving a good car” (121). Binx’s vacation seems initially to 
epitomize a narrative of national and economic flourishing:  he is both “citizen” and the owner of 
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a “good car.” Yet his idyll quickly becomes unfulfilling: “All these things were true enough, yet 
on my first trip to the Gulf Coast with Marcia, I discovered to my dismay that my fine new 
Dodge was a regular incubator of malaise” (121). Binx defines the “malaise” as “the pain of loss. 
The world is lost to you, the world and the people in it, and there remains only you and the world 
and you no more able to be in the world than Banquo’s ghost” (120). Binx’s “malaise” refers, in 
other words, to an experience of alienation, of being set apart from intimacy with others or even 
reality itself. Like Macbeth’s murdered friend, the subject who suffers from the malaise has put 
stock in one version of the real and has been betrayed by it. The accumulation of manufactured 
goods—emblematized in the sedan—betrays Binx, depriving his self from attaining authenticity 
on the grounds that even his romance with Marcia occurs within a symbolic complex of mass-
produced experience. As Binx puts it, he and Marcia had “become like the American couple in 
the Dodge ad” (121), reproducible identities within a mass market of advertisements. Binx’s 
bourgeois freedom thus amounts only to generic individuality, for he finds that “merde” 
intercedes between he and Marcia. Indeed, in Sartrean terms, Binx recognizes that the vacation 
where “everything was in order” is little more than a sustained evasion, a retreat into “bad faith,” 
or the avoidance of the search for authenticity through boredom and distraction.247 He encounters 
Marcia and the Gulf Coast under circumstances produced and approved by mass marketing 
campaigns.  
The association between merde and generic individuality arises again when Binx projects 
existential malaise throughout the twentieth century. Binx elaborates upon the characterization of 
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his contemporary moment as the “very century of merde” by insisting that it is an epoch when 
“everyone becomes an anyone, a warm and creative person, and prospers like a dung beetle” 
(228). Binx’s lament implies a paradox:  the individual becomes nonspecific—an “anyone”—
insofar as he or she embodies impersonal values regarding originality. Fleshing out this paradox, 
Binx portrays the “warm and creative person” as a generic configuration of the self—a 
resignation of agency by the individual subject for the values of an impersonal system of 
thought. In this particular passage, Binx has in mind “the shithouse of scientific humanism” 
(228), which he earlier ridicules for offering a comprehensive theory of the human species:  one 
must “sleep a certain number of hours every night, breathe fresh air, eat a certain number of 
calories, evacuate [one’s] bowels regularly and have a stimulating hobby” (86). Modern 
individuals become “tranquillized in their despair” as they concede to life delineated by scientific 
discourse. According to Binx, the self becomes an instance of an abstract entity—merely an 
organism with “ductless glands”—by conforming to the prescriptions of self-help scientific 
discourse (86). Binx construes such scientific discourse as one of the prominent phenomena of 
the “very century of merde,” which for the sake of “prosperity” abstracts the individual from her 
self through prescriptive behaviors (“have a stimulating hobby”) and self-help philosophy 
(becoming a “warm and creative person”). Binx doubts, in other words, that this form of 
individualism—whether by attention to its bodily glands or its subjective aspirations—represents 
an authentic form of the self, for he says instead that this discourse is paradoxically mediated by 
and filtered through programmatic categories of being. The individual is alienated from the 
modes of producing his or her own self by following the directives of external authorities and the 
abstract dictates of intellectual movements. 
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Percy returns to this skepticism toward programmatic forms of individualism in Love in 
the Ruins. Set “at a time near the end of the world,” the novel chronicles Dr. Tom More’s 
growing dissatisfaction with his suburban life in Paradise, a wealthy community of mostly 
medical professionals in Louisiana. More, a researcher and therapist, invents the “Qualitative-
Quantitative Ontological Lapsometer,” which “measures a person’s innermost self” through 
electromagnetic readings of the brain and spine (92). Despite More’s diagnostic acuity and the 
accuracy of his lapsometer, he is a physician ironically unable to understand or heal himself. 
Indeed, alternating fits of elation and depression, alcoholism, and general surliness plague the 
physician. That’s not to say that More’s discontent is without cause, for his adult life has been 
capsized by the death of his daughter, Samantha, and the subsequent disintegration of his 
marriage. Samantha’s excruciating and disfiguring death, caused by the slow growth of a 
neuroblastoma, leads Tom to a long-term affair with Early Times whiskey. More’s first wife, 
Doris, becomes lonely and aimless, and rather than finding solace in whiskey she searches for 
ways to “recover herself” (64).  
Given their respective ways of tending the wounds from their daughter’s death, the 
couple not surprisingly drifts away from each other. Doris begins to read “spiritual books” that 
prescribe various paths to happiness and individual fulfillment. The result, More warns, is 
nothing less than disastrous for the life of her self: 
Beware of Episcopal women who take up with Ayn Rand and the Buddha and Dr. 
Rhine formerly of Duke University. A certain type of Episcopal girl has a 
weakness that comes on them just past youth, just as sure as Italian girls get fat. 
They fall prey to Gnostic pride, commence buying antiques, and develop a 
yearning for esoteric doctrine. (64) 
 
The “spiritual books” that Doris reads after the disenchanting death of her daughter—“That’s a 
loving God you have there,” she tells Tom as the neuroblastoma pushes one of Samantha’s eyes 
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out and around her nosebridge (72)—prompts Doris to find solace and meaning in “esoteric” 
forms of re-enchantment. Indeed, she adopts a foreign language for understanding her 
discontent—amalgamating Buddhism, Ayn Rand, and Joseph Rhine’s “parapsychology”—
before eloping with a “heathen Englishman” who likewise weds science and Eastern religion. 
Doris’s attempts to “recover herself” through various forms of abstract individualism, such as 
Ayn Rand’s philosophy of “selfishness,” in which unabashed self-interest becomes prescriptive 
for “individual development” and politics alike.248 Despite his own attempts to lose himself in 
Early Times, More is suspicious of Doris’s search because she seemingly adopts the patterns of 
thought and abstract principles of others in order to legitimate the cultivation of her individuality. 
When Doris informs Tom that she plans to leave him, for example, she says simply, “I’m going 
in search of myself,” which elicits More’s incredulous reaction: “My heart sank,” he says, “This 
was not really her way of talking” (65). Adopting the language of “spiritual books” and forsaking 
“her way of talking,” Doris renounces an authentic search for the self by espousing instead 
someone else’s beliefs. “Our marriage is a collapsed morality,” she sadly tells Tom, “like a 
burnt-out star which collapses into itself, gives no light and is heavy heavy heavy.” Her 
recitation of complaints leads Tom to believe that, in fact, she abandons her search for a 
recovered self and retreats into the authority and programmatic individualism of another: 
“Collapsed morality. Law of life. More stately mansions,” Tom laments. “Here are unmistakable 
echoes of her friend Alistair Fuchs-Forbes,” the Englishman with whom she has an affair (66). 
Percy’s recurring representation of systematic forms of individualism evince his distrust 
of the ways such discourses routinize the “true” and “unique” behaviors of the self: “sleep a 
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certain number of hours every night,” as Binx recites, “breathe fresh air, eat a certain number of 
calories, evacuate [one’s] bowels regularly and have a stimulating hobby” (86). This recurring 
skepticism of programmatic individualism is grounded within Percy’s anxiety that institutional 
forces divest the self of what he calls “sovereignty.” As he explains in his essay, “The Loss of 
the Creature,” objects and experiences are “rendered invisible” by theoretical abstractions, such 
as exhaustive scientific theories or bourgeois cultural expectations.  Percy insists that the request 
to validate whether “this is really it”—to legitimate one’s knowledge, experience, or even a 
chosen form of individuality—actually obscures the real and the authentic. He argues,   
The dogfish, the tree, the seashell, the American Negro, the dream, are rendered 
invisible by a shift of reality from concrete thing to theory which Whitehead has 
called the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. It is the mistaking of an idea, a 
principle, an abstraction, for the real. As a consequence of the shift, the 
‘specimen’ is seen as less real than the theory of the specimen. As Kierkegaard 
said, once a person is seen as a specimen of a race or a species, at that very 
moment he ceases to be an individual. Then there are no more individuals but 
only specimens. (58) 
 
It is deeply problematic that the “American Negro” figures here as an object of knowledge 
alongside the “dogfish”—a point to which I return later. But the essay also sheds light on Binx’s 
anxieties insofar as Percy suggests that knowing another individual is threatened with regulatory 
forces that he calls a “symbolic complex.” Even as a scientific theory may inhibit a student from 
seeing the “real” dogfish, Percy explains that “sanctioned” forms of experience necessarily 
arbitrate the individual consciousness’s experience of a thing, person, or event. He asks, for 
example,  
Why is it almost impossible to gaze directly at the Grand Canyon under [touristic] 
circumstances and see it for what it is—as one picks up a strange object from 
one’s back yard and gazes directly at it? It is almost impossible because the Grand 
Canyon, the thing as it is, has been appropriated by the symbolic complex which 
has already been formed in the sightseer’s mind. Seeing the canyon under 
approved circumstances is seeing the symbolic complex head on. (47)  
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The tourist, in this case, encounters not the thing-in-itself but a “prepared experience,” a 
predetermined set of meanings that distances the subject from the landscape that she views (60).  
The consequence of this sifted consciousness, Percy explains, is a gradual concession of agency, 
or progressive “losses of sovereignty” (50).  
The conclusion of Percy’s philosophy of the self is that, by experiencing the world only 
under “approved circumstances,” the individual becomes “lost” within the complex of forces that 
mediate her existence. Such an individual surrenders her “sovereignty” to “a class of privileged 
knowers,” and thereby becomes alienated from her own daily existence. By “sovereignty,” then, 
Percy means the subject’s capacity for self-recognition as “a knowing being whose peculiar 
property it is to see himself as being in a certain situation” (58). The “knower,” Percy argues, 
must reassert her authority over the thing “known” (59). Indeed, Percy’s argument recapitulates 
Sartre’s claim that the origins of “truth” reside in “consciousness confronting itself” (Sartre 40), 
for Percy’s notion of the “sovereign person” construes authentic knowledge of both the world 
and one’s self as deriving from self-presence—the subject exercising control over her 
subjectivity. Likewise, for Sartre, an authentic subjectivity lies at the root of reality:  anything 
less than a consciousness aware of itself is a faulty foundation for the real. However, Percy’s 
notion of sovereignty also depends upon the particularity of consciousness—that is, of seeing 
one’s self as “being in a certain situation.” Thus, those forces that obscure the particular—e.g., 
exhaustive accounts of the human body, Ayn Rand’s philosophical system, or, in Binx’s case, the 
generic identities produced by a bureaucratic state and the national commodity system—actually 
preclude authentic knowledge. What this philosophy of the self suggests is that, for Percy, an 
idiosyncratic authentic subjectivity lies beyond the “certifying” forces of national institutions and 
mass-produced molds of individuality.  
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Percy’s notion of “sovereignty” further clarifies Binx’s vacation with Marcia in the 
Dodge sedan. Binx finds that a vague psychological state that he calls the “malaise” interposes 
itself between him and his romantic interest. Like the biology student who filters the dogfish 
through abstract scientific theories, Binx finds that he and Marcia have cast their relationship 
within the imaginary—the “symbolic complex”—of a Dodge advertisement featuring an 
American couple freely “spinning along” (121).  Binx explains, “We sat frozen in a gelid 
amiability. Our cheeks ached from smiling. Either would have died for the other. In despair I put 
my hand under her dress, but even such a homely little gesture as that was received with the 
same fearful politeness” (121). The relationship between the two is “gelid”—cold, impersonal, 
even synthetic—precisely because a commercialized set of expectations mediates their intimacy.  
In perhaps the most chilling aspect of the scene, this veil of expectations between the two cannot 
drop even when Binx’s hand finds its way “under her dress.” During a sexual encounter in which 
lovers presumably experience intimacy, Binx and Marcia remain politely alienated from one 
another, mediated by both Dodge’s commercialized script for happiness and a national narrative 
about being prosperous “U.S. citizens” (121).  They are sealed off from one another by the 
impersonal norms of a commercialized national body. 
That Binx conflates the scripts of mass consumerism and the American state suggests that 
his alienation is, at least in part, bound up with the way that the state structures its relationship to 
citizens in economized terms and through impersonal bureaucracy. His construal of citizenship 
as another form of consumerism is, in fact, historically grounded within certain shifts in the New 
Deal economic agenda during the postwar era. Shaken by a recession during 1937-1938, 
Roosevelt’s administration shifted the accent of its domestic economic agenda away from 
regulation and central planning to Keynesian redistributive fiscal policy—a shift that begins the 
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so-called second or “New” New Deal. As Alan Brinkley explains, the first phase of New Deal 
liberalism (1933-1937) was characterized by the presupposition that the state could responsibly 
lead an assault on monopoly power and institute “an ordered economic world.”249 In contrast to 
this aggressive regulation of capitalism and central planning, Keynesianism maintained that an 
industrial economy is too convoluted for governmental mechanisms to direct, but certain fiscal 
measures (such as controlling aggregate demand by federal or “deficit” spending) could mitigate 
the volatility of recessions and depressions in an economic cycle. Following the wave of 
Keynesian thought that swept Europe in the 1930s, Roosevelt’s administration—particularly 
Henry Wallace, Harold Ickes, Harry Hopkins, and Henry Morgenthau—began to strengthen 
domestic programs of compensatory social insurance—earlier established in the Social Security 
Act (1935)—while easing the administration’s heavy-handed relationship to corporate America. 
As a result, New Deal liberalism became “less statist than its earlier counterparts, less concerned 
with issues of class, less hostile to existing patterns of economic power, committed above all to a 
new vision of a consumer-driven economy.”250  
This rolling back of the reform agenda of the early New Deal era left Social Security as 
the central component of the postwar welfare state. As Daniel T. Rodgers explains, this emphasis 
upon Social Security, among its consequences, privatized the political relationship between 
citizens and the state by patterning it after the “form not of a broad contract between social 
groups but of myriad private contracts between individuals and the state.”251 That is to say, the 
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earlier assemblage of domestic policies and programs construed state politics as the 
concentration of political will and the institutionalization of a reform agenda, while the postwar 
New Deal state became a broker or distributor of services. Furthermore, its underlying 
Keynesian social-economic philosophy viewed the nation as a statistical body of collective 
consumption, aggregate demand, and income. Questions of “political economy” thus became 
almost exclusively concerned during the 1940s and 1950s with limiting unemployment and 
evading recessions, which “detached liberalism from its earlier emphasis on reform.”252  
Brinkley’s and Rodgers’ arguments regarding the evolution of New Deal liberalism are 
complicated, for example, by Roosevelt’s attempts to achieve greater civil rights for African 
Americans during World War II. Nonetheless, the preponderance of legislation bears out 
Brinkley’s argument that the war “muted liberal hostility to capitalism and the corporate 
world.”253 As such, the principal postwar legacy of the New Deal, then, is its construal of social 
welfare as an actuarial science, which frames citizenship in the terms of statistical aggregations 
and economic transactions.254 Until the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s forced the hand of 
the Democratic Party, the political philosophy of New Deal liberalism was almost entirely 
determined by Keynesian redistributive policies and compensatory mechanisms. The legacy of 
social welfare as an actuarial science underwrites Binx’s conflation of the tokens of his national 
identity and the surfeit objects of mass consumerism, for citizenship becomes little more than a 
form of consumption facilitated by a state that is a broker of services. This form of political 
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economy, Binx believes, forecloses the possibilities of social belonging, mutual understanding, 
and collective welfare. This iteration of liberalism is another abstract force that alienates the self 
from an authentic experience of the world. 
If Percy’s characters are most often alienated because programmatic, institutional forces 
interpose themselves between these individuals and the objects of their consciousness, he 
nonetheless explores a variety of routes to escape that loss of the self.  With Binx, Percy 
considers the search for authenticity, which leads his protagonist to include the state among those 
alienating, impersonal forces. Binx’s self-ironizing promulgates a specific form of distrust 
regarding the individual’s relationship to the state—a distrust centering on the national 
institution’s violations of individual autonomy over the experiential life of the self. That is to 
say, in The Moviegoer, the state intervenes in the consciousness of the individual either by 
promulgating a generic social imaginary (the “model citizen”) or through its bureaucratic edifice 
(the “neat styrene card”), both of which pre-package experience for the citizen and thus 
disassociates her from the production of her own subjectivity. Indeed, Percy portrays the self’s 
reliance upon the state and its surfeit objects as a form of “bad faith.” As Sartre puts this point, 
the person of “bad faith” resorts to “outside aid” despite the fact that he or she occupies a realm 
of “free choice” (47). Allowing the state to mediate one’s consciousness through mass-produced 
values, duties, and experiences, then, becomes equivalent to the consumer driving a Dodge 
sedan:  both the “model citizen” and the consumer are alienated because they encounter the real 
at a distant remove. The “outside aid” of advertisements and state mediation thus force Percy’s 
“model citizen” to become an “anyone,” divested of the capacity for self-determination.   
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Existentialism as a Novel 
Insofar as Percy objects to national intervention in the consciousness of individual 
subjects, his configuration of the self is suited to what Mark McGurl calls the “World Pluribus of 
Letters,” in which postwar writers imagine literature as “a technology of disaffiliation from 
empirical nations in favor of something more ideal.”255 McGurl generally applies this description 
to U.S. minority writers who contest assimilation and commodification by American mainstream 
culture. Such minority authors find themselves connected to a “global pluralist space.” For 
McGurl, literary disaffiliation from the nation-state establishes a connection between U.S. 
minority writers and a pluralistic, transnational community (331).256 Yet the “disaffiliation” from 
the mediation of the state in The Moviegoer does not seem to function as a narrative strategy for 
finding solidarity with the marginalized around the world; rather, it appears to turn away from 
collective affiliation and toward a preoccupation with self-governing consciousness. Indeed, as 
opposed to an idealized post-national community that McGurl says is the “ideal” of the “World 
Pluribus of Letters,” Percy turns away from the state and toward the conscious life of the self in 
search of a more perfect configuration of the individual’s position in the world.  
In Love in the Ruins, Percy inflects this concern regarding self-governing consciousness 
not only by criticizing esoteric and bourgeois truisms about authenticity—such as the good-
natured but conniving Alistair’s cliché, “Holiness is wholeness” (271)—but also by turning that 
critical gaze back upon itself. Tom More inadvertently allows his ontological lapsometer to fall 
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into the hands of Art Immelmann, a Mephistophelian character who promises More the Nobel 
Prize and a lucrative grant to develop his diagnostic tool. In exchange, More agrees to hand over 
his rights to the lapsometer to Immelmann, who quickly appends a “treatment” device that 
distorts the selfhood of the residents of Paradise. Becoming more than a diagnostic tool in 
Immelmann’s hands, the lapsometer incites violence, abstract hate, and anarchy through 
“treatments” of Heavy Sodium ions to the “pineal body,” or the “seat of the self” (370). Besides 
widely applying these treatments, Immelmann also indiscriminately hands out the lapsometer to 
the town’s physicians. Havoc quickly breaks out among “Knotheads”—the future moniker of 
conservatives, More explains—and the “new Left Party,” also known as the LEFTPAPASANE, 
an acronym for “what the Left believed in:  Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, The Pill, Atheism, Pot, 
Anti-Pollution, Sex, Abortion Now, Euthanasia” (18). Immelmann uses More’s lapsometer to 
distort the “selfhood” of these factions, but he explains, 
[W]e operate on a cardinal principle, which we never violate. We never ‘do’ 
anything to anybody. We only help people do what they want to do. We facilitate 
social interaction in order to isolate factors. If people show a tendency to interact 
in a certain way, we facilitate the interaction in order to accumulate reliable data. 
(363) 
 
Immelmann’s distortion of the lapsometer provides the impetus for another permutation of the 
skepticism recurring throughout Percy’s work. As an allusion to the myth of Faust, Immelmann’s 
character eerily employs the royal “we” in his explanation to More about his work. That is to 
say, much like Mephistopheles, Immelmann not only requires More to sell his soul, so to speak, 
for worldly gain; also, he becomes the representative of demonic forces.  The implication is that, 
for More, the “principalities and powers” of the demonic seemingly draw out the evil that he 
believes to be innate within human nature (5). As such, Percy raises a problem with his own 
valorization of self-governing consciousness:  human beings are seemingly inclined toward 
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anarchy, violence, and even self-destruction. That proclivity for evil seems to be intrinsic to the 
life of the self. How, then, can the “sovereign knower” be a prescriptive philosophical ideal when 
consciousness is rife with contradictions and cruelty? 
Despite the problems that Percy raises with “the secret ills of the spirit” and the tools that 
humanity uses to cultivate the life of that innately estranged self (5), Percy nonetheless sustains 
his commitment to the idea of sovereignty in Love in the Ruins. After the apocalyptic events 
precipitated by the lapsometer, More seeks refuge in a rundown Howard Johnson’s motel with 
his secretary, Ellen Oglethorpe. While Paradise is upended—the white residents flee as black 
“Bantus” become rich and take control of the town—Tom and Ellen get married and, eventually, 
continue their therapeutic practice. Five years after the apocalypse, they have two children and 
are poor residents of the inverted segregation that characterizes the new Paradise. Despite the 
difficulties of the “new age,” the physician’s life has finally settled into a “healthy” equilibrium. 
The apocalypse seemingly enables his recovery of the self, although that recuperation is not 
absolute, for More still experiences mild, occasional “depressions and unnatural exaltations.” 
The destruction of civilization has enabled him to arrive at a less crowded vista, and he reflects 
on the things that emerge into view as important during the new age:  
Strange. I am older, yet there seems to be more time, time for watching and 
waiting and thinking and working. All any man needs is time and desire and the 
sense of his own sovereignty. Kingfish Huey Long used to say: every man a king. 
I am a poor man but a kingly one. If you want and wait and work, you can have. 
(382) 
 
Where Doris fails, More succeeds:  he recovers his self not through abstract principles and 
routinized behavior but by attention to “time and desire.” The ideal of “every man a king” is not 
without its ambiguities—More earlier recalls the defunct afterlife of Huey Long’s political 
program, not to mention his notoriously dictatorial strategies for achieving that populist agenda 
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(151). Yet More nonetheless recuperates that ideal about ordinary kingship:  the alienated self 
can piece together life in ruins through attention to the quotidian. While remaining an “exile,” 
More is nonetheless a “sovereign wanderer” (383). His self is no longer “abstracted from itself” 
through hazy “terror” regarding daily existence (11). Indeed, in contrast to the problems that 
plague the physician at the beginning of the novel, Love in the Ruins concludes with More coyly 
inviting his second wife to bed. They fall on a new “$600” mattress that he has saved up for a 
year to buy, and the reader is left with the image of the couple “at home in bed where all good 
folk belong” (403). The association between More’s figure of the “sovereign wanderer” and his 
acclimation to quotidian life promotes a form of authentic selfhood that achieves self-possession 
through attention to the ordinary. Whereas Doris tries to “recover herself” through programmatic 
forms of individualism and Art Immelmann simply unleashes the unreflective proclivities of 
human nature, More becomes a “lordly exile” by slow, meditative work upon the self and its 
daily commitments (383). The ordinary experience of the self becomes the avenue for 
sovereignty.  
The importance of this quest for an awakened, self-determining consciousness not only 
influences the ambiguities and trajectories of the “quests” that preoccupy Percy’s characters. His 
philosophical ideal of the “sovereign knower” or “wanderer” also surfaces in his novels through 
a recurring mechanism in which the reader is invited to succeed—to “know” or recognize the 
real—where Percy’s characters fail to do. Percy’s first suggests this novelistic strategy during 
correspondence with his publishers at Knopf, in which the novelist defends certain stylistic and 
narrative peculiarities in The Moviegoer. He writes to his editor,  
Your calling attention to dropped characters and interrupted story-strands is 
certainly valid novelistic criticism, but it does not seem applicable here—at least 
it does not strike a chord with me. […] I suppose I am trying to say that the 
fragmented alienated consciousness, which is Mr Binx Bolling, cannot be done up 
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in a novel in the usual sense of the word. At least I would not have the stomach 
for the job. Also, I am working on something else.257 
 
It is clear enough that The Moviegoer is fragmented narratively and that this structure mirrors 
Binx’s own sense of being “cut loose” from society (75). It is also clear that The Moviegoer calls 
attention to the causes of that estrangement.  What is less clear, however, is that this detective 
work of the novel is based upon Percy’s assumptions about what constitutes “good” reading. For 
example, as Jay Tolson explains, Percy’s teaching philosophy during his semester at Loyola 
University in the fall of 1967 followed a consistent pattern:  “Whatever the novel of the week, 
Percy asked the same leading questions: What was the protagonist’s problem? Why was he so 
alienated from the rest of society? How did each novel work as a diagnostic and cognitive 
tool?”258 Such questions also surface in related form during Percy’s acceptance speech for the 
National Book Award: “it is perhaps not too farfetched to compare [The Moviegoer] in one 
respect with the science of pathology. Its posture is the posture of the pathologist with his 
suspicion that something is wrong.”259 The point is that, as both teacher and writer, Percy 
understood the primary function of the novel to be its “diagnostic” capacities for uncovering the 
conditions of alienation. Like More’s lapsometer, Percy understands the novel as a mechanism 
for diagnosing “a person’s innermost self” (92). 
Percy’s letter to his editor, Stanley Kauffmann, also suggests the awareness with which 
the author departs from the “usual sense” of the novel. If The Moviegoer diagnoses Binx’s 
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alienation, Percy also explains that “something else” is at stake. While he does not elaborate 
upon this innovation, the contours of this “something else” are traced throughout his 
correspondence with his publishers. For example, Percy originally entitled his work 
“Confessions of a Moviegoer,” although his editor at Knopf recommended the final title as a 
“short” and “memorable” alternative.260 The significance of Percy’s original title is that it stages 
Binx’s narrative as a confession and, as such, The Moviegoer calls attention to the reader’s 
responsibility for making his or her own judgments about the protagonist’s ironic declamations. 
Indeed, Binx’s confessions throughout the novel positions the reader in a “sovereign” position—
a positioning that also accounts for the ill-defined contours of Bolling’s “search.” This 
accentuation of the reader’s responsibility is particularly prominent after Binx has returned from 
running away with his suicidal cousin Kate. Aunt Emily, Kate’s mother, summons Binx for a 
final interrogation of her nephew. During this confrontation, Aunt Emily silences Binx by 
asking, “What do you love? What do you live by?” (226). Even as he is earlier “constrain[ed]” 
from “mentioning the object of my search” because he “do[es] not know the answer” (14), Binx 
is likewise silent in response to Aunt Emily’s questions. That is to say, the novel poses questions 
about which it remains ambiguous, refusing to resolve the existential problems that it diagnoses.  
Thus, rather than filling out the empty space left by Binx’s silence, The Moviegoer positions 
readers in the “sovereign” role of searching for their own answers. Unlike Art Immelmann, 
whose “treatments” in Love in the Ruins institutes a demonic tyranny, Percy does not prescribe a 
definite or programmatic solution to the illnesses of the self that he identifies. 
This refusal to offer a definite alternative social world in The Moviegoer is not without its 
ambiguities. Even if Binx’s anxieties center on the interventionist forces of consumerism and the 
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bureaucratic order of the state, Percy’s ideal of the “sovereign” individual and his understanding 
of the novel as an existential confrontation is, in effect, only a reconfiguration of the bourgeois 
novel, rather than a departure from it. In particular, in Percy’s attempt to reconcile the reader to 
her “sovereignty,” the turn in The Moviegoer toward autonomy and self-authentication reframes 
but ultimately perpetuates the bourgeois subject that Fredric Jameson identifies as the persistent 
hazard of the modern novel. In Jameson’s account of realism and the “problem of the subject,” 
an indivisible and atomized consciousness lingers throughout the history of this modern genre of 
fiction.261 He explains that the novel  
plays a significant role in what can be called a properly bourgeois cultural 
revolution—that immense process of transformation whereby populations whose 
life habits were formed by other, now archaic, modes of production are effectively 
reprogrammed for life and work in the new world of market capitalism. (152)   
 
Reading Balzac’s La Vielle Fille and La Rabouilleuse, Jameson argues that bourgeois 
individuality plagues the novel precisely in the “very life world” that it imagines. Even in novels 
that express discontent with market capitalism, these supposedly “realistic” representations of 
human existence nonetheless seek “to find a way out of its intolerable closure and to produce a 
‘solution’” (167).  That is to say, the “life world” of realism produces a form of subjectivity 
tailored to resolving the tensions of a demystified and alienating reality. The realism of the 
novel, then, “has the structure of a wish-fulfillment, […] a daytime fantasy into which the subject 
projects his own image and of which the reader or spectator [occupies] precisely the place of one 
of the other characters in the daydream” (174). Jameson offers here a Marxist turn on the 
Lacanian notion that desire constitutes the subject, for the wish-fulfilling text imagines 
opportunities for the inhabitant of late capitalist society to evade the material conditions of 
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reality through imagining an alternative social world and subjective state of being. Thus, 
narrative realism—and the novel in particular—produces a desiring bourgeois self, a mode of 
consciousness that resolves its alienation under illusory conditions of its own making.   
For Jameson, this complex construction of the subject also yields a “closed monad,” an 
indivisible entity governed by privatized laws of its own psyche. The “monadized subject” is at 
once alienated from society and in search of a home within it.  In the “life world” of the novel, 
then, this tension between estrangement and the quest for personalized property—a home of 
one’s own—transfigures the Lacanian subject into an agonizing self who navigates the uncertain 
conditions of capitalist society.  The image of bourgeois desire, a “Utopia of the household,” is 
the “‘still point’ around which the disorder and urgency of a properly novelistic time will turn” 
(157).  That is to say, within Jameson’s schema, the novel produces an atomized or autonomous 
self who is displaced within the ruins created by modern capitalist society. That alienated 
individual searches for a domesticized “still point,” some subjective state or private property that 
constitutes the telos of the subject’s quest. Indeed, as Percy puts it in a later book of essays, the 
“Self” is “the Ghost which Haunts the Cosmos.”262 The Utopian search of this displaced 
individual surfaces in The Moviegoer, in particular, through Binx’s quest for a peculiar 
possession:  his own consciousness authenticated through its independence from external 
authorities. Binx is at once an exile from and a pilgrim in search of self-possession. 
In fact, the view of subjectivity underlying The Moviegoer shares several features of the 
desiring bourgeois self that Jameson identifies in Balzac’s realism and the subsequent tradition 
of the novel. For one, while Percy’s existentialist individual is not strictly “monadized,” the 
diagnostic aims of his novel nonetheless try to revive the individual’s autonomous self-
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production. The “diagnosis” of Binx’s “problem” thus presupposes a normative ideal:  if the 
commodity system or the edifice of the state were only surpassed, then the knowing subject 
would be capable of self-governance and control over its experience. This normative ideal also 
underwrites Tom More’s lapsometer, whose name recalls a “lapse, or fall” of the self that the 
tool attempts to measure (205). This lapsarian metaphysics is indebted to Christian theology, 
which, much like Binx’s quest for sovereignty, presupposes an original state of grace or natural 
perfection—i.e., like in the garden of Eden—that offers a normative ideal to which the self longs 
to return. This state of sovereignty, in other words, is the utopian state underpinning Percy’s 
explorations of characters whose various quests are repeatedly frustrated.  
Percy’s work re-stylizes other important features of the desiring bourgeois self that 
haunts realism and the tradition of the novel. The Moviegoer, in particular, poses a conflict 
between an alienated consciousness and a social order in crisis (“the very century of merde”), 
such that self-governing individuality fills the vacuum created by a fragmented world. This view 
of the self not only positions consciousness (as opposed to, for example, historical-material 
conditions) at the foundations of the real and the authentic. Percy also reinstates a form of the 
self that inhabits an as-yet unrealized space of resolution amidst uncertain socio-economic 
conditions. That is to say, the “life world” of Percy’s novel imagines a place where the pilgrim 
resolves her estrangement under conditions of her own making. Binx’s quest for existential 
“sovereignty” admittedly purports to resolve the anxiety that derives from the uncertain 
conditions of the national capitalist economy. But insofar as Percy invests the novel with the 
possibilities of reviving the lost “sovereignty” of the reader, The Moviegoer reproduces the 
“solution” of a wish-fulfillment narrative, finding that resolution not in the material order of 
society but in individual subjectivity.   
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Yet the form of selfhood promulgated in The Moviegoer is not merely a palimpsest of 
Jameson’s desiring subject produced with the birth of modern capitalism. In its anxieties 
regarding mediating authorities and its normative vision of the self as sovereign over experience, 
Percy’s novel also brings definition to the experience of a new configuration of capitalist society 
within postwar America. Namely, The Moviegoer imagines the individual and the alienating 
effects of state mediation in such a way that at once marks and helps precipitate the 
disintegration of the New Deal era. That is to say, Percy’s novel is what Raymond Williams calls 
a novelistic “confirmation” of “a pressing and varied experience which was not yet history,” an 
instance among other intellectual and cultural sensibilities that provide existential terms for the 
decades-long shift toward neoliberalism. Writing about the long annus mirabilis of the English 
novel between 1847 and 1848, Williams explains that novels published by Dickens, the Brontë 
sisters, and other writers “defin[ed] society, rather than merely reflecting it” at a moment when 
that public space was in crisis.263 For Williams, these novels did not merely evince societal 
conditions but clarified and circulated a particular understanding of collective experience, thus 
shaping a new social order emerging in the wake of the Industrial Revolution, Chartism, and 
growing individual and national debt.264 However, if Dickens and others shape what Williams 
calls “the crisis of the knowable community,” The Moviegoer inverts that crisis by giving 
substance and legitimacy to one among many competing forms of individualism in postwar 
American society.265 
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Percy’s scattered political writings and interviews also consider the felt crises of his 
historical moment regarding the authentic life of the self and the alienating effects of the state. 
He often expresses doubts regarding state welfare programs and federal methods for enacting 
desegregation, for example, because he believed that these government interventions were poorly 
executed and generative of unforeseen economic and social consequences. Although he 
supported the Civil Rights Movement, Percy’s philosophical sensibilities were seemingly at odds 
with his political commitments—a tension that often prompted him to write about the landscape 
of American politics from a distance. Indeed, as Percy’s friend Ben Toledano explains, “Walker 
is interested in politics—from a hundred miles away.”266 Percy was well-informed about 
American and international politics, but he rarely campaigned for any defined set of political 
goals. As his friend and priest James Boulware recalls, “My first encounter with [Percy] was 
around the work for civil rights. […] I think he was a little hesitant when it got down to being 
involved in a demonstration. He would do things quietly, but he did not want to get overtly 
involved in a lot of stuff.”267 This nominal support but reticence to get involved in political 
activism surfaces in an 1957 essay, where Percy holds up Martin Luther King, Jr., as a paragon 
of “wise and successful” leadership, even as he asserts that the “worst fate that could overtake 
the struggle against segregation would be its capture by a political orthodoxy of the left.”268  
Percy explains that he is opposed to “militant liberalism,” which enforces reform rather than 
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encourages it.269 Indeed, Percy’s response to the Civil Rights Movement is emblematic of his 
larger political sensibilities, which evince fears of “growing federal power and federal 
money.”270 For example, Percy maintains that the “Northern politicians” who “support any and 
every proposal of federal intervention” are well intentioned but still introduce inadvertent 
resentment and other ills through their heavy-handed attempts to impose social reform.   
In contrast to “militant liberalism,” Percy envisions progressive reform on the “race 
question” from within society, rather than imposed by impersonal federal authority. He explains 
that rapid “social changes are taking place which can only have the effect of radically altering the 
character of the problem, if not solving it.” Elaborating upon this rejection of state intervention 
and reliance upon a changing social landscape, Percy offers two social conditions that will alter, 
if not solve, the “dilemma of the Negro”: first, “the ongoing emigration of the Negro from the 
South,” which will disperse the crisis beyond one region of the nation. Second, the South will 
accommodate “its dwindling Negro population as it moves from second- to first-class 
citizenship, a pattern which has nothing to do with the harsh words and extremist laws, which is 
imperfect but bids fair to be effective.” Percy explains this second societal change more directly: 
“Racial injustice is bad business.”271 Percy maintains, in other words, that federal intervention in 
the struggles for desegregation is both maladroit and preemptively pointless, for socio-economic 
conditions—along with the wise work of individual leaders—are capable of achieving the reform 
that regulation aims to institute. 
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Percy’s view of the Civil Rights Movement and federal intervention resonate with his 
larger anxieties regarding the politics of the New Deal era. Tolson captures the tensions of the 
author’s political affiliations when explaining Percy’s brand of “liberalism”: 
In the early 1950s, as later, Percy was reluctant to label himself politically.  
Despite his aversion to FDR, he maintained that he always voted for Democrats in 
presidential elections, but he was never particularly partisan in his political 
thinking. […] During the 1950s and 1960s, however, he did seem to find a 
position on the political continuum—that of a moderate liberal, concerned 
domestically with civil rights and greater social justice, and internationally with 
the containment of communism.272 
 
Percy’s attraction to Democratic politics had little to do with the party’s economic policies or 
what he understood to be its bungling relief and welfare programs; rather, according to Boulware 
and Tolson, Percy’s liberalism was a consequence of his conversion to a brand of Catholicism 
that promoted social equality. “Percy made peace with liberals, and liberalism,” Tolson explains, 
“because doing so seemed the only way to work for a political solution to the problem [of civil 
rights].”273 This “peace” with the Democratic Party suggests that Percy was hedging his bets 
regarding desegregation:  while Republicans would oppose reform, the Democrats would only 
mishandle it. Nonetheless, Tolson argues that Percy felt there were “pernicious effects of [the 
Democrats’] ill-conceived welfare projects,” and, as his friend Shelby Foote says, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt was Percy’s lifelong “political bugbear.”274  
Percy’s liberalism thus translates into support for the Democratic Party only as a 
pragmatic commitment to social equality, but his political sensibilities were nonetheless rife with 
internal conflicts and anxieties regarding the role of federal intervention in the everyday lives of 
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individuals. Percy cites significant problems with New Deal relief programs and their effects 
upon farming communities. For example, revitalizing the farming industry of rural America 
comprised one of the cornerstones of the New Deal relief programs. The Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 enabled the federal government to pay subsidies to farmers who reduced 
their output, thus decreasing the supply of crops and—by virtue of staving off a flooded 
market—regulating food prices to the benefit of consumers and farmers alike. Such programs 
simultaneously distributed monetary relief to rural communities while also increasing the value 
of the goods they provided. Consequently, by 1935 the average income of farmers in the South 
had almost doubled.  
Percy criticizes this New Deal program of central economic planning in his 1965 essay 
“Mississippi: The Fallen Paradise.” Percy argues that the so-called farming parity of the New 
Deal agricultural plank misfires, for its outcomes marginalize some groups at the expense of 
others, creating unforeseen consequences and merely reshuffling the social ills that Roosevelt’s 
brand of liberalism purported to alleviate. While Percy is primarily concerned in the essay with 
providing an account of the particularly violent race relations of postwar and Civil Rights-era 
Mississippi, he suggests that state intervention in the farming economies was one factor 
contributing to the scale and intensity of Mississippi’s race-related violence. Percy argues, 
“Mississippi desperately needed the New Deal and profited enormously from it. Indeed, the 
Roosevelt farm program succeeded too well. Planters who were going broke on ten-cent cotton 
voted for Roosevelt, took federal money, got rich, lived to hate Kennedy and Johnson and vote 
for Goldwater—while still taking federal money.”275 Percy explains that the New Deal enabled 
poor farmers to construct a populist coalition that later employed its wealth and influence in 
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opposing desegregation and economic reform. Such results appear as tokens of the larger 
inability of state intervention to achieve its desired ends, for these outcomes effectively 
undermined the work of the Civil Rights Section of Roosevelt’s Justice Department. Percy 
suggests, in other words, that the imposition of federal authority results in tragic unforeseen 
consequences, thus undermining its own aspirations to foster a social arena of equity through 
economic planning. 
Percy’s anxieties signal one form of the growing opposition toward New Deal liberalism, 
despite the fact that his political commitments would lead him to criticize the resurgence of a 
new form of conservatism that had become institutionalized by the end of his life. In 1987, for 
example, he chastised his friend Dick Faust for the latter’s unquestioning support of President 
Reagan: “Why do [you] feel obliged to make out Ron Reagan as perfect?” he wrote Faust in a 
letter. “Nobody has been perfect since Hitler and Stalin. I find it more useful to think of 
conservatives as ordinary fucked-up humans with perhaps a good idea or two, and of liberals as 
perhaps even more fucked-up and hardly an idea beyond good intentions.”276 Even if Percy’s 
caustic dichotomy between “good intentions” and “a good idea or two” led him to affiliate with 
the “even more fucked-up” liberals, he nonetheless felt some sympathy with the new brand of 
conservative Republicans that had come to power in the 1980s. Boulware explains that Percy 
“admired Reagan’s simplification, Reagan’s communication of what we all should hold to.” Yet 
even when he accepted a dinner invitation from Reagan in 1987, Percy still remained distant 
from the latest resurgence of conservatives because of his “serious doubts” about their 
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intentions.277 He was attracted simultaneously to a “simplification” of federal regulations and the 
social vision of Presidents Johnson and Kennedy; a voluntary desegregation of the South and the 
enforcement of civil rights legislation; the freedom of the individual and a set of ideals that 
resolve by fiat the “shit” surrounding the self. Percy felt attracted, in other words, to two 
competing forms of political thinking:  a liberal social arena of “sovereign knowers” and a 
liberalized economic arena governed by virtuous—“what we all should hold to”—behavior. 
Boulware observes these tensions and explains Percy’s reasons for his political ambivalence 
through his conservative brand of Catholicism. Explaining the paradox of Percy’s religious and 
political commitments, Boulware says simply, “[Walker] kind of wanted that code.”278  
Boulware’s characterization of the tensions underlying Percy’s commitments recalls the 
persistent but ultimately failed pursuit of a “code” by Lancelot Andrewes Lamar, the titular 
narrator of Percy’s Lancelot (1977). A former “liberal” NAACP lawyer and scion of a 
distinguished Southern family, Lancelot narrates his intermittent recollections for how he has 
come to be confined to a mental hospital. The narration is stylized as a series of confessions to a 
silent second party, a priest-psychologist named Harry, who is also a former college friend of the 
narrator. Lancelot is confined to a cell in the Institute for Aberrant Behavior because, he slowly 
allows himself to remember, he went temporarily insane after his mansion, Belle Isle, burned to 
the ground, killing his wife, Margot, along with three members of a movie crew making a film at 
the estate. While the therapists at the Institute believe that Lancelot merely finds Belle Isle 
burning and is burned trying to rescue his wife, Lancelot confesses that he is the architect of the 
catastrophe. The seeds to destroy Belle Isle along with Margot are planted when Lancelot 
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inadvertently discovers that his youngest daughter, Siobhan, is not his biological offspring. With 
some investigative work, Lancelot discovers that his wife has sustained a long-term affair with 
an actor, Merlin, and later with Janos Jacoby, the director of the film being made at Belle Isle. 
Merlin, he believes, is the biological father of Siobhan. Lancelot’s disgust with Margot’s affair 
and the sexual habits of the film crew reaches a fever pitch when his sixteen-year-old daughter, 
Lucy, becomes the lover of Troy Dana, a famous handsome actor, and his girlfriend, Raine 
Robinette. Immediately after discovering his daughter’s participation in a “rough swastikaed 
triangle” of sexual acts, Lancelot resolves to take revenge. He makes a “shopping list” of items 
needed to trap natural gas within his home, and he thus designs a scheme to create a devastating 
explosion while Margot, Troy, Raine, and Jacoby are in his home.279  
The violence and destruction reaped by Lancelot’s disenchantment and intermittent 
madness prompts him to doubt humanity’s capacity for love. For example, in a moment of anger 
and disillusionment, Lancelot tells the priest-psychologist, “the monstrous truth lying at the very 
center of life” is that “[women’s] happiness and the meaning of life itself is to be assaulted by a 
man” (222). Lancelot insists that “rape” is the “omega point of evolution,” for modern 
civilization is still governed by sexual foundations—indeed, all human behavior derives from 
sexuality. Turning on a famous phrase from Pascal, Lancelot concludes, “man is […] a thinking 
reed and a walking genital.” Women, on the other hand, are either passively subject to this sexual 
logic or self-deluded about the other sex’s motivations. Those women who try to “escape” this 
social order are “like a hen wanting to be a hawk” (223). Such declarations construe human 
beings according to one of two categories—the violent and the violated—and Lancelot thus 
suggests that sexual assault is the inescapable horizon for those competing forms of existence.  
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Yet Lancelot also undermines his own beliefs about the “omega point” of human life, 
which is seen most clearly in his attempts to have an “innocent” relationship to the patient in the 
cell adjacent to his own. This patient, Anna, is the victim of a violent gang rape and refuses to eat 
or speak since the assault. However, Lancelot slowly draws Anna out of her silence through 
kindness and, significantly, his attempts to communicate with her through a “code,” a system of 
taps upon the shared wall of their adjoining cells. This “code” is simple:  each tap corresponds to 
a letter in the alphabet: “One knock = A, two = B, and so on.” He admits that introducing this 
“code” is not “as easy as you might think,” especially to a silent subject who does not necessarily 
reciprocate the desire for communication (34). But Lancelot persists in establishing this code 
because, he enigmatically explains, Anna “may be a prototype of the New Woman. It is no 
longer possible to ‘fall in love.’ But in the future and with the New Woman it will be” (35). 
Lancelot explains that he has developed a “sexual theory of history,” beginning with a 
“Romantic” period, in which people “fell in love,” followed by a “sexual period” of 
indiscriminate mores, and finally a “catastrophe of some sort” that inaugurates a “new age” 
populated by “new” men and women (35-36).  
The larger significance of Lancelot’s desire to disseminate a “code” becomes clearer 
when he later elaborates upon his theory about the “new age” and the “New Woman.” 
Suggesting the extent to which his expectations are dislodged from reality, Lancelot says that he 
intends to marry Anna. Then, explaining his confused rationale, Lancelot says, 
She is the first woman of the new order. For she has, so to speak, endured the 
worst of the age and survived it, undergone the ultimate violation and come out of 
it not only intact but somehow purged, innocent. Who else might the new Virgin 
be but a gang-raped social worker? I do not joke. Her ordeal has made her like a 
ten-year-old. (159) 
 
  191 
Lancelot’s idealization of Anna comes to naught—she later denies his marriage proposal—but 
even his tortured understanding of her as a “new Virgin” suggests that his harsher assertions 
about the sexual assault latent within all human behavior is tempered by his hope for an 
“innocent” humanity. The implication of Lancelot’s claim is that Anna, unlike most self-deluded 
women, has encountered the violence underpinning the sexual age. Being the victim of the 
“omega point” of civilization, she is seemingly able to reject it. Catastrophe enables Anna to see 
society’s rampant faults and fundamental violence, and so she retreats into a state of innocence.  
Anna’s return to a “ten-year-old” virginal state, as an unraveling of her adult place in 
society, represents Lancelot’s larger conviction that catastrophe will undo civilization itself, thus 
forcing humanity—or, at least, those who survive the apocalypse—to enter a new mode of 
existence. Lancelot receives this apocalyptic vision through frequent dreams about a “future life” 
(36, 220). In one permutation of this dream, Lancelot imagines a “young man” standing “in a 
mountain pass above the Shenandoah Valley. A rifle is slung across his back.” The man inhabits 
a world of “great dying cities,” collapsing after an unidentified crisis, and the figure is thus 
forced to live as an isolated wanderer. “He is waiting and watching for something,” Lancelot 
explains. “What? A sign? Who, what is he? WASP Virginian? New England Irish? Louisiana 
Creole? Jew? Black? Where does he live? It is impossible to say” (221).  The “young man” of 
this apocalyptic new age emerges after “Washington, the country, [has gone] down the drain” 
(220). His attentiveness—“waiting and watching for something” (221)—replaces the passivity of 
the former age: “The people have lost [the country] to the politicians, bureaucrats, drunk 
Congressmen, lying Presidents, White House preachers, C.I.A., F.B.I., Mafia, Pentagon, 
pornographers […]” (220). The new man cannot rely upon societal structures for his significance 
or welfare, and indeed the social categories of the former age do not apply to him—it is 
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“impossible to say” the race or class or origin of Lancelot’s man of the future. The 
“impossibility” of these categories derive from the fact that civilization has collapsed—there is 
no more New England, no more South, no more races—and, as such, the apocalypse forces him 
to become an individual. The self in reliance upon itself is the only form of life available to the 
“young man” living after the collapse of civilization. 
Lancelot’s man of the future, much like the “New Woman,” returns to a state of 
innocence. But, unlike in his descriptions of Anna, Lancelot specifically notes that the “new age” 
for men will allow them to be independent from politics. Washington having fallen, parties 
likewise fall away, and only individuals remain. (Women, it seems, are not part of Lancelot’s 
political schema in either the pre- or post-apocalyptic ages.) The implication of Lancelot’s claim 
is that partisan politics is a function of the disease infecting the present age. For example, in an 
earlier permutation of Lancelot’s apocalyptic dream, he imagines a revolution in which there will 
be no “speeches, rallies, political parties. There will be no need of such things. One man will act. 
Another man will act,” initiating a sequence of independent action by atomized individuals 
(157). This new form of existence will allow men to understand one another as “gentlemen used 
to know each other,” rather than as members of a party or movement. Lancelot qualifies his ideal 
of the “gentleman,” explaining,  
I’m not talking about social classes. I’m talking about something held in common 
by men, Gentile, Jew, Greek, Roman, slave, freeman, black, white, and so 
recognized between them: a stern code, a gentleness toward women and an 
intolerance of swinishness, a counsel kept, and above all a readiness to act, and 
act alone if necessary—there’s the essential ingredient—because as of this 
moment not one in 200 million Americans is ready to act from perfect sobriety 
and freedom. If one man is free to act alone, you don’t need a society. (157) 
 
To Lancelot’s earlier presentation of the “New Woman” who recuperates her virginity as a result 
of catastrophe, he adds that she will receive “gentleness” from men. Thus, if the new woman 
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regains her innocence in the apocalypse, men recuperate their status as gentlemen who 
voluntarily adhere to a “code.” The new gentleman is able to subvert or perhaps circumvent the 
sexual violence that is the “omega point” of human civilization, although Lancelot seems 
conflicted even on this point (222). Still, the form of life imagined in his theory of the new 
gentleman centers on the idea of “a counsel kept,” a shared mode of life that at once establishes 
an ideal ethic even as it first and foremost values self-possession. The “essential ingredient” of 
the new gentleman is that he is willing to “act alone.” No Americans in the present age live 
according to this code, Lancelot decries, because they refuse to act from “perfect sobriety and 
freedom.” Instead, he suggests they retreat into absurd sexuality and political dependencies. 
For Lancelot, then, the “code” refers to an ideal mode of being. “You have your Sacred 
Heart,” he tells the therapist-priest. “We have Lee” (157). Even as Catholics look to the 
traditional image of the heart of Christ as an ideal of compassion, the new gentleman looks to 
paragons of the former age who acted singularly. Lancelot abstracts the Confederate General 
Robert E. Lee’s status as “gentleman” from the political and historical contexts of his actions, 
focusing instead upon an idealized understanding of Lee’s willingness to “act alone,” to live with 
“perfect sobriety and freedom” (157). Lancelot thus identifies the code not so much with specific 
beliefs, political positions, or religious dogma as with a mode of being shared by exemplary 
figures. Indeed, the notion that this code is a “counsel kept” explains why Lancelot uses the same 
term to describe the system of communication that he earlier proposes to Anna. Much like the 
apocalyptic ideal for the new gentleman, the earlier simplistic code is “something held in 
common,” a communicative order (157). Lancelot hopes, in other words, to establish a shared 
understanding of the world with Anna from the bottom up, as it were, creating a simplistic 
language of taps and knocks. He imagines constructing a new linguistic plane to communicate 
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with Anna because, by implication, the conventional language they used before their respective 
catastrophes does not suffice. On the one hand, then, Lancelot’s “code” is a further permutation 
of Percy’s earlier figure of the “sovereign knower”: the new gentleman is the individual who in 
full self-possession of him or herself acts singularly. Yet, on the other hand, Lancelot’s “code” 
inflects the ideal of sovereignty through a desire for a shared communicative order which 
cultivates understanding (“a counsel kept”) and even intimacy (e.g., the desire to marry Anna) 
among its adherents. The “code” therefore represents a communal permutation of Percy’s 
recurring interest in the sovereignty of the self. 
However, despite the appeal of the “code” to Lancelot, this route for resolving his 
anxieties about the “present age” are not without its problems and ambiguities. In particular, 
Lancelot’s anxieties about conformity and, paradoxically, the difficulties of shared life frustrate 
the aspirations of intimacy underlying his conception of the “code.” Lancelot explains, for 
example, that his encounter with catastrophe has taught him that “the only way to avoid imitation 
is to ask a question and the only way to establish a code is repetition” (34-35). Lancelot’s 
statement evinces the paradox that ultimately unravels his search for a shared communicative 
order: that is to say, the “code” and its constitutive mechanisms of “repetition” are themselves 
forms of “imitation,” the hazard that demands asking questions. This tension between Lancelot’s 
skepticism toward imitation and his valorization of a shared form of life is further complicated 
by his own vacillations between uncertainty and conviction. As he puts it when faced with the 
possibility that Siobhan is not his biological daughter, “One has to know for sure before doing 
anything” (43). Sober action is the child of conviction, he implies, and so one either has to take 
the word of another or sort out the truth for one’s self (156). That standard of absolute certainty 
chips away at Lancelot’s confidence in a shared code, for even his “conviction not [to] tolerate 
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this age” is a close cousin of the certainty about Margot’s infidelity that precipitates his scheme 
to destroy Belle Isle along with its visitors (156). In other words, Lancelot suspects that his 
convictions often form the basis of destruction, not just new life. Likewise, skepticism—the 
demand for certainty, the questioning of imitation—nurtures Lancelot’s suspicion that an 
individual may not act singularly while also enjoying intimacy with others. For example, 
explaining his hopes to “make a new life, an absolutely new beginning,” Lancelot muses, 
Begin with a burrow, a small clean well-swept place such as this [cell], with one 
tiny window on the world and another creature in the next room. That is all you 
need. In fact, that is all you can stand. Add more creatures, more world, books, 
talk, TV, news—and we’ll all be as crazy as we were before. (108) 
 
Lancelot’s “new life” begins with isolation, a space where the self is not crowded other 
“creatures” and things. Indeed, “all you need” in terms of shared life is “another creature in the 
next room.” The intimacy of Lancelot’s “new beginning” occurs at a remove, as if self-
possession demands that the individual remain set apart within his or her own enclosed cell. 
Shared space becomes partitioned space, for any greater intimacy with other “creatures” 
precipitates “craziness.”  
Therefore, even as Lancelot desires a shared code that facilitates mutual understanding 
among its adherents, his figure of the new gentleman is nonetheless atomized, cordoned off from 
others within an oubliette of skepticism, irony, and self-sufficiency. The communal aspirations 
of Lancelot’s code are never fully established because of his simultaneous, paradoxical desire to 
retain the “freedom to act on my conviction.” Lancelot desires intimacy with Anna and to be 
recognized as a gentleman like General Robert E. Lee, while also remaining within the silo of his 
own sovereignty. The result of these conflicting aspirations underwriting Lancelot’s quest for a 
code is that he does not conquer alienation and is rejected by Anna, who tells him to “shove off” 
(252). Lancelot consequently slips further into isolation because of the failure of his attempts to 
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establish a communicative order, vowing to “start a new world singlehandedly or with those like 
me who will not tolerate [the present age]” (255-56). Indeed, whether others “like” Lancelot join 
him, he insists that he will act alone to “destroy” the corrupt world he inhabits (255). As he puts 
it, “I am my own instrument,” for Lancelot concludes that he does not need others to institute a 
“new “order” (256). He hopes Anna will change her mind or that other mavericks will join him 
(257). Yet Lancelot nonetheless resolves to usher in a new world regardless of whether others 
keep counsel with him. 
Much like Lancelot’s own vacillations, Percy provides scope for validating Lancelot’s 
suspicions about the present age and his apocalyptic figure who is “waiting and watching for 
something” (221), but also Percy raises doubts about the isolation that results from Lancelot’s 
final conviction to “start a new world singlehandedly” (255-56). These doubts surface when 
Lancelot explains Anna’s rebuff of his marriage proposition. Lancelot proposes that, after 
marrying and fleeing to the hills of Virginia, they might become “the new Adam and Eve of the 
new world” (251). However, Anna rejects Lancelot’s construal of her sexual trauma as a 
catastrophe that somehow purifies her. “Are you suggesting,” she says, enraged, “that I, myself, 
me, my person, can be violated by a man? You goddamn men. Don’t you know that there are 
more important things in this world? Next you’ll be telling me that despite myself I liked it” 
(251). Anna rejects Lancelot’s implication that rape is inherent to the relationship between men 
and women and that, as such, the latter’s existential worth is somehow tied up in being violated. 
Intuiting such implications in Lancelot’s proposal, Anna retorts that her “person” is not 
predicated upon—and therefore cannot be violated by—a man. If her very self could be violated 
by the other sex, the implication is that Lancelot’s sexual theory—as he earlier puts it, that 
“[women’s] happiness and the meaning of life itself is to be assaulted by a man” (222)—would 
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be correct. But Anna responds instead by dismissing the notion that her self—its value and 
wellbeing—is dependent upon the actions of men, much less their sexual appetites. 
Lancelot, at first chastened, admits that there “is something to what she says,” although 
he soon reverts back to his theory of sexuality. Despite her protestations, he even hopes that 
Anna, along with other women, “will admit the truth, will refuse to accept it, and then they will 
be my best recruits” (252). While still nurturing fantasies about the male-dominated “truth” 
governing the lives of women, Anna’s rebuff nonetheless seems to make Lancelot less beholden 
to his theory of sexual violence than to his conviction about instituting a new world through 
singular action. Indeed, the scope that Percy provides for being suspicious of Lancelot’s 
theories—that is, Anna’s repudiation of the idea that the “person” of a woman is predicated upon 
the actions of a man—only reinforces another dimension of Lancelot’s conflicting aspirations. In 
particular, the fact that Lancelot admits there is “something to what she says” prompts Lancelot 
merely to expand his apocalyptic figure of self-sufficiency to include women. The “something” 
of Anna’s rebuff that Lancelot suggests is correct is the notion that the “person,” the selfhood, of 
a woman cannot be violated by a man, for this idea fits squarely within Lancelot’s image of the 
“new life” predicated upon the individual enclosed within her own uncrowded cell—a self that is 
sufficient unto itself (108). In other words, while there is scope in the novel to doubt Lancelot’s 
theory of sexual violence, the grounds that Percy provides for doing so depend upon Lancelot’s 
alternative notion of a self that has settled into the cul-de-sac of its own self-possession.  
This failure to establish “something held in common” in Lancelot—the inability of the 
code to cultivate understanding, much less love, between Anna and Lancelot—signals the 
foundering of the communal permutation of Percy’s “sovereign knower.” The different routes for 
resolving individual alienation in Percy’s work find their center of gravity in this ideal of 
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sovereignty. Indeed, that philosophical crisis of an estranged self, which is adrift in an 
incalculable society and perpetually searching for a secure framework for self-realization, is the 
centerpiece of the crisis that Percy identifies with postwar society. According to the author’s 
social imaginary, New Deal liberalism—along with mass media society—is an estranging 
interposition. Yet Percy’s work suggests that a more substantial or authentic form of experience 
lies beyond the mediating forces of impersonal authorities. Indeed, this nuanced set of tensions 
and anxieties resides at the heart of The Moviegoer, despite the fact that national politics surfaces 
in much subtler ways than in the author’s later works. As Percy explains in his comparison of 
The Moviegoer and “the science of pathology” during his acceptance speech for the National 
Book Award: “the pathology in this case had to do with the loss of individuality and the loss of 
identity at the very time when words like the ‘dignity of the individual’ and ‘self-realization’ are 
being heard more frequently than ever.”280 If only on this account, The Moviegoer affirms the 
political sensibilities of Aunt Emily, who asserts, “Oh I am aware that we hear a great many 
flattering things nowadays about your great common man—you know, it has always been 
revealing to me that he is perfectly content so to be called, because that is exactly what he is:  the 
common man and when I say common I mean common as hell” (223).  For Aunt Emily, 
collectivist philosophies take away the dignity of the individual, the self’s ability to be a unique 
legislator of its own existence. Furthermore, Aunt Emily maintains that the consequences of a 
social order organized around the “common man” are quite dire: “Our national character stinks 
to high heaven. But we are kinder than ever” (223). Aunt Emily’s irony is that the kindness and 
consensus characterizing the postwar “national character” is a veneer that covers up social decay. 
Indeed, her denunciation alludes to Binx’s own preoccupation with the malaise, concurring with 
                                                
280 Walker Percy, “Accepting the National Book Award for The Moviegoer,” 246. 
  199 
her nephew that the stench of popular American discourses regarding programmatic self-
realization is yet another form of alienation. Thus, even as New Deal Democrats traded 
extensively on the terms of “the dignity of man” to gain political capital, it is only one more 
instance of the angst that besets Binx:  the social and political frameworks for his experience are 
disputed, isolating, and dubious at best.   
While Percy pursues different routes for the alienated self to search for a more authentic 
form of experience, his work nonetheless centers upon the figure of the “sovereign wanderer.” 
This figure recovers some form of authenticity by preserving the sovereignty of its own roving 
consciousness, at least until a collective framework—perhaps, for Percy, even a new religious 
order—may be realized. Percy’s nostalgia for a communal past and his longing for a shared 
“code” or order of shared understanding is countervailed by the self-possession of the pilgrim 
awaiting the arrival of the new age. This central tension surfaces in Binx’s odd agreement with 
his theosophist Aunt Edna, who asserts that Bolling “had been a Jew in a previous incarnation.” 
Binx agrees, explaining, “it is true that I am Jewish by instinct. We share the same exile” (89).  
Binx construes his social and existential crisis after the fashion of the Jewish Diaspora, where 
Zion is no longer inhabitable but nonetheless resides in the heart and mind of the exile. Indeed, 
what is lost for Binx is his dignity as an individual self, his status as a “sovereign wayfarer” in 
Martin Luschei’s turn on Percy’s own phrase.281 Much like the existential crisis facing human 
beings in Sartre’s philosophy, Binx is adrift and without a clear or present metaphysic for 
making meaning of his life.  What is left in the ruins of this modern situation is the burden of 
existential choice placed upon the individual, unique and alone in the world. While Binx’s exile 
suggests an Edenic (or Zionistic) past, that prior communal state has been lost. Thus, as Sartre 
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might put it, Binx’s crisis of experience “remind[s] man that there is no legislator but himself” 
(53). Even if Bolling hunts for other epistemological and existential grounds, he finds that 
independent self-realization is the avenue for his search. Indeed, the longing for communal life 
that haunts Percy is indicative of a paradox that comes to preoccupy both European 
existentialism and its American variety in the postwar moment:  the relationship between 
individual consciousness and the problem of intersubjectivity.  Percy navigates this tension in 
ways that mark one variation upon the existentialist themes of authenticity and choice that is 
especially prominent in the American reception of existentialism.   
 
Intersubjectivity, Consciousness, and the Varieties of American Existentialism 
Readers of Percy’s essays and academic articles may object that my characterization of 
the various cul-de-sacs created by his pursuit of sovereignty misrepresents the author. In this 
view, rather than unmediated consciousness, Percy instead believes (following the existentialist 
Gabriel Marcel) that an “intersubjective milieu” lies at the base of reality and is thus the object 
under consideration in Binx’s search.282 Indeed, in essays such as “The Delta Factor” (1975), 
Percy rejects the notion that subjectivity is self-enclosed or autonomous from other human 
beings. He likewise rejects the Kantian distinction between the unknowable noumenon (a thing-
in-itself) and the phenomenal attributes that are intelligible to individual consciousness, for he 
maintains that such distinctions “let the world slip away.”283 Percy instead argues that the 
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triangulation between the individual subject, the “real” object in the world, and the medium of 
language comprises “the ultimate and elemental unit not only of language but of the very 
condition of the awakening of human intelligence and consciousness.”284 Human beings “break 
through into the daylight of language” as children, or as existentialists, but they do so because 
the public phenomenon of language makes it possible.285 
Binx’s anxieties about consciousness are in fact made more complex by Percy’s debt to 
Marcel’s notion of intersubjectivity, as well as Sartre’s fraught invocation of the idea in 
“Existentialism is a Humanism.” What’s more, Percy’s interest in semiotics and the philosophy 
of language throughout his essays presupposes a shared or public field of consciousness. Percy’s 
self-avowed debt to European existentialism began in the 1940s after experiencing a nearly fatal 
bout of tuberculosis. According to Patrick Samway, Percy first encountered existentialism 
through Sartre’s novel, Nausea (1938), although he later “made a transition […] from Sartre to 
Marcel.”286 Critics such as Mary Deems Howland have also emphasized the influence of Gabriel 
Marcel’s Catholic existentialism upon Percy.287 But Tolson argues that Percy’s novels bear the 
imprint of Kierkegaard’s philosophy most prominently, even to the point that almost all of his 
protagonists imitate “the Kierkegaardian progression from the aesthetic stage to the ethical stage 
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and then on to the religious stage—or at least to the brink of this last stage.”288 However, few 
scholars have fully appraised Sartre as a resource for Percy’s novels, perhaps because the 
former’s atheism is thought to be antithetical to the metaphysical contours of the latter’s 
“search.” Yet Percy argues that Sartre’s “atheism is ‘religious’ in the sense […] that the novelist 
betrays a passionate conviction about man’s nature, the world, and man’s obligation in the 
world” (“Notes for a Novel about the End of the World” 103). While Percy differs from Sartre in 
terms of his religious “affiliation,” he shares the French philosophers concern to explore 
narratively the “problem of the subject” (111). The existentialist sensibilities that Percy borrows 
and restylizes from Sartre center on the idea of an awakening consciousness, while also 
diagnosing the alienation caused by intercessory forces and bad faith. In fact, as Percy claims 
during his interview with Bradley R. Dewey, “Sartre’s version of existentialism [is] peculiarly 
suited to novel writing,” and Percy felt that Nausea was the prevailing novel for “translating a 
philosophy to art, to fiction. That was the first time I had ever seen it done.”289 The point is that 
the influence of Sartre’s philosophy—and European existentialism more broadly—upon Percy’s 
so-called post-Southern fiction is not a question of imitation so much as a variation upon a 
theme. From Sartre, Percy takes the existentialist sensibilities about consciousness and 
authenticity, repurposing them to respond to the felt exigencies of his historical moment. 
For example, while Percy restylizes Sartre’s central image of the subject awakening to 
itself, he also continues Sartre’s vexed attempts to reconcile that existentialist image of the 
subject with the competing aspiration to base a theory of consciousness upon the idea of 
intersubjectivity. In his famous 1946 lecture, “Existentialism Is a Humanism,” Sartre offers an 
                                                
288 Jay Tolson, “The Education of Walker Percy,” The Wilson Quarterly 8.2 (Spring 
1984):  165. 
 
289 Dewey, “Walker Percy Talks about Kierkegaard,” 296. 
  203 
account of the subject that speaks to the problem of whether the self-in-existential-crisis actually 
brings in “bourgeois subjectivity” through the back door. That is to say, Sartre responds to the 
Marxist charge that his existentialism is tailored to individual capitalist society at “the very 
moment in which man fully comprehends his isolation” (18). According to Sartre’s detractors, 
understanding one’s self as an autonomous, self-governing individual actually renders the 
existentialist “incapable of re-establishing solidarity with those who exist outside of the self, and 
who are inaccessible to us through the cogito” (18). Sartre responds to these allegations by 
clarifying why “our point of departure is, indeed, the subjectivity of the individual” (40).  He 
insists that his philosophical starting point, which in the mid-1940s runs counter to the historical 
materialism of the Marxist tradition, is “not because we are bourgeois, but because we seek to 
base our doctrine on truth, not on comforting theories full of hope but without any real 
foundation” (40). Sartre’s reference to “comforting theories full of hope” seems in the context of 
the essay to refer to dialectical history. In Marx’s materialist inversion of Hegel’s dialectic, 
history is structured according to the “antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes.”290 Yet 
this dialectical struggle also entails a kind of Utopian future for Marx and Engels, for a class-less 
and property-less society becomes the inevitable outcome of dialectical materialism.  
Furthermore, within this materialist tradition of thought, the production of history resides not in 
individual consciousness but in the material conditions of a historical world.   
For Sartre, in contrast, the Marxist dialectic is, “at the outset, a theory that suppresses the 
truth, for outside of this Cartesian cogito, all objects are merely probable, and a doctrine of 
probabilities not rooted in any truth crumbles into nothing” (40). The fact that historical-material 
conditions purport to precede consciousness is, for Sartre, both nonsensical and philosophically 
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unsupportable. Categories such as “history” and “material reality” are comprehensible only as 
concepts that derive from the certainty of consciousness. Therefore, the individual only “defines 
himself” after “he encounters himself” (22). By recognizing this fundamental truth, Sartre 
maintains that human beings are confronted with the fact that they alone are responsible for their 
actions. Only by “directly seizing” this truth of the self is one able to formulate authentic 
resistance to forces of oppression (22). 
However, after insisting upon the privileged place of individual consciousness, Sartre 
then pivots in “Existentialism Is a Humanism” to another facet of his argument which would 
become increasingly important in his later philosophy. In particular, Sartre argues that this 
fundamental positioning of consciousness does not imprison the individual within monadic 
subjectivity, as his opponents claim, for the moment in which “consciousness confronts itself” is 
actually conditional upon the perception of the existence of others (41). There are ethical 
ramifications for Sartre’s qualification, such as the fact that the existentialist’s responsibility for 
the self does “not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is 
responsible for all men” (23).  But pressing this ethical responsibility into an epistemological 
claim, Sartre maintains that his philosophical arrangement also imbricates the self and other, for 
the individual “who becomes aware of himself directly in the cogito also perceives all others” 
(41). In other words, Sartre argues that consciousness only becomes authentic—that the self is 
aware of itself—insofar as it recognizes the existence and freedom of other human beings. 
Therefore, according to Sartre’s postwar existentialism, self-determination occurs within the 
“intersubjectivity” of the world (42).   
Sartre’s response to his Marxist critics in “Existentialism Is a Humanism” signals a 
transitional moment in his career. His earlier work, such as Transcendence of the Ego (1936), 
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repudiates the Husserlian notion of a “transcendental ego”—the thinking ego that exists above or 
outside the objects that it contemplates—but Sartre nonetheless construes consciousness as 
reliant upon itself for being in the world. That is to say, Sartre’s pre-war philosophy centers on 
the phenomenological “problem of being,” and he attempts to avoid the hazards of solipsism by 
presenting the ego as itself an object of consciousness. While in his early work Sartre makes 
certain claims about the material world that abstractly prefigure his later concerns, the problem 
of intersubjectivity only begins to surface in his work toward the end of World War II. During 
the war Sartre read Alexandre Kojève’s Marxist interpretation of Hegel, and through Kojève’s 
influential arguments the French philosopher became increasingly interested in thinking about 
the ethical and political implications of existentialism. The foundations of this ethical concern 
are signaled in Being and Nothingness (1943), but the political import of Sartre’s philosophy of 
freedom is, at best, implicit in his opus. However, beginning with “Existentialism Is a 
Humanism,” Sartre’s postwar work attempts to reconcile systematically the tensions between his 
earlier existentialist construal of consciousness with Marxism. Sartre most explicitly articulates 
this project in Search for a Method (1957), which became the de facto introduction to Critique of 
Dialectical Reason (1960). 
The reconciliation between Sartre’s postwar Marxism and his earlier privileging of 
individual consciousness and authenticity creates a paradox that would become notorious among 
his readers. In 1955, for example, Sartre’s longtime friend and co-founder of Les Temps 
modernes, Raymond Aron, criticizes Sartre’s postwar turn as an “incompatible” union of 
Kierkegaard and Marx.291 Even Thomas R. Flynn, who is more sympathetic to Sartre’s project 
than most postwar American academics, concludes, “It is among the ‘revisionists,’ if at all, that 
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we must find the criteria for Sartre’s Marxism.”292 Flynn argues that the existential 
phenomenological perspective that Sartre preserves in later works such as Search for a Method 
ultimately distance him from the dialectical materialism that forms the centerpiece of orthodox 
Marxist thought. The point is that the majority of critics of Sartre’s turn toward intersubjectivity 
insist that his refusal to abandon his philosophy of individual consciousness undermines and 
complicates his postwar project. Indeed, Sartre’s later political project received significantly less 
intellectual purchase among American existentialists than his claims about freedom, authenticity, 
and the absurdity of existence. This selective reception of Sartre’s work began as soon as his 
explicit Marxist turn became apparent, and it was spearheaded by New York intellectuals such as 
William Barret, Philip Rahv, and William Phillips. During this phase of American existentialism, 
many of this group of writers and editors “worked to popularize central texts in existentialism, to 
evaluate its strengths and weaknesses, and to judge how well it responded to the spirit and needs 
of the age.”293 In fact, being attuned to the “spirit and needs of the age” prompted many of these 
intellectuals to reject the political agendas of Sartre, Camus, and de Beauvoir, while still 
refashioning existentialism to respond to that perceived “spirit.” Hannah Arendt, for example, 
argues in “What Is Existenz Philosophy?” (1946) that modern existentialism has its roots in the 
German tradition of Kant and Schelling, who establish “the autonomy of man.”294 The art critic 
and New York intellectual Clement Greenberg ambivalently explains the modified influence of 
the French movement upon his compatriots: “Whatever the affectations and philosophical 
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sketchiness of Existentialism, it is aesthetically appropriate to our age.”295 The felt need for 
philosophical avenues of individual action gave the early advocates of existentialism cultural 
equipment—and the intellectual capital of a European touchstone—to respond to the political 
and social angst they identified with the postwar moment.  
Apart from the New York intellectuals, other postwar American existentialists wrote 
about the movement for a wider audience and soon began to fashion a philosophical canon. 
Marjorie Grene’s Dreadful Freedom (1948) provided one of the first systematic “critiques” or 
elaborations upon existentialism. Suggesting how the movement might speak to the “aesthetic” 
or felt concerns of the age, as Greenberg would have it, Grene presents existentialism as “a 
brilliant statement of the tragic dilemma if not of man, at least of man in our time” because of its 
“relentless, even extravagant, honesty in the rejection of easy solutions or apparent solutions” to 
the anxieties of “modern man.”296 In 1956, for example Walter Kaufmann collected the 
influential anthology, Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre, which extends existentialism 
beyond France and also into literary terrain. (In addition to helping define and circulate 
existentialism in the United States, Kaufmann was also responsible for completing the first 
English translations of many of Nietzsche’s works.) Going even further, Hazel Barnes in The 
Literature of Possibility (1959) argues that many nineteenth-century American philosophers, 
such as William James, share the European existentialists’ “value of consciousness itself.”297 
                                                
295 Clement Greenberg, “Jean Dubuffet and French Existentialism,” in Clement 
Greenberg: The Collected Essays and Criticism, vol. 2, Arrogant Purpose, 1945-1949 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988), 92. 
 
296 Marjorie Grene, Dreadful Freedom: A Critique of Existentialism (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1948), 14. 
 
297 Hazel E. Barnes, The Literature of Possibility: A Study in Humanistic Existentialism 
(Lincoln, N.E.:  University of Nebraska Press, 1959), 171. 
  208 
These interpretations of existentialism within its philosophical context tended to stifle direct 
discussion among American intellectuals regarding its political radicalism. In the case of 
Barnes’s work, as Cotkin explains, she “attempted to steer existentialism away from its 
presumed pessimism toward a greater sense of possibility and individual responsibility, even 
flirting with optimism, themes that might be expected to resonate more deeply with American 
readers.”298 As William Barrett argues, in contrast to the “oversimplified picture of man” in 
Marxism, existentialism “attempts to grasp the image of the whole man, even where this involves 
bringing to consciousness all that is dark and questionable in his existence. And in just this 
respect it is a much more authentic expression of our own contemporary experience.”299 
These attempts by American existentialists in the 1950s to attune existentialism to the 
alienation and angst of their postwar moment often resulted in marginalizing Beauvoir’s and 
Sartre’s accounts of intersubjectivity along with their political programs. The idea receives no 
sustained discussion in the major American existentialist essays and texts of the 1940s and 
1950s, and indeed the French existentialists’ various political agendas—particularly their vocal 
criticisms of American foreign policy—are likewise elided from the presentation of 
existentialism. Many American existentialists of the 1960s undid this omission, however. On the 
one hand, the New Left frequently invoked Sartre in the movement’s criticisms of American 
imperialist intervention in Vietnam. For example, Jerry Rubin, the leader of the so-called Yippie 
faction of the New Left, referred to Sartre during a 1966 antiwar rally: “Sartre calls the Left in 
America ‘the accursed of the earth’ because of the difficulties it faces in this nation.” Following 
Sartre’s increasingly incendiary rhetoric, Rubin advises, “We must begin the politics of radical 
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alternatives.”300 On the other hand, the radical student movements of the 1960s found in the 
work of Camus, rather than Sartre, articulate form for its rebellious attitudes and activism against 
segregation and the Vietnam War.301 The generation that came of age in the 1960s had, as Tod 
Gitlin explains, “breathed the intellectual air of existentialism: action might not avail, but one is 
responsible for choosing. … [T]hey leaped to a paradoxical conclusion: that history was alive 
and open.”302 Another significant iteration of this activism centers on Simone de Beauvoir’s 
existentialism. While never gaining the kind of independent purchase among American women 
that Sartre gained among intellectuals and Camus among the student movements, de Beauvoir 
influenced these groups by way of other activists such as Betty Friedan. Indeed, as Sandra 
Dijkstra puts it, Betty Friedan’s landmark feminist study, The Feminine Mystique (1963), 
“translated” de Beauvoir’s argument in The Second Sex (1949) that women are socialized to 
accept an artificial “femininity” and, by extension, an oppressive confinement to domestic life.303  
These variations upon European themes suggest the heterogeneity of the place of 
existentialism within American life. Indeed, many intellectuals continued in the 1960s to engage 
principally with Sartre within the context of philosophical history—e.g., his relationship to 
Husserl, Heidegger, and Kierkegaard—rather than his decolonial and leftist writings of the 
1960s. The roots of existentialism within the soil of American intellectual and cultural life was 
thus both tangled and deeply established. It inspired political protest and abstract philosophical 
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inquiry; it informed sit-ins in the South and a short-lived interest in Heidegger among the 
American public and academic philosophers alike. Following in the tradition of American 
existentialists like Barnes and Barrett, many intellectuals in the United States during the 1960s 
continued to view existentialism as principally a philosophical avenue for exploring the problems 
of freedom, the absurd, and individual consciousness, while rejecting those elements of French 
thought that tend toward radical politics.  
The “sovereignty” that preoccupies Percy throughout his career is part of the tangled 
influence of existentialism within the cultural marketplace of postwar America. Indeed, Percy’s 
commitment to the existentialist tradition is unique among most of his contemporaries because of 
his attempts, much like Sartre, to construe authenticity and alienation in terms of “consciousness 
confronting itself,” but also by insisting upon the theoretical importance of intersubjectivity. As 
part of this project, Lancelot’s longing for a shared communicative order is, I have shown, 
fraught with problems. The protagonist of Percy’s The Last Gentleman (1966), Will Barrett, is 
similarly alienated from the world around him and obsessed with finding a communal home. 
Barrett, “dislocated to begin with,” moves to New York and is overwhelmed by the teeming 
possibilities around him. As such, Barrett “hardly knew who he was from one day to the next. 
There were times when he took roles so successfully that he left off being who he was and 
became someone else.”304 Barrett eventually meets the Vaughts, a Southern family living in the 
city so their son, Jamie, can receive medical treatment. Mr. Vaught invites Barrett to return to the 
South with them to “show [Jamie] how folks act” (79). Taking the invitation, Barrett eventually 
discovers that upon his return to life in the South with the Vaught family “I was no less 
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dislocated” (320). His philosophical ruminations and attempts to love one of the Vaught’s 
daughters are both abortive, and Barrett continues to be isolated from other people.  
The various failed attempts in Percy’s career to resolve the isolation of his characters 
through intimacy with other people suggests that his figure of the “sovereign knower,” despite 
the ambiguities that Percy identifies in his fiction, is the bone that the novelist continually 
worries. This vexed affirmation even surfaces in The Moviegoer, although almost all of Binx’s 
relationships seem trivial. Indeed, Binx’s ironic distance makes intimacy—and, more broadly, 
the recognition of the other—impossible, such that his “shit-searching” method becomes as 
much a part of the problem as it is a method for identifying and resolving his alienation. Much 
like Sartre’s attempts in “Existentialism Is a Humanism,” Percy calls attention to the deficiencies 
of Binx’s “search” by pointing to his blindness to others. This is especially vivid during Binx’s 
interactions with Mercer, the African American butler who has worked for the Bolling family for 
decades. In a moment of self-ironizing, Binx candidly admits his blindness toward Mercer: 
“Ordinarily it is hard to see him,” for the Bolling family “retains” Mercer for his services. 
Continuing this instrumental view of the man, Binx says that his “main emotion around Mercer 
is unease that in threading his way between servility and presumption, his foot might slip” (22).  
This confession exposes Binx’s stratified sense of the social order, in which class and race draw 
the distinguishing lines. Binx is less concerned with “seeing” Mercer—with sifting through the 
layers of social and racial conventions that impinge upon his consciousness—than with 
preserving the tenuous ecosystem of his Southern household. However, the fact that Binx is 
aware of his difficulties in “seeing” Mercer suggest his ambivalence about the racial structures of 
his domestic arrangement as well as his ironic distance. Binx nonetheless is unable to overcome 
this habitual oversight. He later divulges, for example, “Truthfully I do not know, and Mercer 
  212 
does not know, what Mercer really is” (50).  Binx explains that the conventions of Mercer’s 
relationship to the Bolling family—and, indeed, for African Americans living in the South—
mediate the two men’s knowledge of one another. Binx “does not know,” and across the course 
of the novel never knows, “what Mercer is.” The impersonal pronoun “what” suggests the extent 
to which the racial protocols and class etiquette of their society preclude intimacy and 
understanding:  that is to say, Mercer is a “what” for Binx, not a “who.”  
While Percy suggests that Binx’s failure to “see” others deepens his alienation and self-
absorption, the grounds for articulating that criticism of Binx’s search and his ironic distance 
nonetheless presuppose an ideal of unmediated consciousness. Like Aunt Emily, who 
“transfigures everyone,” the unreliability of Binx as a narrator comes through clearest when he 
fails to escape the social scripts that predigest his experience, whether of Mercer “the old 
retainer” or of his various love interests (49). Indeed, in a novel rife with anxiety about 
mediation, the only way for Binx to imagine authenticated consciousness is through an 
apocalyptic vision—a precursor to Love in the Ruins. This vision recurs to Binx after his final 
chiding by Aunt Emily. “For a long time,” he explains, “I have secretly hoped for the end of the 
world and believed […] that only after the end could the few who survive creep out of their holes 
and discover themselves to be themselves and live as merrily as children among the viny ruins” 
(231). Binx’s vision imagines that the survivors “discover themselves to be themselves” only 
after the destruction of social scripts and the impersonal authorities of the adult world. Binx’s 
catastrophe, like Lancelot’s, is a recuperation of innocence, but the other side of that return to 
childhood is that it amounts to an escape from social responsibility. Indeed, Binx presents the 
destruction of the world as a mechanism for consciousness becoming aware of itself (the 
survivors “discovering themselves to be themselves”), as if the present reality has to pass away 
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in order for the self to find its home. As such, the current social world is not sustainable as an 
ecosystem for the self. Binx hopes that such unspoiled self-realization is possible without the 
“ruins” of the world: “Is it possible that—it is not too late?” he asks (231). Like all of the 
existential questions posed in The Moviegoer, Binx shirks the burden of response and foists it on 
the reader.  
The ways that Binx approaches the threshold of recovering an authentic form of life but 
nevertheless remains within his alienation recalls the larger ambiguities that Percy explores 
throughout his career. The problems that Binx identifies with a liberal script regarding social 
welfare—its construal of collective national life as another form of consumption analogous to 
mass consumerism—undermines his attempts to find a collective sense of identity. Similarly, 
Tom More’s criticism of “liberal anxiety” and “conservative rage” leads him to abandon these 
partisan groups, and relative isolation is the cost of his psychological and existential recovery. 
Lancelot likewise fails to establish a shared communicative order, and he anticipates (probably 
without justification) leaving the “nuthouse” and retreating to the hills of Virginia alone to start a 
new “order of things” (3, 156). Yet individual sovereignty and self-reliance do not solve their 
alienation, either. Binx’s commitment to marry his “cousin” Kate, who is still emotionally 
unstable after the death of a former lover, is only another form of alienation:  he becomes a kind 
of cinematographer, directing her every move on a common errand (241-42). The moviegoer 
becomes the moviemaker, but the cost of that transformation is the sovereignty of another. The 
consequence of Percy’s exploration of these ambiguities is that the possibilities of structuring 
collective welfare appear to be worse than the existential disease they purport to alleviate. The 
best that Percy’s characters can hope for is that, as a local and temporary salve for their 
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alienation, they can become Tom More’s “sovereign wanderer,” the “lordly exile” whose 
isolation and angst are mitigated by the work of “watching” and “knowing” (383). 
Percy’s suspicions about the possibilities of a shared communicative order—the loss of 
the self that occurs when one gains the social world—gives articulate form to the felt crises of 
the postwar moment. The ambiguities of Percy’s communal aspirations suggest that losing the 
independence of the self is the cost one incurs by entering social space, by subordinating 
individual authenticity to collective welfare. Suspicions about such a cost preoccupy Percy’s 
work, and instead the reader is left in a liminal position, waiting as an “exile” for a new social 
world. As part of the “aesthetically appropriate” rise of existentialism, Percy’s exilic position 
perpetuates the struggle for individual consciousness that emerged as the principal route for 
resolving the postwar “malaise.” That is to say, while he explores how both social welfare and 
self-governing consciousness are fraught with problems, Percy nonetheless responds to these 
uncertainties by retaining the figure of the waiting exile. Percy construes the anxieties of the 
postwar moment, then, as a crisis of existence, where the “victims of the malaise” are “lost” to 
themselves by living at a distant remove from the burden of self-production. The individual is 
little more than the remainder of political calculation and the product of mass consumption. The 
sovereign wayfarer, on the other hand, has gained the self but lost the social world. For Percy, 
this vexed dilemma leaves the postwar individual in an uncertain existential struggle:  she is an 
exile from political programs and institutional formations—a pilgrim wandering the ruins of 
social space. 
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